From possession to property: how the commodification of land affects youth participation in farming in Ghana

Posted on 0 min read

With the gradual transition from the customary possession of land to property ownership based on a capitalistic logic, customary lands in the Techiman[1] area in Ghana have been commercialised and are failing to fulfil their traditional role as essential stepping stone for the youth to initial economic independence. Gertrude Aputiik argues that, contrary to mainstream assertions of the youth being disinterested in farming, difficulty accessing agrarian resources (land) could be seen as the major cause of poor participation of the youth in farming.

Clearing of agricultural land for construction in Techiman, Ghana. Photo taken by the author in August 2020

‘Possession’ and ‘property’ are two categories of institutional systems linked to land ownership. While rules on land possession are often inaccurately equated with property rules, there is a clear distinction between these two types of ownership rights. Possession rules refer to those regulating the material use and yield of resources, production technologies, products, and waste (Gerber and Steppacher 2017). In contrast, property rules are linked to property ownership and titles that enable land markets and credit transactions of land (when used as collateral). Property can be seen as the core institution of capitalism and as its institutional driving force (Hodgson 2015). This point has also been made by Hernando de Soto (2000), one of the most influential defenders of formal property rights, who said that for a modern property system to be fully operational, it must form a unified institutional system at the national level.

Thus, while both can be actualised in parallel – a plot of land for example can be inhabited (possessed) and at the same time used as collateral (owned as property) – the potential of property as financial asset to safeguard financial security strongly affects (non-)adherence to customary logics. More and more land is commercialised and traded, and customary land is declining. However, contrary to the belief that property ownership will automatically have beneficial effects, this transition to land ownership linked to market transactions seems to work only for a few powerful groups and individuals who are able to pay for land at market prices. Others are struggling to navigate this unequal system, including youths in Ghana.

In Techiman in Ghana, the reinterpretation of customary norms has led to a transition to property of Stool[2] lands that were hitherto managed following logic of possession based on the material use of the land. Rapid urbanisation in Ghana has led to increased demand for land; as a result, a widespread conversion of agricultural land into land for commercial use can be observed.

As part of my research on the commodification of land in peri-urban Techiman and its implications for youth participation in farming, I interviewed youths in Techiman in 2020. I observed that youths are struggling to get access to land despite their readiness to pursue farming on a full-time basis. In an interview, one of the youths described their plight:

“Since lands have become more and more costly, we have had no other choice than to move out of the town to work and pay for the small farm lands we can afford. It is also difficult to cultivate food crops these days, since landowners now demand that we cultivate cash crops on their farms.” (young male farm tenant, Techiman, 13 August 2020)

Beyond the high costs of land, the extract above also highlights the extent to which young farmers have limited agency in pursuing farming activities. Farming to them has now become just another opportunity to sell their labour power for survival and it is almost impossible to even decide the “when”, “how” and “what” of farming. Based on this finding, I argue that, contrary to mainstream assertions of the youth being disinterested in farming, difficulty accessing agrarian resources (land) could be seen as the major cause of poor participation of the youth in farming. This is the basic reason explaining why many of the young agriculturalists in the Techiman area are tenants with only limited farming rights.

The scholarly debates on customary land tenure in Sub-Saharan Africa in many ways have revealed the intensification of land commodification in peri-urban areas (Akaateba 2019). However, an elaborate analysis of the different transitory phases of this process is missing. One of my research objectives was to fill this gap by identifying some of the key phases in the transition from customary norms – possession – to market procedures in Techiman – property. In my findings, I identified four stages in the commodification process (Figure 1). The first stage corresponds to a fully customary system (no link to land markets). Gradually, chiefs started renting out lands in exchange for money (second stage). In the third stage, there is a shift from renting out lands to the outright sale of lands, albeit with no property titles, so informally. The final stage refers to the full commodification of land.

Operations under a property-based logic suggest that buyers would not only assume full ownership of lands, but also that they are entitled to use these lands as collateral for obtaining credit. A commodified system is strikingly unfavourable to smallholders. Unable to compete with wealthy farmers and entrepreneurs, smallholders are often prevented from accessing communal lands. My observations thus echo Frans Benda-Beckman’s critique of de Soto, who said:

“That formal property rights and free market for it to circulate under conditions of great economic and political inequality should work to the benefit of the poor is wishful thinking to me. I think that it is scandalous that the political aspects of property and the issue of redistribution are so downplayed [by de Soto].” (Von Brenda-Beckmann, 2003: 190)

In Techiman, the transition has not (yet) reached the final stage of a full commodification; yet, it is clear that the commodification process is already threatening the livelihoods of young farmers. Some authors have argued that even under a fully customary system, youth access to land has been impeded by the customary structure of land ownership, basing their argument on the fact that access modes such as inheritance only favour indigenous youths (Kiddido et al., 2017). While this indeed presents a challenge to the youth that has no access rights in any landholding family, customary landholding arrangements in which there is equal access rights could represent an egalitarian possession-based land system that provides more just and secured farming livelihoods for the youth.

