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Navigating the stormy waters: How the South Caucasus Water Academics Network (SWAN) is furthering discussions on water diplomacy in the South Caucasus and beyond

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Source: Bliss

Water security in the South Caucasus region is under great threat. The three countries in the region, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, share the waters of the Kura-Aras River Basin with Iran and Türkiye (Turkey). The basin faces major water management challenges that can have a dire impact on the region’s water security in coming years. Third-party involvement in water diplomacy has potential to benefit the region greatly but also carries specific risks. In this blog article, Farhad Mukhtarov and Douwe van der Meer of the recently established South Caucasus Water Academics Network (SWAN) discuss the network’s upcoming activities and show how it will help address issues related to transboundary water cooperation and beyond.

The Kura and Aras rivers are the lifelines of the South Caucasus, traversing the region diagonally from Türkiye (also known as Turkey) to Azerbaijan, where they meet to drain into the Caspian Sea. The levels of the two rivers have dropped dramatically over the past decade and are set to decrease even more as a result of national water management practices that fail to consider the wider region’s water security.

Source: Shannon1, CC BY-SA 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0&gt;, via Wikimedia Commons

Several challenges can be discerned:

  1. Upstream dam construction

One major challenge for water availability, especially in downstream areas of the basin, is the construction of new water reservoirs (dams) in the upstream areas of two main rivers of the basin, the Kura and Aras. Some estimations (1) for example predict that the Kura-Çoruh Water Diversion is set to decrease the amount of water that flows from Türkiye, where the Kura originates, through neighbouring Georgia and Azerbaijan by at least 25%. Sakal (2) writes that the diversions of Kura river waters at Çoruh from the Caspian Sea Basin to the Black Sea Basin “means that the Government of Türkiye plans to divert 59.6% of the available volume of water in the Kura River, at the diversion”. Such major interbasin transfers may have a serious destabilising impact on downstream countries. Türkiye is also planning to construct a number of dams on the Aras River — a potential source of tension with downstream users Iran, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

  1. Downstream water abstraction

Besides upstream dam construction, water scarcity is being compounded by increased water abstractions downstream and by climate change. In Azerbaijan, the country through which the two rivers run through last before draining into the Caspian Sea, the total size of irrigated land has nearly doubled from around 1 million hectares in the early 2000s to 1,8 million hectares by 2019 as part of a plan to develop an agriculture-based economy. This has placed further stress on available water resources and their equitable distribution among citizens — an enduring global priority (SDG 6 for example calls for ensuring universal and sustainable access to water and sanitation). A recent World Bank Country Climate and Development Report for Azerbaijan indicated that if adaptation measures are not taken in time, crop production in the years 2051–2060 will drop dramatically (e.g. the yield of onions slashed by around 70%, of tomatoes by 60%, and of maize and potatoes by 50%) (WB, 2023). This would hit the bottom 40% of population (by income) the hardest.

  1. Climate change

Water scarcity in the region is also likely to further increase as a result of climate change through a combination of decreasing and less predictable precipitation rates and the melting of the region’s glaciers, which would lead to strong surface water run-off into the sea. This brings the increased risks of droughts and floods together with landslides in mountainous areas of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. On average, river flooding already affects 100,000 people in Azerbaijan annually — the most affected country in the region due to its downstream positioning. If unaddressed, the costs of these disasters to the government would surge to USD 251 million per year.

  1. Water pollution

Water scarcity aside, water quality is another problem in the region, as most of the sewage and industrial runoff flowing or discharged into the Kura and Aras is untreated. Although water pollution is a problem throughout the region, downstream countries struggle the most due to the absence of wastewater treatment facilities along the Kura and Aras rivers; most of the raw sewage and industrial effluents flow in these two major arteries of the region untreated, whereas Azerbaijan depends on these waters for domestic water supply and sanitation.

The need for transboundary water cooperation (and why it’s not working)

These challenges show the need for collaborative solutions. This cooperation has not been easy in past in the region fraught by ethnic tensions, separatist movements, military conflicts, and rivalries of major powers for influence (3). While cooperation on water management between the countries sharing the basin could potentially alleviate water management problems, they have cooperated only minimally so far. No multilateral treaty governs the Kura-Aras basin, and the countries of the basin have signed only few bilateral agreements inherited from the Soviet Union period (4).  The political situation in Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh and in the broader region moreover has been tense since the Second Karabakh War in 2020 and the ongoing Russia–Ukraine War, complicating current transboundary water relations.

Third-party involvement in water diplomacy

In light of these challenges and own motivations, external actors (those that are not part of the river basin) have become involved in water management in the South Caucasus. The EU has a strategic interest in the region traditionally seen as a “backyard” of Russia and Iran, with Türkiye also having a significant presence. For example, Türkiye and Azerbaijan have been in close cooperation, as recently manifested by the jointly prepared Karabakh Action Plan to revitalize agriculture in the region.

European Union countries consequently have a serious presence in the region (5) — both governmental and private sector companies from the Netherlands, Germany, and France are participating in water-related research, capacity-building efforts, and development projects. A big part of this presence is focused on helping Armenia and Georgia, countries committed to harmonising their water legislation with the European Union Water Framework Directive and other water-related directives, which include the adoption of new water management codes, the establishment of river basin management bodies, and the creation of participatory river basin management plans (6). The US also has a history of interest and engagement in the region, both geopolitically and from a developmental perspective; USAID has funded three projects on transboundary cooperation in the region in the past 20 years, with the latest launched in 2023 and to run until 2028.

