Unlearning Colonial Analytics: Rethinking Women in ‘Conservatism’

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In this blog, ISS Alumna, Tia Isti’anah invites us to rethink beyond the binary label of conservatism vs progressive. Drawing from decolonial feminist thinkers, it challenges the secular-liberal feminist moral world and invites readers to centre love as an act of unlearned colonial biases.

 

Image from Harmonia Pictura from Pixabay

In 2020, I was doing research with Yayasan Rumah Kita Bersama in Bekasi, West Java, Indonesia. I remember that I perceived women who joined the Islamic teaching in ‘conservative’ mosques as victims of religious doctrine. I had some categories for what I call ‘conservative’ mosques; the ones that called themselves ‘salafi’ or ‘manhanji’ and the ones whose women used the big veil which covers their shoulders and chest.

In one of these mosques, I talked to women who refused to work after getting married because they were worried about the ‘ikhtilat’. Ikhtilat refers to the gathering, mixing and intermingling of men and women in one place. I whispered to myself about how this kind of tafsir (explanation or exegesis) limits women from doing what they want. One woman I met even refused to use online booking services for transportation because it could result in her being alone with a man, although the public transportation in that area (Cikarang, Bekasi) was difficult to find. When I also joined the Islamic studies for this research in one of the mosques in Bekasi, I saw that women could only ask questions on paper by writing it down and giving it to the committee, while men could raise their hand and speak directly to the speaker in front of the audience.

As a woman who grew up in a traditional Islamic family and school, I often experienced the Islamic tafsir that justifies patriarchy and I remember feeling angry and confused listening to it. That experience made me feel the urge to save women who follow ‘conservative’ Islamic teaching which I thought of as patriarchal. This is also the reason why I am actively involved in the Islamic feminist movement in Indonesia.

Later, I found out that my analysis of putting women who accepted ‘conservatism’ teaching as merely a victim of religious doctrine is a colonial and binary approach. Chandra Talpade Mohanty called this kind of analysis a commodification and appropriation of knowledge about women in third-world countries, where we pack them as one category: oppressed, dependent and powerless, without allowing them to speak for themselves. This objectification or analysis, however, has been used by many Western and middle-class African or Asian scholars for their rural and working-class sisters. Sabaa Mahmood book’s Politics of Piety, which is the result of her anthropological research in Egypt with pious women, can be used as an entry point to unlearn this colonial analytical category and challenge secular-liberal feminist analysis. She invites us to see religious practices in their own terms, not through the eyes of other moral values.

Unlearning colonial categorization

Mahmood’s work is important because it challenges the secular-liberal feminist approach, which is obsessed with individual freedom or free will. This obsession with the norm of individual freedom stems from a secular-liberal feminist approach, which is rooted in Western history. Individual freedom, however, is inadequate for understanding the reality of pious women in Egypt, the women with whom Mahmood conducted her research. Pious women in Egypt are living in communities with significantly different norms than women in Western countries. Mahmood saw that their life goal was not individual freedom or free will, but striving for piety by following the Prophet Muhammad’s example.

I reflected on this during my own research in Bekasi. I assumed that women following ‘conservative’ teaching are backwards and in need of being saved. I thought that the ‘conservative’ Islamic doctrine, such as ‘ikhtilat’ limits their freedom.  I also considered women having to ask questions in writing in Islamic teaching as a sign of subordination, especially when the same rules do not bind men. In fact, my analysis mirrored what Maria Lazreg calls reductionism, where religion is assumed to be the main reason for gender inequality or patriarchy. By assuming this in my analysis, as Saba Mahmood mentioned in her book, I denied other realities and factors of patriarchy. This also made me reject another reality about women in Islamic teaching –  the reality that what they strive for is not about individual freedom but about striving to embody piety modelled after the Prophet Muhammad.