The author wishes to thank Julien-Francois Gerber for his comments on an earlier version of the post.

Footnotes

[1] The case of Techiman is unique in many ways. Predominantly occupied by youth farmers and a small rural population, the region still remains the largest producer of Ghana’s food and cash crops. It is also widely known for the presence of what is believed to be the biggest market in West Africa. Customary lands, called Stool lands in the Techiman area, served as essential building blocks for the youth to start an independent economic life.

[2] They are called “Stool lands” because chiefs who are custodians over communal  lands,  sit on specially carved stools as a symbol of chiefly authority.

References

Akaateba, M.A., 2019. The politics of customary land rights transformation in peri-urban Ghana: Powers of exclusion in the era of land commodification. Land Use Policy, 88, p.104197.

De Soto, H., 2000. The mystery of capital: Why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails everywhere else. Civitas Books.

Gerber, J.F. and Veuthey, S., 2011. Possession versus property in a tree plantation socioenvironmental conflict in Southern Cameroon. Society & Natural Resources, 24(8), pp.831-848.

Kidido, J.K., Bugri, J.T. and Kasanga, R.K., 2017. Youth agricultural land access dimensions and emerging challenges under the customary tenure system in Ghana: evidence from Techiman area. Journal of Land and Rural Studies, 5(2), pp.140-163.

GSS (2013) Ghana in figures. Accra, Ghana. Available at : https://eros.usgs.gov/westafrica/land-cover/land-use-and-land-cover-trends-west-africa (Assessed : 6 April, 2021)

Opinions do not necessarily reflect the views of the ISS or members of the Bliss team.

About the author:

Gertrude Aputiik is a graduate from the Agrarian, Food and Environmental Studies major at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS). Her research interest lies in areas of Political Ecology, Post-development studies, and Degrowth.

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The bitter aftertaste of chocolate: why Ghana’s cocoa farmers are struggling to adhere to sustainable cocoa production standards by Adjoa Annan

Posted on 4 min read

Prompted by demands from consumers to know where the chocolate we eat comes from and how it is made, companies producing chocolate are increasingly investing in measures such as certification schemes and company-driven sustainability initiatives in an effort to make chocolate production more transparent and sustainable. However, cocoa farmers in Ghana are struggling to adhere to environmental standards for more sustainable cocoa production practices. Adjoa Annan explains why.

Consumers are more interested than ever to obtain information about the sustainability of cocoa beans, one of the main ingredients of chocolate, including the way in which it is sourced. At the farm gate level, where the sourcing of raw cocoa beans begins, Sustainable Cocoa Production (SCP) is increasingly promoted through the implementation of certification programmes and company-driven sustainability initiatives. These programmes attempt to enhance process quality through farmers’ adoption of production practices that focus on reducing environmental harm and including social considerations, such as paying a fair price for raw cocoa.

However, efforts to ensure SCP have been largely compromised by a lack of transparency and accountability of certification auditing systems [1] [2]. What is less known are the effects of undesirable incentives for cocoa farmers and a low level of knowledge transfer on their ability to ensure SCP. This article seeks to explain some of the barriers cocoa farmers face in adhering to environmental standards prescribed by the certification schemes they are subscribed to.

One objective of my PhD research on quality enhancement in Ghana’s cocoa sector is to examine how cocoa buyers control and promote process quality at the farm gate level. Two communities were selected for this study from the Adansi South and Amasie West districts in the Ashanti region, which accounts for one of the largest cocoa-producing regions in Ghana. Within the various cocoa-growing communities, different Licensed Buying Companies (LBCs) purchase cocoa beans. LBCs employ a purchasing clerk(s) who buys cocoa beans from farmers.[1]

For the purpose of the study, an LBC which implemented the UTZ certification scheme and a cooperative supplying cocoa beans through an international chocolate brand’s label that adopts Fairtrade principles into its sustainability programme were studied. Purchasing clerks, inspection officers facilitating the auditing of farms, and farmers enrolled in both UTZ and Fairtrade programmes were also interviewed. By using in-depth interviews, participant observation, and farm visits, training regarding the UTZ and Fairtrade environmental best practices and factors on farmers’ adoption and non-adoption of best practices were examined.