Thus, third parties such as the European Union, USAID, and others have an important role to play in the river basins in the South Caucasus. While it is evident that these countries are active in the area out of self-interest, the impact of their presence can also be positive (e.g. enhancing dialogue, capacity building, and highlighting the attractiveness of the water sector for young professionals). Generally, external (or third-party) water diplomacy, both political and economic, has proven effective in fostering dialogue among participating countries and creating trade and economic ties that shift attention from resource sharing to benefit sharing(7). However, there are also complexities in this subject.

Short-term wins, long-term losses?

Indeed, third-party involvement in water diplomacy is not without risk (8). Powerful third-party donors, mediators, and development assistance partners may normalise unequal relationships in order to achieve tangible results such as basin agreements — a solution that may temporarily reduce tension but may backfire in the longer term due to the fact that arrangements have been forced from outside and without sufficient bottom-up trust-building and legitimacy. Such arrangements have been creating what has been called ‘negative peace’ for their tendency to create what seems to be peace on the short term while leading to greater tension on the longer term. This arguably happened in the Nile River Basin, where temporary diplomatic arrangements did not lead to a longer-term agreement among the riparian states involved in the negotiations (9). Instead, the situation escalated and is presently very tense.

Lastly, third parties also tend to prioritise technical cooperation and infrastructure projects, neglecting “soft” infrastructure such as trust building and information exchange; this perhaps has to do with the tangibility of technical cooperation and the challenges of institution building (10). This was one of the comments of the IOB, the Dutch Policy and Operations Evaluation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in its analysis of the Netherlands development cooperation work for water diplomacy between 2006 and 2016. As a result, it is important for water diplomats of third parties working in the South Caucasus to realise that efforts to build confidence, trust, and promote public diplomacy through cultivating scientific, cultural, and educational links between societies of conflicting riparian states (i.e. track-2 and track-3 diplomacy) are as important as technical infrastructure and expertise.

Another potential danger comes from the difficulties in balancing multiple and at times conflicting objectives that third parties may have, such as building/maintaining peace, providing development cooperation, seeking geopolitical gains (e.g. issue linkages) and promoting trade. These difficulties have been discussed in other contexts in detail, where third-party actors have engaged in economic and political diplomacy to the detriment of basin-wide solutions. For example, active US role in the Mekong River Commission has been linked to the lack of political will of China to join basin wide discussions. On the other hand, the difficulties that the Netherlands experiences in adjusting its export of water governance expertise and making it more socially inclusive suggests the inherent difficulty of the “win-win” scenario – both getting profits and helping partner countries (11).

The creation of the South Caucasus Water Academics Network (SWAN)

Academic and policy discussions and analyses of these complex dynamics is necessary both for increased security in the region and improved water diplomacy and management. This is important because there is little awareness both in the region and in European Union about the importance of water for economic and political stability in the region. It is also important because any meaningful change in water security will depend on the strength of bottom-up organic initiatives that emerge from the experts in the region themselves.

With this in mind, dr. Mukhtarov recently initiated the UNIC4ER seed funding project titled ‘Advancing EU Water Diplomacy in the South Caucasus’ in collaboration with the University of Oulu in Finland and the Koç University in Türkiye. UNIC4ER stands for UNIC for Engaged Research — an initiative of UNIC cities and universities to foster societally relevant research in a collaborative manner. The project sought to create a network of academics and practitioners from the region to collaborate on the issues of research and capacity building in the areas of water governance and diplomacy. You can read more about the project here.

Through this project, academic experts from all five countries of the Kura-Aras basin gathered in Tbilisi, Georgia from 3 to 5 April this year to discuss transboundary water relations and water diplomacy in the Kura-Aras basin. The workshop that took place in Tbilisi led to the establishment of the South Caucasus Water Academics Network (SWAN), which consists of regional water management experts and other experts on the topic of water governance from UNIC partner institutions. A follow-up meeting took place on 2 May in order to discuss the major outcomes of the inaugural workshop and to prepare for new events and activities. SWAN members will gather regularly to discuss follow-up activities such as writing joint grant proposals, supervising MA students, and conducting joint research, advocacy, and awareness raising. Two follow up events have already been planned and take place in June in the Hague.

Two upcoming network events

The first follow-up workshop is titled ‘The Water–Conflict Nexus and Diplomacy: The Case of the South Caucasus’ and will take place at the International Institute for Social Studies (ISS) in The Hague on 18 June 2024. This workshop, which includes panelists from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the US, and Kazakhstan, is the first event to connect the discussion on water governance and diplomacy in the South Caucasus with the broader debates around third-party involvement in (regional) water cooperation to promote global security and solidarity.

The second follow-up event is a conference panel titled ‘Third-Party Engagement in Water Diplomacy and Governance: The Case of the South Caucasus’ that forms part of the Third International Conference on Environmental Peacebuilding in The Hague. The panel will take place on 21 June 2024 and will enable discussion of the issues in the South Caucasus in the global context of water diplomacy, governance, and peacebuilding.