Mahmood’s work generated criticism, for example that the celebration of pious agency, if taken too far, could risk romanticizing the power of domination and denying the structure that is often imposed by those in power. However, her argument allows us to pause before putting other women (who, borrowing from Mohanty, are actually our sisters in struggle) in the oppressed, dependent, powerless and backward category box.

Decolonial Calling

Maria Lugones, a decolonial feminist, argued that even the gender system itself is colonial, as is the very definition of gender-oppressive. Moreover, she deepened this conversation by inviting us to practice playful ‘world‘ travelling by moving to each other’s ‘world’ with a loving rather than an arrogant eye. A world, as I understand from Lugones, is characterized as being inhabited by flesh and blood people, where meaning, ideas, construction and relationships are organized in particular ways. Loving here means that we see with their eyes, that we go to their world, see how both of us are constructed in their world, and witness their own sense of selves from their world. Only by travelling to their world can we see them as subjects and identify with them because we are not excluded and separate from them.

This made it clear to me that I have failed to love women who joined the ‘conservative’ Islamic teaching. Instead, I looked at them arrogantly, seeing them as victims and as oppressed women, while at the same time seeing myself as an educated woman who has become enlightened. I failed to understand how women in ‘conservative’ teaching see themselves within their values and their world. I failed to meet women where they are, not where I assumed they should be. I failed to see their own ways of making meaning, but rather saw them through the lens of me, who was already brainwashed by the idea of individual freedom as the only valid goal in life. By travelling to other women’s worlds, we are not necessarily endorsing what they believe, but rather learning to see their world.

Looking back, I realize that Lugones’s framework has helped me embrace contradictions and differences, to live with a loving way of being. I might not always agree with what people believe but I now try to love them. I think of a friend in Iran who is forced to wear a hijab. Because of that, she hates how religion is used as a tool to discriminate against those who are different. Her story is real and painful. Yet, by travelling to the other women’s world, I also find women who find their meaning and purpose in life from the same moral universe my friend rejects: ‘conservative’ Islam. Decolonial feminists remind us to see the plurality of women’s worlds; worlds that cannot be looked at through one single lens, especially not the lens of Western domination and power.  The journey has humbled me, enabled me to unlearn what I thought I knew ,and relearn seriously from the wisdom of other women’s worlds who are different from mine – how they seek meaning, resilience, and dignity.

 

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the author:

Tia Isti’anah

Tia Isti’anah is a freelance writer/researcher. She is an alumna of International Institute of Social Studies. Some of her writings can be found here: https://linktr.ee/tia.istianah (mostly in Indonesia language). Connect professionally here: www.linkedin.com/in/tia-istianah

 

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Paving the Way for Authoritarianism: The Prabowo regime and Indonesia’s colonial continuities 

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This blog captures the current political situation in Indonesia under Prabowo’s regime. This regime utilizes all possible resources to bring back an authoritarian government; from eliminating opposition and restructuring national budgets, to other structural intervention and subtle measures such as controlling the way people acquire knowledge by controlling media and using a buzzer or ‘thought leader’ who promotes opinions and perspectives sympathetic to the regime with the aim of making them seem common. Fatimatuz Zahra considers the regime to be employing colonial logic, in which the state treats its own population, particularly marginalized groups, as objects to be disciplined and extracted from rather than as respectable subjects. 

Adapted from: Guy Goodwill

How this regime got elected and how it’s doing  

From the very beginning, Prabowo Subianto and his vice president Gibran Rakabuming (37 y.o at that time) took advantage of an opaque political system in Indonesia. Gibran, who is the son of former president Joko Widodo (Jokowi), fulfilled the administrative requirement to run in the 2024 election for vice president after the constitutional court approved a lawsuit lowering the minimum age requirement for a presidential and vice presidential candidate. Following this decision, the chief justice of the court , who is Gibran’s uncle, was removed from his post due to an ethical violation. Jokowi’s endorsement of Gibran’s candidacy was also allegedly done through what used to be known as ‘pork barrel politics’ which can be defined as using state and public resources to influence voters. In this instance, the regime used state resources, such as mobilizing the social assistance budget, to further its political interests. Jokowi (at the end of his second presidential term) played a huge role in the success of Gibran’s candidacy, which seems to have been well prepared ahead.  