Empirical observations revealed some challenges compromising effective SCP. Farmers were not effectively trained on the UTZ and Fairtrade environmental best practices. In the case of the international chocolate brand studied, farmers were seemingly sporadically trained on Fairtrade best practices once or twice a year, during cooperative meetings. The LBC that implemented the UTZ certification scheme organized training for farmers only once annually. In both cases, group trainings held in classroom venues were not suitable for explaining certain best practices that demanded on-farm demonstrations. This led to farmers’ poor understanding and implementation of environmental best practices on farms.

Farmers enrolled in both certification schemes noted that they struggled to understand technical topics presented in training, especially related to agrochemical use, health and safety issues, and water and waste management. Consequently, some farmers did not properly adopt best practices such as removing rubbish and agrochemical bottles from farms and wearing safety clothing. Some farmers also struggled to understand the required measurement of agrochemicals.

Aside from poor training, farmers noted that adopting all environmental best practices was time-consuming. Low-price premiums paid to farmers served as a disincentive to adopt best practices. Farmers complained that the premiums received for enrolling in certification programmes were not sufficient to warrant their efforts[2]. These factors led to a low adoption rate on Fairtrade and UTZ certification environmental best practices. However, interviewed farmers felt that a premium increase and access to frequent on-farm training could enhance their efforts to adhere to sustainable production practices [3].

Overall, SCP was not effectively promoted in the various studied communities. Cocoa buyers did not seem to invest enough in the sourcing communities where they buy cocoa beans. In order to achieve sustainable chocolate, there should be an increased engagement of farmers to enhance the quality of cocoa bean sourcing processes. The needs of farmers should also be addressed to ensure cocoa farming as a sustainable livelihood. At present, this is not happening, which is leaving chocolate with a bitter aftertaste.

[1] In one of the studied communities, for instance, five different LBCs and nine different purchasing clerks were buying cocoa beans from farmers. There is competition over cocoa beans among purchasing clerks.

[2] As at 2018, the premium received by UTZ and Fairtrade farmers interviewed for this study in the studied communities was 1.4 USD and 1.6 USD, respectively per the standard 64kg bag of cocoa beans.

References
Fountain, & Hütz-Adams. (2015). Cocoa Barometer – Looking for a Living Income. Cocoa Barometer, 42–43.
Fountain, A., & Huetz-Adams, F. (2018). Cocoa Barometer.
In-depth interviews with farmers during data collection from July 2017 to March 2018 in Aponapon and Subiriso communities, Ashanti region, Ghana.

adjoa annan.jpgAbout the author:

Adjoa Annan is a PhD candidate at the Center for Development Research of the University of Bonn, Germany. Annan completed a Master’s degree in Development Studies at the ISS.

Bewitched, bothered and bewildered: a study of witchcraft accusation in Northern Ghana by Issah Wumbla

Posted on 6 min read

Witchcraft accusation and consequent banishment that still persists globally can be viewed as a form of violence against women and children. While it is believed that women are accused of witchcraft mainly due to their socio-economic status, an intersectional analysis of witchcraft accusation in Northern Ghana shows that other factors also contribute.

Could you imagine justice depending on the posture of a dying chicken? Such is the case of determining who is a witch in the witch-finding shrine at Gambaga. In the court of the god (judge), both the accused and the accuser present a live chicken to be used for the ritualistic trial process by the priest. If the slaughtered chicken lies on its breast as it dies, then the accused is guilty. If the chicken lies on its back with wings spread upwards, then the accusation is false.  This is what a partial observer of the of the witch trial process at the Gambaga witch-trying shrine might think. Believe it or not, witchcraft accusation and consequent banishment persists globally and can be viewed as a form of violence against women and children. However, the means of identifying a witch can be ridiculous as the one explained above.

While it is believed that women are accused of witchcraft mainly because of their gender, an intersectional analysis of witchcraft accusation in Northern Ghana shows that other factors also contribute. Ongoing research on the phenomenon of witchcraft accusation and banishment of women suspected to be witches indicates that the interaction of multiple identity categories such as gender, socio-economic conditions, age, or institutional practices influences the process of witchcraft accusation and subsequent banishment.