Through these two events, we hope to provide answers to some pressing questions and debates, including:

  • The links between water governance and water diplomacy in the South Caucasus (i.e. EU Directives and the standards they promote in Georgia and Armenia but not in Azerbaijan; donor dependency and public sector capacity in Georgia and Armenia; reform fatigue; the lack of trust among the riparian states to collaborate)
  • The nexus between water diplomacy and conflictwith a critical perspective on the role of donors (e.g. motivations of donors to fund projects given the multiple difficulties in the region)
  • The nexus between water diplomacy and energy resources/infrastructurewith a critical perspective on the role of donors (e.g. motivations of donors to fund projects given the multiple difficulties in the region)
  • Variation in how donors/third-party water diplomacy agents operateand in the agents themselves (who they are and how they operate); variation based on where they operate
  • Donor-dependency and donor-driven project landscapes of water governance and diplomacy in the region —issues and challenges (e.g. how to make impact sustainable beyond project timelines, how to make sure the power disbalances are not harmful in the longer-term, how to make sure there is attention to local communities and not only national level government specialists/experts/officials in projects with a strong regional focus)

The results of these two events will be discussed by SWAN members and will be published after the summer as part of the strategy of the newly established network to facilitate exchanges between scholars and practitioners working on water security in the region and to promote positive change.

Endnotes:

  1. Sakal, Halil Burak. “The risks of hydro-hegemony: Türkiye’s environmental policies and shared water resources in the South Caucasus.” Caucasus Survey 10, no. 3 (2022): 294–323.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Previous analyses have provided several reasons for the difficulties of transboundary collaboration in this complex context. See e.g. Campana, M. E., Vener, B. B., & Lee, B. S. (2012). Hydrostrategy, Hydropolitics, and Security in the Kura‐Araks Basin of the South Caucasus. Journal of Contemporary Water Research & Education, 149(1), 22–32.
  4. See Sakal (2022: 300) and Campana et al. (2012) above.
  5. Bilgen, A. and Mukhtarov, F. (2024) Selling Excellence: Hydrohubs and Policy Mobility in Neo-liberal World Order. In Edward Elgar Handbook on the Governance and Politics of Water Resources. Eds. Oliver Fritsch and David Benson. Edward Elgar. Forthcoming.
  6. E.g. https://www.oecd.org/environment/partnership-eu-water-initiative-euwi.htm
  7. Pohl, B., Swain, A., Islam, S., & Madani, K. (2017). Leveraging diplomacy for resolving transboundary water problems (pp. 19-34). Anthem Press, London.
  8. E.g. Mukhtarov, F., Gasper, D., Alta, A., Gautam, N., Duhita, M. S., & Hernández Morales, D. (2022). From ‘merchants and ministers’ to ‘neutral brokers’? Water diplomacy aspirations by the Netherlands–a discourse analysis of the 2011 commissioned advisory report. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 38(6), 1009-1031. Also see footnote no. 8.
  9. See Pohl et al. (2017).
  10. Ibid.
  11. See for example Van Genderen, R., & Rood, J. (2011). Water diplomacy: A niche for the Netherlands. Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, with the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Water Governance Centre. Mukhtarov et al. (2022) studies the report by van Genderen and Rood (2011) and provided an analysis of the challenges of the “win-win” and “neutral broker” modes of operation for the Netherlands in practice. These modes of operation are commonly used to reconcile the donor interest (e.g. the Netherlands’ interest in economic spin-offs) and donor needs (e.g. Indonesian interest in keeping Jakarta floods-free).

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the authors:

Farhad Mukhtarov

Farhad Mukhtarov is Assistant Professor of Governance and Public Policy at the International Institute of Social Sciences (ISS), Erasmus University Rotterdam and an Adjunct Senior Research Fellow at Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at National University Singapore. Mukhtarov’s research can be summarized in three broad themes: water governance, politics of knowledge, and theories of policymaking. Geographically, Farhad’s work has covered Western Europe, the larger Mediterranean, and Central and South-Eastern Asia. He currently develops research in the South Caucasus.

Douwe Meer

Douwe van der Meer is a recent graduate of Leiden University with a degree in International Relations. As an intern at Clingendael Institute, Douwe researched transboundary relationships around the Aras River’s management. Douwe is active as a freelance researcher, consultant, and tour guide in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia.

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From transferring expertise to co-creating change — the Dutch water sector needs a transformation

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The Netherlands Enterprise Agency (Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend Nederland) has spearheaded several stakeholder consultations within the Dutch water sector to discuss social inclusivity in the Netherlands-funded international water management projects. In this blog article, ISS researchers Farhad Mukhtarov and Karen Vargas, together with colleagues from Deltares, TU Delft, and IHE-Delft, discuss a recent participatory session they organized that sought to better understand ‘social inclusivity’ in the water sector. A key takeaway was that self-reflection about power dynamics among senior decision-makers and other water professionals in international water projects is crucial for making the water sector more inclusive, given the many challenges facing contemporary development cooperation.

Partners for Water, a programme managed by the Netherlands State Enterprise Agency (Rijsksdienst voor Ondernemend Nederland or RVO) to support governments around the world with subsidies and expertise on water management, organized an event titled ‘Social Inclusion in Water Climate Adaptation – Making a Transformation‘ (12 September 2023, Utrecht, the Netherlands). The departure point for this event was a broadly shared realisation that Dutch water sector parties have too often handled in a top-down fashion in international projects, displaying a condition that became known as on the pages of this blog as “polder arrogance” – a term coined by the project’s “Professor Poldergeist” (IHE-Delft, 2022). The workshop aimed to foster dialogue between academics and practitioners to promote social inclusivity in the designs and implementation of international water projects funded or delivered by the Dutch actors as an antidote to the abovementioned ‘arrogance’. As a group of long-term collaborators from Deltares, IHE Delft, and ISS/Erasmus University, we organised a session within the RVO event to discuss the transformative potential of the idea of ‘social inclusivity’ and what stands in the way of its materialisation. We aimed to create a safe space for open exchanges among diverse participants from government, advocacy groups, academia, and the private sector.