These dirty measures continued throughout the campaign. Prabowo and Gibran successfully whitewashed Prabowo’s dark history and blood legacy, including his involvement in the 1998 human rights violations, through their ‘gemoy’ campaign and use of jargon to reshape Prabowo’s image into that of a cute, chubby grandpa. With the massive use of social media campaigns and narrative battles to rebrand this pair, they successfully won the election with 58% of the votes. 

 

What is it like to have a president who is allegedly a human rights violator?

Amnesty International said that Indonesia is experiencing the most serious deterioration of human rights since the 1998 reform era. This can be seen in many areas: the massive militarization of civil spaces, the absence of meaningful public participation in the policy planning and implementation process, and the excessive police repression that has been increasingly normalized. In November 2025, the House of Representatives and the government passed a revision of the Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP) that further facilitates the police’s use of brutality. In response to the legislation, Indonesia witnessed a massive protest in August 2025 against police brutality and to demand reform of the bureaucracy. Yet instead of listening to that protest, the regime continues to pave its way toward authoritarianism. 

 

Strategies of power consolidation under the current regime 

In October 2025, the documentary  “Dirty Vote II: O3” was released and went viral. The video exposed how this regime consolidated its power via three pillars: otak, otot and ongkos(O3) or mind, muscle, and money. The documentary suggests that the regime is deploying these three pillars as an expression of insecurity. The regime needs to strengthen its muscles (otot), namely the security apparatus, such as the military and police. These institutions have been repurposed by the regime and no longer function to protect citizens or provide external defence, but increasingly act as instruments and defenders of the ruling elites’ interests. Another strategy is demolishing the opposition as a manifestation of the mind (otak) to push through laws and other political decisions that serve oligarchic interests. And this strategy has been successful, as is evidenced by how easily this regime has passed many problematic laws that have been protested against for years. The last strategy is to strengthen guided capitalism, as a manifestation of money (ongkos). This constitutes an elite-driven mechanism of power consolidation to manage the regime’s interests. One recent example of this was to change the electoral system from direct elections to selection by the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR), an institution that has been criticized as dysfunctional and not representing the people.  

One of the most visible implications of deploying these three pillars is how this regime continues to ignore people’s voices. This is clear in policy decisions that are not grounded in public interest, for example, the decision to impose budget cuts in strategic sectors such as health and education to fund the problematic free-meal programme, which, rather than resolving the policy objective of addressing stunting, has generated widespread cases of food poisoning. We are also witnessing how this regime openly dismisses any criticism, for example, when it passed the Indonesian National Armed Forces Law (UU TNI) and the revised Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP) despite nationwide protests, some of which included fatalities.  

Using paternalistic logic, this regime has also silenced women’s voices with its many militaristic policies and projects, such as making the military a strategic partner in the free-meal programme (MBG) while at the same time ignoring the protests of mothers who live in fear of their children being poisoned by it. Indeed, even the President regarded the poisoned children as merely numbers. The way this regime is refocusing the budget by cutting spending in the care sector while continuously increasing defence spending is another example of how this regime is structurally marginalizing women. 

 

Reproducing colonial logic 

From the practices above, we can see that this regime is currently continuing the colonial legacy by deploying colonial logic in its way of governing. The way this regime defends elite interests while continuing to delegitimize critics by using expressions such as ‘ndasmu’ (an insulting word, like bullshit) or ‘antek asing’ (a political slur used to label someone as a lackey of foreign interests in order to delegitimize their action) to describe critics, is evidence of how this regime is trying to normalize its exploitation. This is an important pillar in the coloniality of power – seeing the population as inferior in order to justify their exploitation. In order to maintain its power, the regime is also deploying a strategy of whitewashing collective knowledge, such as denying the historical fact of the 1998 mass rapes and reframing human rights violators such as Soeharto as national heroes. This is a manifestation of coloniality of knowledge, which controls the knowledge and production systems as a means of asserting superiority within the hierarchy of power. 