The call for the achievement of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls, and the elimination of all forms of violence and harmful practices against women as stipulated by the Sustainable Development Goal 5 could not have come at a better time. At present, violence against women has assumed rather subtle forms, sometimes passing by unnoticed. Witchcraft branding and the banishment of alleged witches from their communities to seek refuge in witches’ camps, as is still practiced in Northern Ghana, is one such a subtle form of violence against women that requires the attention of scholars and policy-makers alike.

Understanding the phenomenon however, requires investigating it in a more nuanced and pragmatic manner than just considering it as old women’s issue that demands legal and or policy attention. An analysis of the way in which gender intersects with other statuses of power and how the daily struggles for dominion and control over socially valued resources between women and between women and men is vital. My resent research paper titled “Condemned without hearing”[1] provides an intersectional analysis of how gender interacts with age, and socio-economic conditions to contribute to the branding of some women as witches and the practice of banishment.

The research was conducted in the at the Gambaga Witches’ camp[2] and Gbangu in the East Mamprusi District of the Northern Region of Ghana. The study sought to find out how the social positioning of women contribute to discrimination against them in context of witchcraft accusation and exiling of suspected witches. Based on the objective, I did a mini survey on the socio-demographic characteristics of the inmates of the Gambaga witches’ camp and interviewed fifteen of them. The manager of the Presbyterian Go Home Project was a key informant. The interview questions were centered on their experience of accusation and the accusation process. The interviewees provided insights into the social values and structures that influence beliefs and practices in communities, as well as women’s own life experiences and strategies in coping with their situation. Fifteen people from the Gbangu community were also interviewed. Gbangu is a nearby community to Gambaga where the belief in witchcraft was common. These interviews and survey were conducted within a two month’s (mid-July to Mid-September 2017) field work.

Factors affecting witchcraft allegation

The findings are fascinating. Firstly, the study showed that gender is a major social category that influences witchcraft accusation. Women’s susceptibility to allegation is not due to their gender per se. However, their vulnerability emanates from the constructed roles and expectations of women and men. Some practices that are imbedded in some institutions locate some women in lower status of power, making them experience witchcraft allegation and its associated violence differently as compared to men and other women.

Secondly, socio-economic conditions of women contribute to witchcraft accusation. Both relative success in economic ventures and poverty make women the target of witchcraft accusation. The differences between the relative well-off women and the poor in relation to accusation is that those economically well off are also located in other social categories of higher status of power that work to their advantage amidst accusation whereas the poor women are usually located in other categories of low status of power making their experience of accusation and oppression different.

Thirdly, old age usually coupled with the status of widowhood and poor family backgrounds has proved crucial for the understanding of women’s vulnerability to witchcraft branding and exiling. Most of the women surveyed were widows and attested to being affiliated to and dependent on poor family members; as a result, they were defenseless when accused.

Fourthly, there are three levels of decision-making in witchcraft accusation within the accused community thus; at the family, the clan, and community chief’s level. Before reaching the witch finding shrine at Gambaga, leaders of at least one of these levels would have decided or been consulted. And at all these levels, the interactions of all the categories mentioned above influence the decision-making process. Having strong connections such as influential children, affiliation to royalty of good standing, being economically self-dependent as well as a lack of them influences the final decision regarding accusation. These apply to the process of accusation since it is related to the decision-making process.

Concluding remarks

Intersectionality and power relations (Foucauldian power/knowledge)[3] help in our understanding of how the locations of some women accused of witchcraft in multiple social categories (gender, socio-economic conditions, and old age) make their experiences of accusation different than others because the interactions of such multiple identities can mutually strengthen or weaken each other. The concepts also help in the making of meaning in the decision-making process and the process of accusation itself in witchcraft allegation.

Overall, gender, socio-economic conditions, and old age are key factors that influence accusation and related treatment. However, one of these categories or statuses of power considered in this research standing alone is inadequate to explain women’s susceptibility to witchcraft allegation and its related violence. Being placed differently in multiple statuses of power makes women´s experience of violence different from one individual to another. Depending on how many of these categories an accused person belongs to, a woman could be less vulnerable, more vulnerable, or not vulnerable at all. The interactions of gender with socio-economic conditions and age, and their embeddedness in institutions and structures in the accused original communities, influence the processes of accusation and decision making regarding suspected witches.