With this blog post, we aim to summarise the major topics of discussion from the workshop and offer our take-aways. We first revisit the session to invite a broader audience into the discussions about the transformative journey of the Dutch Water Sector (DWS), and then offer our reflections.

Reflexivity and humility require skills

During the RVO event, there were several plenaries, reflective exercises, and parallel sessions with panels on different subjects related to the activities of the Dutch water sector internationally. Some examples include a session on Dutch Water Authorities-operated “Blue Deal” programme on the “Valuing Water Initiative” spearheaded by RVO. In our session, we initiated a fishbowl discussion with Laura Caicedo, a recent MA graduate from the International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS/EUR), who discussed her research of an ongoing Water as Leverage project in Cartagena, Colombia, and Kim van Nieuwaal, a Dutch expert on water and climate adaptation involved in Climate Adaptation Services (CAS). Water as Leverage (WaL), as represented on the RVO website, is a Dutch-founded public-private partnership mandated with tackling urban water-related challenges such as floods and declining water quality.

We chose them to start a conversation that gave clues of what inclusivity means in Water Projects. We began by exploring the meaning of transformation in the DWS and the current state of ongoing effort, then explored the key actors in the effort to transform the projects towards more socially inclusive and finished with a discussion of key challenges and ways of transcending them.

We were positively surprised to discover a reflective stance of all participants regarding the necessity to be aware of power relations, including one’s relative power, in achieving a genuine transformation in how projects run. This is especially pertinent in relationships with the recipients of the Dutch aid, technology, or governance expertise. This self-awareness marks the initial step in recognizing actors’ positionality – how parties are situated in projects often define what can be shared and what not, how discussions take shape, and who is included or excluded from decision-making venues. For example, Caicedo’s example of a less-than-fortunate choice of a venue for a meeting with stakeholders in Cartagena – a fancy water-front expo centre, demonstrated how thoughtless choices may have great adverse consequences. Caicedo’s research showed that informal settlers and members of fishing communities did not feel welcome in such a venue and did not show up.

Willingness to be conscious of power relationships, including awareness of own power, also implies the challenge to be aware of power dynamics within one’s own team, to utilise and communicate knowledge differently, with more empathy, and to acknowledge local wisdoms and knowledges in ways that foster trust. Many of these actions require more than an attitude – they require new skills to critically listen, be mindful of own responses, and to cultivate reflexivity and curiosity in working with others.

The discussion on how to build and train these skills will continue in two forthcoming events, which some of us will organise in June: a workshop at the International Institute of Social Studies devoted to the roles, skills, and attitudes of foreign policy-makers in water diplomacy to be held on 18 June, 2024, and a conference panel titled “Third-Party Engagement in Water Diplomacy and Governance: the Case of South Caucasus” at the Third International Conference on Environmental Peacebuilding in The Hague on 21 June 2024.

Photo credit: Farhad Mukhtarov. The fishbowl session was led by Jaap Evers and Leon Hermans and was chaired by Shahnoor Hasan and Farhad Mukhtarov.

On the transformation journey

This session builds on earlier dialogues and seminars on rethinking the modus operandi of the Dutch Water Sector internationally. Such discussions have been motivated by evidence and growing consensus among academics and practitioners alike that the DWS parties often work through a one-sided transfer of knowledge and technology from the Netherlands to “recipient countries” and suffers from the lack of a meaningful dialogue in such projects despite continuous claims of proper participation, demand-driven project designs, and efforts for the sustainability of projects across time.

In 2018, the Center for Sustainable Development Studies from the University of Amsterdam UvA), Both ENDS, a Dutch NGO and civic advocacy group, and the Water Governance Group of IHE Delft organized the conference “Critical Perspectives on Governance by Sustainable Development Goals: Water, Food and Climate”, where discussions on Delta Dynamics and Global Challenges took place. This event was the first to engage with the sensitive subject of unequal and non-inclusive features explicitly and directly in water projects funded through the Netherlands Development Cooperation Funds. In 2019, the Netherlands Enterprise Agency (RVO) organized a follow-up event with insightful discussions and a very good end report circulated to participants. In 2021, the Partners for Water program hosted the fourth edition of the WATERPROOF event, focusing on transforming development cooperation and making social impact with it. These events, well attended and taken notice of by decision-makers, marked an important shift in the discussions on the Dutch Water Sector and its record of transformation and social inclusivity.

Unfortunately, despite these widespread discussions and initiatives by and on the DWS, a tangible structural shift has not yet occurred. Our session highlighted that while there are certainly more efforts on the part of the DWS to identify diverse groups to work with and to be inclusive, practical changes on the ground are too slow. It seemed to us that scepticism persists regarding the actual impact of transformative practices, with a real concern that sociocultural and governance complexities in project contexts often get overlooked or underplayed to sustain a certain modus operandi of the DWS parties.

Translating instead of transferring

“Sometimes the Dutch water sector looks at itself in the wrong way, or maybe too late… it is important to make changes in the way … how others are involved…. How to break the barriers and break yourself to be aware of your own position? How to transfer power to others?”                  

Anonymous participant

Examining the Dutch intervention internationally, the discussion touched on the need for senior decision-makers in concerned projects to be self-conscious about the power dynamics and difficulties in correcting, or at least couching, asymmetric power relationships in projects. We agreed that the DWS parties would benefit from reflecting on their role, breaking the barriers to open and clear communication with their partners, and transferring some of their powers to others to the extent that is politically possible. This is easier said than done, but luckily there are some examples that offer a possible way forward, such as Reversing the Flow (RtF) initiative, a project that supports communities in vulnerable situations by strengthening their water security and contributing to more resilient communities. Especially remarkable is the funding mechanism within RtF allowing some of the RVO funding to be given to NGOs in recipient countries in a way that surpasses Dutch private sector actors. Whether this works needs to be studied carefully.