Fundamentally, this regime reproduces the logic of coloniality, which works by producing the hierarchy of ‘being’, with certain groups being treated as more fully human than others. This is manifested in people’s voices and interests being easily dismissed, with their interests taking second place to those of elites. People’s voices are seen as noise that obstructs power, rather than expressions of political agency. This forces critics of the regime to continue our collective movement to resist this colonial structure, which promises the dream of modernity while steadily narrowing the space for civic action in the name of stability. 

 

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts solely reflects the views of the author of the post in question.

 

About the author:

Fatimatuz Zahra 

Fatimatuz Zahra is an alumna of the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), where she majored in Social Justice Perspectives. Her work engages with gender, religion, and political issues in Indonesia, with an interest in decolonial approaches and feminist analysis 

 

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Exporting ESG: Can EU Standards Deliver Fair Sustainability in Global South contexts?

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In this blog, ISS Guest Researcher Kim-Tung Dao delves into the effects that European Union ESG (Environmental, Sustainability, and Governance) standards can have on export partners in the ‘Global South’. Whilst ESG regulations are an important tool for the EU to control corporate behavior, they can have unintended consequences on producers, including onerous paperwork, blocking access to markets, and creating hierarchies of knowledge and expertise. Rather than rigid models of compliance, the author argues for a more inclusive and flexible approach that concentrates on transformation.

Image Credit: Wikimedia

European Union ESG regulations are reshaping global business practices, but their impact on the Global South remains complex and contested. This blog looks at the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of EU ESG frameworks in countries in the ‘Global South’ and proposes pathways toward more inclusive and equitable sustainability governance that respects diverse contexts and knowledge systems.

The Global Reach of European ESG  Standards

Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) regulations have emerged as central pillars in re-shaping corporate behavior toward sustainability, particularly within the European Union. The EU positions itself as a global regulatory leader, and its recent frameworks: the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), and Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR)- impose increasingly strict rules on companies operating within or trading with Europe.

While these frameworks aim to foster responsible capitalism and ecological stewardship, their influence extends far beyond European borders, raising a critical question: How do EU ESG regulations shape economic, social, and ecological outcomes in the Global South? Can these standards genuinely promote sustainable development globally, or might they inadvertently entrench existing asymmetries and constrain development pathways in the very regions they intend to benefit?

Economic Development: Opportunity or Exclusion?

Access to Green Markets 

EU ESG regulations can function as powerful catalysts for production upgrading (the process of moving to higher-value activities in global supply chains), enabling firms in the Global South to participate in emerging “green” value chains in EU countries. When effectively implemented, these standards allow exporters to secure long-term access to premium EU markets, differentiate products through sustainability credentials, and capture price premiums for verified sustainable goods. The International Trade Centre has documented how producers aligning with non-tariff environmental and social standards often gain entry to more stable, higher-value market segments, particularly in sectors like specialty coffee, ethical textiles, and certified forestry products.

However, the economic reality for many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) across Africa, Asia, and Latin America reveals a different picture. For these businesses, ESG regulatory compliance costs often represent a significant barrier. The financial burden of certification fees, auditing costs, and infrastructure investments can be prohibitive. Administrative complexity through extensive documentation and reporting requirements strains limited resources. Additionally, many SMEs face technical capacity gaps.  While the EU provides technical guidance documents, these often remain insufficient for practical implementation. The complexity of the regulations and guidance frequently drives SMEs to seek expensive external consultants, ironically often from EU or US firms, creating an additional financial burden and potential dependency that undermines the goal of empowering Global South businesses.