In general terms, I am convinced this can apply to other forms of violence against women. So, policies and programs aimed at curbing violence should consider the differences in women as starting point for analyzing such phenomena and how they should be addressed. Measures aimed at addressing violence against women might fall through the boundaries at the intersections of the various categories of power and gender related to the problem in context.

[1] Wumbla, I. (2018) ‘Condemned without Hearing: An Intersectional Analysis of the Practice of Branding, Banishing, and Camping of Alleged Witches in Northern Ghana’, ISS Working Paper Series/General Series 633(633): 1-51.

[2] Gambaga is the is the capital of the East Mamprusi District. The camp is in the middle of the town and serves as a refuge for accused witches who are banished from their communities.

[3] Sawiwki, J. (1986) ‘Foucault and Feminism: Toward a Politics of Difference’, Hypatia 1(2): 23-36.

Winker, G. and N. Degele (2011) ‘Intersectionality as Multi-Level Analysis: Dealing with Social Inequality’, European Journal of Women’s Studies 18(1): 51-66.

Image Credit: African Gender Institute/Groupuscule

About the author:

Wumbla Issah holds a Master of Arts in Development Studies-Human Rights, Gender and Conflict Studies: Social Justice Perspectives, a Bachelor of Arts in Social Work with Political Science from the University of Ghana and a Diploma in Basic Education from Gbewaa College of Education. He has has varied research interests in gender issues and development, Child rights, youth and development, educational policies, and social justice. He is a professional teacher and social worker with experience in Teaching, Community Development, and Human Rights Advocacy.

The role of the media in promoting water integrity: the case of Ghana by Abdul-Kudus Husein

Posted on 7 min read

Ghana’s water utilities are undermined by corruption, impeding the ability of millions of Ghanaians to access safe water resources. The media can play an important role in pushing back corruption in several ways. But often, the media’s potential as watchdog is not fulfilled. This article highlights the key challenges that the Ghana’s media sector faces and argues that it is not likely to ensure greater water integrity without support from the government, the private sector, and civil society.

It is 6am on a Saturday morning and Charity Abiamo, a street vendor of oranges, is on a daily mission with her three children to find water. Charity and her children live in Abofu, an informal settlement situated between Achimota and Abelemkpe in Accra, Ghana’s capital.

Charity leads the way in the alleys of Abofu carrying a black plastic container, with her one–year-old child strapped to her back whilst her two other children follow her carrying two yellow jerrycans known as ‘Kuffour gallons’. These yellow one-gallon containers, which have become a symbol of the water shortage in Ghana, were named after the country’s former president, John Agyekum Kuffour (2000–8), under whose rule Ghana experienced a severe water crisis.

The journey from Charity’s home to the source of drinking water, a large drainage channel connecting to the Odaw River in Accra, takes between 10 and 15 minutes. As Charity arrives, other families are already at the Odaw drainage channel, stretching over the edge with their containers to collect water from an overflowing algae-infested pipeline. Charity claims she uses the water for cooking, drinking and washing, despite the water not being treated considering the lack of suitable and safe alternative water sources.

Accra’s water problems

Accra, Ghana is a fast-growing urban area that is facing considerable planning challenges including access to clean water owing to its rising population. With a current total of 4 million, the city’s population is expected to double by 2030, further compounding the water situation as illustrated by Charity.

Water supply to urban populations in Accra is assigned to the Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL). Water is provided for inhabitants of these regions using a piped rationing system managed by the GWCL. Additionally, there are private tanker services to provide water to areas that are not served by the GWCL. Despite these measures, both high and low income earners in Accra still face a great challenge in accessing water. High-income earners in areas with piped water connections even purchase large water-storage vessels, such as the ‘poly-tank’, to store enough water to last them a week or more. Those in the low-income bracket rely on small, unhygienic storage systems and informal vendors such as the water-tanker services, community standpipes and boreholes for their daily use.

Poor integrity contributes to water woes

In an article published by Bloomberg, Moses Dzawu (2013) argued that many of the GWCL’s problems can be attributed to weak and outdated pipes, which fail to support the mass production and distribution of water to certain parts of the capital, as well as poor management, a lack of transparency and accountability, and corruption.

Similarly, Peter Van Rooijen (2008) maintains that corruption, together with a lack of transparency and accountability, is a key challenge hindering the GWCL’s effective operation. Corruption in the water sector in Ghana takes many forms, from misappropriations of huge sums of money to illegal connections and consumption of water. Indeed, stories of corruption have always dominated the media space in Ghana.