The self-reflective approach of RtF underscores the importance of understanding power dynamics before and during negotiations, fostering reflexive discussions on resource constraints, and acknowledging the limitations of asymmetrical negotiations and working relationships. Self-reflection first needs to take place internally, among various parties involved in projects, and only then should be extended to cover partners in other countries. Earlier projects and some of the events we mentioned earlier in this post (by Both ENDS, IHE Delft, and RVO) indicate at the possibility of such a shift in the paradigm of inclusiveness provided continued effort and faith.

As an example, Wageningen University through the Centre for Development Innovation (CDI) had created manuals packing the conversation on social inclusivity in a kind of serial editions for transformation on paper. The consultancy-driven organizations tend to focus on restructuring policies to act on becoming diverse and expanding their work profiles into thematic areas such as nature-based solutions and social inclusion. The audience in our room considered that there is a gap between the scholarly work on transformations toward social inclusion and such work in practice.

Addressing unresolved challenges, our discussion uncovered the following barriers to social inclusivity of the DWS’s operations. First, our focus shifted to project assessment terms that prioritise tangible outcomes over long-term and trust-based relationships with the partners, for instance a piece of embankment that is strengthened, a flood risk management report, or a technology transferred. More intangible but crucial elements such as capacity, trust, and joint development of problem diagnoses often deserve less attention. If project outcomes and outputs are pre-determined and the managerial logic of projects push participants to focus on these deliverables regardless the context on the ground, it is not surprising that one faces little participation and dialogue and achieves little social impact.

Second, we discussed gaps in socioeconomic class, especially among those who represent project beneficiaries on the ground in Indonesia, Bangladesh, or Colombia and the beneficiaries of the projects. Involving the beneficiaries, such as the slum dwellers, the urban poor, and the fishermen communities in the discussions requires special project design, suitable designs for deliberation, and settings suitable for such groups, as the case with the meeting venue in Cartagena illustrated.

Finally, and related to the previous two points, we discussed the time constraints of the projects that have to be delivered within a particular timeframe and to reflect a particular pre-determined “theory of change”. As an overarching theme, the critical discussion centred on the top-down approaches of the ongoing projects, urging a shift towards more bottom-up solutions and away from the mode of “transferring” knowledge, expertise, or technology. Instead, we need to foster open-ended dialogues based on respect, curiosity, and critical listening. Then transferring will become translating, and both the Netherlands and recipient countries could be seen as “co-authors” of such works – a true shift from transferring expertise to co-creating change.

Photo credit: Farhad Mukhtarov. The participants joined a fishbowl, which is a facilitative technique to encourage a discussion. We have begun by asking about what transformation means for the DWS. What is the current point of the discussion and in what direction are the efforts taking effect?

Despite intentions for inclusivity, practitioners keep facing challenges in translating discussions into practical strategies. The Dutch Water Sector’s role abroad demands adaptation to diverse contexts, acknowledging that one-size-fits-all solutions are inadequate. While the Dutch Water Sector is making strides in prioritizing social inclusion in international projects, not all organizations are homogenously transforming. Applauding these efforts, we remain curious about the implications and requirements of this transformation, and we hope to see this conversation moving forward.

About the authors: Farhad Mukhtarov, Karen Vargas, Shahnoor Hasan, Jaap Evers and Leon Hermans.

Farhad Mukhtarov is Assistant Professor of Governance and Public Policy at the International Institute of Social Sciences (ISS), Erasmus University Rotterdam and an Adjunct Senior Research Fellow at Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at National University Singapore. Mukhtarov’s research can be summarised in three broad themes: water governance, politics of knowledge, and theories of policy-making. Geographically, Farhad’s work has covered Western Europe, the larger Mediterranean, and Central and South-Eastern Asia. He currently develops research in the South Caucasus.

Karen Vargas is a researcher with working experience in Colombia and Mexico. She is a political scientist holding a Master’s degree in Development Studies from Erasmus University Rotterdam, with a professional focus on public policies and governance. She has experience collaborating with research institutes, communicating results to international cooperation agencies, and fostering conversations with grassroots communities.


Shahnoor Hasan is a senior researcher and advisor at the department of resilience and planning at Deltares. Her work deals with issues of production of policies and dynamics of development cooperation from a perspective of water governance. One of Shahnoor’s research works on the Dutch Delta Approach in Vietnam and Bangladesh have generated heated and constructive debate in the Dutch water sector. It has pushed practitioners to reflect critically on their methods of exchanging delta knowledge and expertise with international partners, contributing to further discussions about social inclusion in international cooperation. With her work, Shahnoor opens-up discussions on what ‘good’ policies and practices are and stimulates rethinking about how different knowledges and ‘knowers’ can relate to each other and come together for sustainable and just development.


Jaap Evers works at IHE Delft since 2011. Starting of as lecturer in River Basin Governance, he currently has the position of Senior lecturer in Water and Environmental Policy as a member of the Water Governance department. His main research interests revolve around the departments research line Policy and Organizations. Jaap’s research interests revolve around policy implementation, and more specifically policy mobility, policy learning, policy -implementation- practices, and implementation feasibility in planning in the water sector.