The EUDR starkly illustrates these challenges by mandating full traceability and due diligence for commodities like palm oil, cocoa, and soy. Research by ECDPM highlights how Indonesian palm oil producers, particularly smallholders, struggle with the mounting costs of compliance with traceability protocols (tracking systems). Without targeted support mechanisms, such regulations risk creating a “green barrier” to trade that disproportionately affects the most vulnerable actors in global supply chains.

Social Development: Empowerment or Imposition?

From a social perspective, ESG-driven supply chain due diligence can foster improved labor standards, gender equity, and protections against exploitation. As EU firms face increasing pressure to assess and mitigate human rights impacts across their value chains, this has stimulated rising investment in social infrastructure and monitoring systems. It has also encouraged greater stakeholder engagement with previously marginalized communities and advanced the development of grievance mechanisms and remediation processes (ways to raise complaints and fix problems). The Shift Project notes that ESG regulations can drive positive business and human rights outcomes when paired with effective enforcement and local capacity building. In sectors like cocoa and coffee, EU sustainability demands have encouraged certification schemes and community development programs, as documented in multiple Fairtrade Foundation reports.

However, these well- intentioned frameworks may inadvertently marginalize the very communities they aim to protect when not grounded in local contexts. While establishing fundamental workers’ rights is important, the challenge lies in how these standards are implemented. Many ESG standards emerge from European perspectives and risk disrupting informal economies that support millions of livelihoods, not because workers’ rights are inherently problematic, but because the implementation often lacks sensitivity to local economic realities. These frameworks often overlook local working traditions and traditional governance structures while imposing externally developed metrics that fail to reflect local contexts. In regions like West Africa, cocoa farmers often lack the support infrastructure to meet traceability requirements tied to deforestation monitoring, leaving them vulnerable to market exclusion. Moreover, rigid labor standards, if applied without considering local economic conditions and providing transition support, may displace informal workers without offering viable alternatives.

Environmental Governance: Protection or Appropriation?

Ecological Safeguards

Environmental sustainability constitutes the cornerstone of EU ESG policies. Regulations like the EUDR aim to curb global deforestation and biodiversity loss by demanding verifiable, sustainable sourcing. These measures can catalyze the restructuring of multinational supply chains to prioritize conservation, adoption of more transparent environmental practices, and increased investment in ecosystem restoration and protection. By raising environmental due diligence expectations, the EU is effectively internationalizing its Green Deal ambitions, potentially accelerating global progress toward climate targets and biodiversity conservation.

Sovereignty Concerns

Yet, these ecological gains may come at the cost of local autonomy and environmental justice. As the Rights and Resources Initiative (RRI) and the authors of ‘Pluriverse: a post-development dictionary’ argue, a “one-size-fits-all” model of environmental governance often overlooks Indigenous knowledge systems that have sustained ecosystems for generations. It often ignores local conservation practices that balance human needs with ecological integrity and fails to account for diverse cultural understandings of nature-human relationships. This dynamic can lead to what critics term “green colonialism,” wherein sustainability is imposed through externally defined metrics that sideline plural understandings of environmental stewardship. Furthermore, in many parts of the Global South, livelihoods and ecosystems are deeply intertwined. Forest-dependent communities, shifting cultivators, and pastoralists may find their access to land and resources restricted under ESG frameworks focused primarily on carbon storage and biodiversity indicators.

Toward Inclusive ESG: A  Pluriversal Approach

To ensure that ESG regulation contributes to truly equitable sustainability, fundamental shifts in both process and substance are essential:

Co-creation and Shared Governance

Standard-setting must evolve from top-down prescription to collaborative co-creation. This requires meaningful engagement with diverse stakeholders from the Global South throughout policy design, representation of civil society, smallholders, Indigenous peoples, and local governments in governance bodies, and effective mechanisms for incorporating local knowledge systems and perspectives.