The link between media and integrity

The media, along with other agencies, plays an important role in corruption detection and promoting transparency and accountability in the water sector. Scholars argue that Ghana’s media has contributed largely to the country’s democratic efforts by holding the state accountable, promoting citizen education and participation, and monitoring state institutions.

In fact, in 2001, the media, together with the Integrated Social Development Centre (ISSODEC), successfully opposed a World Bank-backed project to fully privatise the GWCL. This effort was largely carried out through increased media reportage, in order to educate the public on the dangers of such privatisation (Amenga-Etego and Grusky 2005: 275).

The media is widely regarded as a defence against abuses of power; excessive politicization of national matters in the Ghanaian media is therefore very worrying. The lack of coverage and at times biased coverage on corruption or lack of integrity show that there is still a way to go before the media plays its potential role of encouraging and catalysing change within the water sector.

Challenges for the media on water integrity

The Water Integrity Network (WIN) supports and connects partners, individuals, organisations and governments promoting water integrity in order to reduce corruption and improve water-sector performance worldwide. In its Water Integrity Global Outlook 2016, it maintains that in order to fight corruption in the water sector there is a need for people to first recognise that corrupt practices exist. Local and national media both have an important role to play in bringing issues of corruption to the attention of civil society, the public and policymakers, to ensure that action is taken through policy or advocacy.

Several things come into play here: first, ownership of the media can play a role. The question of whether the media is independent or state-owned influences the extent to which it can be critical about the level of corruption in state institutions. State media tends to be less critical of government institutions, whilst the private media will most likely be more critical.

Furthermore, the amount of resources available to journalists may influence how effectively the media is able to act as a watchdog in fighting corruption. Ghanaian reporters are often poorly paid, under-resourced and lacking in training. As a result, journalists in Ghana find themselves susceptible to bribery and self-censorship.

Aside from low salaries, the Ghanaian media also suffers from weak capacity. There is a lack of adequate training and mentoring for thousands of journalists in the country in general and in specific the water sector, even though some donor organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have attempted to train reporters. Most of these attempts have, in fact, been frustrated by a lack of commitment from the journalists themselves.

The social media debate

Social media presents opportunities as well as challenges for the future of the news media in promoting integrity in the water sector. It offers many people new ways of networking, and of sharing and receiving information outside of the mainstream media such as TV, radio and newspapers.

Social media can serve as a mechanism to ‘name and shame’ corrupt officials and share information on corruption using blogs and corruption-reporting platforms such as ‘I PAID A BRIBE’ by the GII in Ghana. This online platform helps to collect anonymous reports of bribes paid, bribes requested but not paid, and bribes that were expected but not forthcoming.

Looking ahead

The watchdog role of the media does not end at producing information about misbehaviour, but also concerns how that information is used to hold people accountable for their actions. A government must know that people want responsiveness and wish to hold those in power accountable for their actions. A country’s media is likely to have a minimal effect on corruption if it tows the political line or fails to obtain the necessary support from the government, the private sector and civil society.

If the UN’s Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 6 on water is to be achieved, the issue of water integrity should be taken more seriously by the media because it plays a key role in various aspects of the SDGs.

It is important that new initiatives are established where the media is further encouraged to take a keen interest in reporting on water related issues. International non-profit organisations, such as WIN, as well as other civil-society organisations have a role to play in ensuring that journalist networks are supported to report on these issues. It is important that the interest of journalists in reporting on such issues is sustained, which could be done through involving them in training courses or broadening their knowledge and awareness on integrity issues in the sector. The government has a role to play in ensuring that the space for the media remains open and that their safety on reporting on sensitive issues is assured.

International non-profit organisations, such as WIN, as well as civil society organisations should intensify their efforts in supporting the media to report on water issues. Journalists who show an interest in the water sector should be given the opportunity, through training courses, to broaden their knowledge and awareness of integrity issues in that sector.

Finally, there is a need for enhanced monitoring mechanisms to be utilised by citizens, civil society and the media in order to strengthen accountability and transparency, and to ensure value for money in water-service delivery.

This post is a shortened version of the original article that can be found here

33591844_10216565409229217_4810907646955618304_n.jpgAbout the author:

Abdul-Kudus Husein graduated from the ISS last year with a MA degree in Development Studies. He is currently the Communications Officer at the Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GACC). His professional portfolio includes communication and fundraising with civil society and the private sector. He has over 10 years experience in generating and implementing positive offline and online messages to engage audience and stakeholders and strong long term commitment to public policy, governance, participatory development, communications for change and local economic development.