Leon Hermans is Head of the Land and Water Management Department at IHE Delft, with responsibility for the department’s integral management and academic leadership. As Associate Professor of Environmental Planning and Management, Leon is also responsible for the Specialization of Environmental Planning and Management within the IHE MSc programme on Environmental Science. Leon Hermans combines work at IHE Delft with a part-time appointment as Associate Professor at TU Delft’s Faculty of Technology, Policy & Management. Prior to joining IHE Delft, Leon worked fulltime at TU Delft, where he also obtained his PhD degree in policy analysis, and at FAO at its headquarters in Rome, Italy.

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From ‘merchants and ministers’ to ‘neutral brokers’: how the Dutch do water diplomacy

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The Netherlands has been a leading participant in water diplomacy efforts due to a self-proclaimed water management expertise. An extensive discourse analysis of an advisory report finds that the Netherlands in framing itself as a ‘neutral broker’ pursues multiple objectives in its water diplomacy efforts. The article shows that these include much self-interest, and that this small nation’s mercantilist ambitions are alive and well. It also illustrates how to apply a linked series of discourse analysis methods to key policy texts in a way that is feasible for non-specialists.

Water diplomacy as a geopolitical tool

“An old cliché about who the Dutch really are – a mix of merchants and [religious] ministers – applies to foreign policy as well.” (Lechner 2008: 247)

Water conflicts loom large in the present world. Think about Israel/Palestine/Jordan, India/Pakistan, Turkey/Syria/Iraq, US/Mexico and conflicts in the Mekong and Nile basins. There are many more on a smaller scale. Water diplomacy seems to be the only solution to prevent bloodshed and ensure regional stability.

Two things are essential for understanding water diplomacy:

  1. There is no multilateral and universally accepted system in place to manage transboundary water conflicts and tensions. The two UN conventions (New York 1997 and Helsinki 1992) failed to build a global regime, although they partly succeeded in advancing some governance norms. This gave space for so-called ‘third-parties’ – states, NGOs, foundations – to try to mediate and resolve conflicts, including far away.
  2. ‘Third parties’ explicitly pursue self-interest when engaging in water diplomacy. This means pursuing the goals of enhancing their own international prestige and authority, facilitating exports of goods and services, and shaping global governance norms. Merrill Lynch and the Bank of America estimated that the water industry market could be worth US$800–1,000 billion annually by 2030.Water diplomacy is one of the areas where countries compete to get a share of that huge pie. They do so by promoting their own private sector through technical cooperation and also promoting their own image through promoting and using venues and mechanisms of conflict resolution. The Netherlands is one such country with global aspirations in the water sector, including water diplomacy.

In search of a ‘niche’ for water diplomacy

Third-party water diplomacy offers opportunities for the Dutch water sector. It may win a lot of good will internationally and especially from some powerful riparian actors if successful mediation or prevention of conflicts in transboundary basins occurs. In some cases of strategic importance, such as the conflicts in the Nile and Mekong basins, technical cooperation is an important element of transboundary cooperation through services such as dam construction and maintenance, flood early warning systems or extraordinary releases, and exchange of monitoring and water flow information. Setting up these systems can generate revenues.

Furthermore, there are indirect ways of wielding influence internationally — for example through setting global norms of ‘good transboundary governance’ that would be more accepting of private involvement or that would allow for an internationally-funded river basin organisation to play an active role.

Another possible pathway to influence is by promoting particular venues where transboundary disputes can be discussed, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the International Court of Justice, both conveniently located in The Hague. If these courts can wield authority over transboundary conflicts and the Dutch government has some influence over the two courts (by virtue of being a host country), then there is a clear interest for the Netherlands.

Analysing seemingly contradictory objectives

However, aggressive promotion of own self-interest in water diplomacy raises questions. The aims of helping achieve peace on the one hand and pursuing economic self-interest and geopolitical influence on the other may, at least in some cases, be conflicting. This observation led us to research how the acceptance of the Netherlands as a third-party actor in water diplomacy by the riparian parties as well as the wider international community can be furthered despite such seemingly contradictory objectives.

We looked at an advisory report (van Genderen and Rood, 2011) to the Dutch government on water diplomacy, from a key phase of policy reorientation, to find out how the Netherlands positions itself as a leader in water diplomacy efforts globally in relation to its objectives to benefit economically. We looked at the different rhetorical tools used in the report to manage the seeming contradiction by applying a series of discourse analysis techniques: 1) content analysis (word frequency tables plus collocations for key terms, showing the terms that accompany them); 2) text and argumentation analyses, following the approach of Scriven-Toulmin-Gasper (e.g. Gasper, 2000; Gasper and Roldan, 2011); 3) metaphor analysis in the formats by Schmitt (2005) and Steger (2007); and 4), growing out of the previous three steps, a  frame analysis using the WPR format developed by Bacchi (2009).

We used these methods in sequence. The content analysis helped in initial orientation and sharpening questions, the argumentation analysis investigated key sections in detail, the metaphor analysis explored then how the central issues are finessed, and the frame analysis synthesised the findings that emerged from the preceding stages.

Here are some of the things we found:

The Netherlands frames itself as a water diplomacy expert. The word “diplomacy” (152 counts) featured more than the word “conflict” (112 counts); “the Netherlands” (138 counts) was mentioned more frequently than the “UN” (86 counts). Also using collocation analysis and concordance analysis, we concluded that the report is not focused on a deeper understanding of the conflicts in specific river basins and ways of resolving them. Instead, its primary concern is the promotion of the Netherlands as a diplomacy agent with a specific ‘niche’.