Capacity Building and Transition Support

The implementation gap must be addressed through comprehensive support systems. This includes dedicated funding for SMEs to upgrade practices and technologies, development of accessible and affordable traceability tools training programs that reach marginalized producers, and flexible implementation timelines that recognize different starting points.

Just Transition Integration

ESG frameworks must explicitly incorporate principles of justice and equity at their core. They should balance climate and ecological goals with social development imperatives, use context-sensitive indicators that respect diverse sustainability models, integrate benefit-sharing mechanisms that compensate communities for ecosystem services, and recognize the “pluriverse” of sustainability approaches beyond Global North conceptions.

Beyond ComplianceToward Transformation

EU ESG regulation represents a promising step toward responsible global capitalism, but the promise alone is insufficient. For ESG standards to support equitable sustainability in the Global South, they must transcend box-ticking compliance and embrace deeper, more inclusive frameworks. A pluriversal ESG model, one that integrates diverse knowledge systems, promotes justice, and fosters ecological stewardship, can offer a path forward. This requires humility, dialogue, and genuine co-governance from European policymakers and businesses. Without these elements, ESG frameworks risk reproducing the very inequalities they ostensibly seek to eliminate. The path ahead demands not just technical solutions but fundamental reconsideration of how sustainability is defined, measured, and governed. Only then can ESG truly deliver on its promise of a more equitable and ecological global economy.

 

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the author:

Kim Tung Dao

Kim Tung Dao is a recent PhD graduate of the International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam. Her research interests include globalization, international trade, sustainable development, and the history of economic thought.

 

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The Ruling Elites Put Democracy under Duress in Indonesia – and the People are fighting back

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Police violence against recent protests by civil society groups and social movements marks the biggest challenge for Indonesia’s Prabowo administration and tests the Indonesian political class’ commitment to democracy. In this blog Iqra Anugrah and Rachma Lutfiny Putri explain how Oligarchic agendas of the elites have led to disastrous policy choices, triggering the protest movement. Progressive politics, despite its lack of leadership and clear ideology and platform, should maintain this momentum by defending itself from state repression and forcing elite concessions.

Photo Credit: Maria Cynthia, Wikimedia

Recent anti-oligarchic protests across Indonesia have presented the biggest political challenge to the Prabowo administration since it took power in 2024. Repressive handling of the protests by the Indonesian police, which resulted in the martyrdom of Affan Kurniawan, a motorcycle taxi driver, and nine others along with the arrest of 3,337 protesters triggered a protest movement to spread like wildfire. All of this has happened in less than a year after Prabowo’s inauguration as president.

The gruesome nature of Affan’s death significantly raised political consciousness of the movement and the general public, but the collective anger behind it has been simmering for a while. Like other authoritarian populists, Prabowo had pursued a series of questionable policies prone to elite hijacking and rent-seeking, such as the Free Nutritious Meal programme and the Danantara sovereign wealth fund. But the causes for the recent protests were something more structural and paradigmatic: increasing inequality and precariousness, shrinking ‘middle class,’ growing military role in politics, and crackdown on democratic dissent. These were exacerbated by the contempt of several members of the parliament (MPs) toward the plight of the working people and the proposal to raise their allowances amidst economic hardship.

By the time of this writing, the clashes between the state and the movements had entered a period of protracted de-escalation. With the exception of some young liberal influencers who naively entered an appeasement dialogue with a few MPs, labor unions, women’s movements, and student activist groups still continue their grassroots advocacy and popular education works, while the police continue to detain those arrested.

Concrete policy shifts after this crisis are still unclear. Aside from the cancellation of the proposed housing allowance raise for MPs, the government has yet to meet other crucial demands: ending police violence, reducing excessive allowances for MPs and high-ranking officials, and addressing labor demands concerning fair wage and employment relations.