The detailed text and argumentation analysis confirmed that there is an effort to establish the Netherlands as a credible, authoritative, capable and willing actor to be involved in conflict prevention. We examined the meanings communicated and the logic in the report’s ‘Conclusions’ section where it turns to recommendations for the Dutch government. There, the authors openly but carefully contradict the Minister of Development Cooperation (in 2011 this was Ben Knapen, now Minister of Foreign Affairs) and argue that the Netherlands is better suited to engage in conflict prevention than conflict resolution.

One of the possible benefits of this, along with smaller risks compared to mediation, is the larger role for the Netherlands water sector in all kind of activities that may go under ‘conflict prevention’. We also observed that the water engineering and management prowess of the Netherlands at home is treated as a prerequisite to engage in water diplomacy internationally – which is not self-evident.

Most importantly, neutrality is presented as a key enabler of the Dutch water diplomacy efforts. Using a metaphor analysis, we explored the report’s presentation of the Netherlands as a “neutral broker” in water diplomacy efforts. We looked at three key types of metaphors in the report – “neutral broker”, “conductor of an orchestra”, and games metaphors such as “win-win”, “zero-sum game” and “player” – and observed that the “neutral broker” metaphor (11 uses) dominated. This metaphor links from a source domain of business deals to a target domain of promoting peace (Kövecses, 2002). “Neutral broker” aptly hints at a desired combination of minister/preacher and merchant: a state that will act as an ”international hub”, “enabler”, “norm entrepreneur” and “mediator”, promoting peace (roles that are all suggested for the Netherlands in the report) while at the same time actively promoting its own country’s business.

Finally, we performed a frame analysis to synthesise findings and understand how the report frames the problem that it addresses, what solution it offers, and how this solution is legitimised. The earlier three techniques provide inputs and background to this. We use the format designed by Carol Bacchi called “What is the Problem Represented to Be?”. We found that the report produces three key effects of representation:

  1. The representation of attempted water conflict resolution as risky prompts a focus on conflict prevention. This steers the Netherlands’ external involvements away from conflict mediation towards a larger field with more economic opportunities, both technical and governance-related, namely conflict prevention.
  2. The perception that there are many developing countries in the world without technical knowledge and expertise in water governance and diplomacy leads to the promotion of Dutch assistance – with ‘economic spin-offs’ for the Netherlands.
  3. The presentation of the Netherlands as having a reputation for neutrality, which is foundational to use of the “neutral broker” concept, facilitates the efforts to secure its participation in water diplomacy.

Summary

The report that we studied framed the Netherlands as capable, neutral and willing to engage internationally (with partners in the Hague and around the world). At the same time, it implicitly framed the world (Global South river basins) as lacking expertise and in need of third-party mediation/involvement — hence the ‘niche’ for the Netherlands that has something to gain from such involvement. No serious engagement with counterarguments on these fronts was detected. The report’s orientation is in line with a business-oriented world order within which globally competing nations are there to uphold self-interest (in the competition between “Global Hydro-hubs”). The report seems to continue the historic trajectory of Netherlands’ foreign policy by combining its two paradigmatic roles: the “merchant” (pursuit of self-interest) and the “(religious) minister” (provision of advice and aid).

This post presents findings from our recent article in International Journal of Water Resources Development. The article is open access and can be accessed via the link.

References

Bacchi, C. (2009). Analysing Policy: What’s the Problem Represented to Be? Pearson Press.

Gasper, D. (2000) “Structures And Meanings – A Way To Introduce Argumentation Analysis In Policy Studies Education”. Africanus 30(1), 49-72.

Gasper, D., and Roldan, B. (2011) “Progressive Policy Framing: Kofi Annan’s Rhetorical Strategy for The Global Forum on Migration and Development”. African Journal of Rhetoric, vol.3, pp. 156-195.  https://repub.eur.nl/pub/77719

Kövecses, Z. (2002) Metaphor: a Practical Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lechner, F. J. (2008). The Netherlands: Globalization and National Identity. New York: Taylor and Francis.

Mukhtarov, F., Gasper, D., Alta, A., Gautam, N., Duhita, M. S., & Hernández Morales, D. (2021). From ‘merchants and ministers’ to ‘neutral brokers’? Water diplomacy aspirations by the Netherlands–a discourse analysis of the 2011 commissioned advisory report. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 1-23.

Schmitt, R. (2005). Systematic metaphor analysis as a method of qualitative research. The Qualitative Report, 10(2), 358-394.

Steger, T. (2007). The Stories Metaphors Tell: Metaphors as a Tool to Decipher Tacit Aspects in Narratives. Field Methods, 19(1), 3-23.

Van Genderen, R., and Rood, J. (2011). Water diplomacy: A niche for the Netherlands. Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, with the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Water Governance Centre.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the authors:

Dr. Farhad Mukhtarov is Assistant Professor of Governance and Public Policy at International Institute of Social Sciences (ISS), Erasmus University Rotterdam.

Des Gasper is professor of Human Development, Development Ethics and Public Policy, at ISS of Erasmus University Rotterdam.

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EADI ISS Conference 2021 | For the redistribution of water, framing matters!

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In the face of increasing pressure on global water resources, a degree of inventiveness in finding just and sustainable ways to ensure access to water is required. The redistribution of water is one possible way in which this could be done. But ongoing research on elite responses to a recent water scarcity crisis in South Africa shows that the redistribution of water resources will not go uncontested by water elites and that existing narratives on the sharing of water are not creating the extent of solidarity needed. We need to frame this action differently, writes Lize Swartz.

Water is intricately linked to development, both to ensure or improve people’s quality of life, as well as to help secure livelihoods such as subsistence farming. But increasing pressure on water resources due to a changing climate, as well as an increased demand for water, amongst others, is making it difficult to even sustain current access to water, let alone provide new access to populations that are not yet connected to formal water networks.