Deepening illiberal and authoritarian practices under Prabowo presidency suggest the limits of a democratic façade to oligarchic politics. This propelled widespread response from a broad alliance of grassroots social movements supported by the public and piggybacked by liberal-leaning groups and influencers. The ruling elites made only limited concessions to popular demands, while divisions between grassroots bases and liberal networks show how fragmented the civil society remains. The future will remain uncertain and bleak, but grassroots social movements can break this impasse by exercising their leadership and mobilizational power to force further elite concessions.

By Mori505 - Own work, CC BY 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=174069478
Photo Credit: Mori505 via Wikimedia

Drivers of the protests: the changing contour of oligarchic politics

The shift to a more brazen display of authoritarian politics in Indonesian democracy is not merely a product of changing elite political culture, but a logical consequence of the transformation of mechanisms of oligarchic extraction in the interests of the ruling class and the bourgeois state. At the international level, Indonesian economic and political elites try to tap into profits offered by the booming nickel industry. Domestically, these oligarchic elites have expanded their extraction targets from traditional sectors (e.g., land and coal resources) to ‘white elephant’ projects most notoriously the construction of the new capital city.

As detailed by the People’s Liberation Party, this heavy strain on the state budget is further compounded by the ambition of Prabowo, himself a top member of the oligarchic elites, to implement his flagship Free Nutritious Meal  programme, which has been poorly implemented, and increase military spending. This forced the central government to slash transfer funds for regional governments by 50 per cent in 2025. In turn, many local governments significantly raised property taxes, with some raising them by over 100 per cent.

These policies prompted various mass protests since the beginning of Prabowo’s tenure, ranging from anti-government protests in various cities to the famous anti-tax protest in Pati, Central Java, which forced the district head of Pati to resign.

Unsurprisingly, it becomes imperative for the ruling elites to further constrain democratic spaces to defend their interests. The tragic death of Affan, the excessive use of state violence, and the political elites’ lukewarm response to this crisis are clear signs of this development.

 

The nature of the protest coalition: Fragmentation amidst rising political consciousness

Responding to this elite assault, a series of protests started in late August. Of particular interest were the protests in Jakarta on August 28, the day Affan was martyred. They shared the same anti-government sentiment but differed in their policy demands and compositions of protest coalitions. Four participating groups can be identified:

1) labor unions, whose demands centered around wage increase and job security,

2) broad people’s coalition for climate justice consisting of farmers, fishers, grassroots women’s movements, and urban poor organizations,

3) student activists who rejected the proposed housing and other allowances raise for the MPs, and

4) motorcycle taxi drivers, whose mobilization intensified after the police’s armored vehicle ran over Affan.

These four groups, in varying degrees, continued their protests after Affan’s tragic death and intensifying police violence.

Afterwards, the coalitions and support for the protesters gained broad public support. Public jubilation and awe when witnessing the looting of the houses of problematic MPs, most notoriously the suspended MP Ahmad Sahroni, indicated the culmination of their collective anger.

But this brief period of political joy was punctuated by arson cases targeting public infrastructure in Jakarta such as bus stops and an optical server box, a pattern that spread to other cities. While there is a strong possibility that factions of the competing elites were behind these provocations, one should keep in mind that the youth participating in these urban riots saw their act as one of defiance and, we would add, protest against the sanctification of wealth and private properties of the elites.

These chaotic events, followed by increasing repression and control by the police and armed forces, led to the reappearance of a familiar trope in Indonesian politics: the dichotomy between peaceful and ‘anarchistic’ protesters. While we remain cognizant of elite manipulation behind these events and the excesses of street protests, we reject such dichotomy. Such as a false dichotomy, in our view, is cynically deployed by the ruling elites and the state to tame people’s militancy and divide the public. Further, as the case of violent attacks against student protesters resting at safe zones at Bandung Islamic University and Pasundan University showed, the police and armed forces have a long record of using the false dichotomy as a pretext to curb freedom of assembly and speech of dissident and marginalized groups.