Millions of people around the world are still waiting for the moment they can turn on a tap and watch water gushing from it, to be able to flush a toilet, or to bathe under running water. In light of the need to keep an expanding access to water and sanitation facilities, but also with the realisation that less and less water is available per capita, new ways of thinking about ensuring access to water are needed.

‘Sharing is scaring’

During a recent panel session on inclusive development and water governance linked to the 2021 EADI ISS Conference, the likelihood of having to share water came up toward the end of the discussion. Emanuele Fantini[1] suggested that it’s not as straightforward as ‘sharing is caring’ when it comes to water, pointing to the many complexities that would affect the governance of water redistribution by using the term ‘sharing is scaring’. Joyeeta Gupta[2], one of the panel convenors, observed that it is likely that “there will be no win-win situation; it will be a win-lose situation” when it comes to sharing water. As one of the main challenges, she recognised the need to convince water elites of the necessity of sharing water.

My ongoing research on elite responses to water scarcity shows exactly how difficult it will be to get ‘buy-in’ from those who are able to share water: I  investigate the way in which elite water users navigated the collapse of three urban water supply systems in South Africa in 2016. With ‘buy-in’ I mean that those who have sufficient water agree to share it, provided that they still have enough water to meet their own basic water needs. ‘Elite water users’ in the context of South Africa can be considered those who either have water and sanitation connections within their own homes, or who have access to non-municipal water resources such as groundwater (through boreholes) that can replace or supplement municipal water.

Some of the preliminary conclusions of my research are that:

  • Basic water needs are different for different socio-economic groups in South Africa. For example, irrigating private gardens to ensure that lawns remain green and plants continue to grow may be considered a basic need by those owning gardens, but not by those without gardens. This may be linked to the pride that is taken in being able to maintain ‘life’ by tending to an urban nature.
  • The way in which water is used is closely linked to the socio-economic and cultural identity and status of water users; water is much more than a product linked to hygiene, for example – having abundant water is a reminder of a high standard of living and prosperity. Swimming pools, fountains, and running water in general is considered part and parcel of a ‘good life’.
  • Water is closely linked to emotional and mental health; having sufficient water creates a sense of peace and safety among water users, which turns into anxiety when the threat of water scarcity or shortages looms. My research found that retaining a sense of water security seems to trump other considerations that may inform how water is used and whether and how it is shared.

Allegations of mismanagement stand in the way of viewing water scarcity as collective problem  

In addition to the symbolic importance of water that moves beyond the idea of water needs as largely material, political factors may also affect the willingness of water elites to share water. My research found, for example, that specific interpretations of the collapse of urban water supply systems as being caused by municipal mismanagement and water losses through leakages in general may prevent water users from seeing water scarcity as a collective problem and responding to it in a similar way. Those who hold such views are unlikely to cooperate with local governments to ensure that those without water are helped out of own accord. My research also shows that water is hoarded by households out of fear of not being able to access it in the future and is mostly shared with those elites’ own social networks.

Also, in the communities studied, distrust stretches beyond the local level and is rooted in perceptions regarding the legitimacy and accountability of the national government. A certain level of mistrust is based on its perceived disability to govern in the interests of water elites, who in South Africa for the most part are also socio-economic elites. This also affects the extent to which water scarcity is considered a collective problem requiring collective action, similar to the above observation.

Capping the water use of elites?

Thus, ensuring elite buy-in of the need to redistribute water will not be a simple task. The sharing of water may involve the limiting of water use for elites by imposing a maximum daily or monthly limit (‘holding back’ water) and making greater amounts of water available for other water users who have used less water. Another example is the redistribution of groundwater by pumping it into municipal water tanks that are accessible to all. But limiting the water use of some households and not others is likely to cause dissatisfaction and perhaps even resistance.

What complicates matters further is that the amount of water used in informal urban areas is generally far lower than that of the amount used in formal urban areas – while the redistribution of water is likely to reduce the amount of water used by water elites, water use may not increase in areas where there are different water needs and priorities and where the majority of residents still share taps and toilets. This may thus not create the impression that water has been distributed more equitably so that everyone gets ‘more or less the same’.

The overall reduction of water on the other hand may be beneficial in countries like South Africa where the water supply is under severe stress. But convincing water users that it is possible – and desirable – to use less water will be a challenge.

In light of this difficulty, the redistribution narrative – and indeed a narrative of ‘sharing is caring’ – will need to be reconsidered. A reduction in the amount of water used by water elites that frees up water for a municipal ‘reserve’ may be achieved more easily if it is framed in light of the need for a water reserve to prevent the water scarcity and corresponding water use restrictions – the idea of ‘using less water now so that there will be water in the future’. This de facto would free up water that is needed elsewhere in urban areas. Elite water users may have to be convinced that limiting their water use will benefit them in the future, and that this sacrifice is worth making.

[1] Senior Lecturer in Water Politics and Communication at IHE Delft

[2] Professor of Environment and Development in the Global South at the Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research of the University of Amsterdam and IHE Delft Institute for Water Education in Delft

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.[

About the author:

Lize Swartz

Lize Swartz is the editor-in-chief of ISS Blog Bliss and a PhD researcher at the International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam, where she researches political dynamics of socio-hydrological systems. She is part of the newly formed Transformative Methodologies Working Group situated in the Civic Innovation Research

Are you looking for more content about Global Development and Social Justice? Subscribe to Bliss, the official blog of the International Institute of Social Studies, and stay updated about interesting topics our researchers are working on.