As this chaos subsided, the latter phase of the protests witnessed the emergence of liberal influencers as accidental torchbearers of the movement. Political scientist Edward Aspinall argued that the proponents of this not-so-new counterculture of protest are student executive councils, unions and NGOs. His comprehensive analysis misses one new actor: liberal influencers with links to consultancy and ‘hip’ online media industries. Deliberately intervening into the ongoing dynamics, they summarized organic programmatic demands from various working-class and popular organizations into a laundry list of demands called the ‘17+8’ demands (a catchy reference to the Indonesian date of independence, 17 August).

While we recognize the value of such campaigns and their impact on raising political awareness among the urban middle class, we doubt their claims about actual campaign reach and policy impacts. We also criticize the inherent class bias and celebrity culture in their methods of activism which unfortunately sideline the role and agendas of actual working-class bases and organizations — groups whose agency played a key role in advancing the political aims of the protests and yet remains nameless and unseen. This attitude is emblematic of the cultural and political outlooks of the liberal/critical sections of the professional managerial class in Indonesia.

Our informal conversation with working-class activists involved in the protests and grassroots collectives reveal their anger and criticism toward the liberals. The main problem with liberal activism, in their view, is the lack of stronger labor and class demands and the dominance of liberal aesthetics and voice at the expense of aspirations and experiences of the most marginalized. From our conversation with them, we learned that the sacrifice of working-class activists at the frontline of the protests, including a dozen of ordinary labor and rural activists from our own personal networks detained or charged as provocateurs by the police, features mostly as statistics in mainstream media rather than stories of pro-democracy heroism.

Like their previous predecessors, liberal influencers are ‘floating’, divorced from the lived experience and consciousness of the masses. This detachment reveals a long-standing fault line in Indonesian civil society: between liberal and progressive–radical activism.

 

Take-away points

It is still too early to assess the impact and legacy of the 2025 protests, but we would like to highlight three important take-away points.

First, both ‘spontaneity’ and ‘leadership’ in mass movements are not opposites, but rather essential parts in a process to consolidate democratic leadership and institutionalization of social movements. As Rosa Luxemburg once reminded us, social reforms and spontaneity mobilized the oppressed, but revolutionary collectivity is mandatory to make their gains last.

Second, reflecting on the severity of state repression in recent protests, we reaffirm the right of the protesters to defend themselves against state violence through peaceful, and, under severe circumstances, disruptive methods. Our argument is not a provocation of violence but rather a view backed by research. A rigorous study has shown that disruptive actions by nonelites drive democratic deepening. Street protests and their dynamics are indeed the bloodlines of democracy.

Lastly, given the lack of success of the liberal influencers’ lobbying effort with the parliament, it is high time for grassroots working-class organizations to mobilize again. Only their leadership and political power can break this impasse.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

 

Disclaimer and acknowledgement: We maintain an active engagement with Indonesian social movements and our works since 2015 can be verified with various organizations, communities, and individuals that we have been working with. Currently we are conducting field research in Indonesia as Visiting Researchers at Agrarian Resource Center (ARC). In particular, we would like to thank our comrades at Progressive Islam Forum (FIP) and Kolektif SULU for insightful discussions on recent developments with them.

About the authors:

Iqra Anugrah

Iqra Anugrah is a Trapezio MSCA Seal of Excellence Fellow at the Department of Foreign Languages, Literatures and Modern Cultures at the University of Turin. He holds affiliate positions at the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) at Leiden University and the Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education, and Information (LP3ES) in Jakarta. His current project examines multi-strand conservatism in Indonesia.

 

Rachma Lutfiny Putri

Rachma Lutfiny Putri is a Wenner-Gren Wadsworth International Fellow and a PhD candidate at the Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology, Vrije Universiteit (VU) Amsterdam and a Visiting Fellow at Populi Center. Her interests include urban anthropology, value chain, informal work, and development studies.

 

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Tren illiberal akan semakin kuat di era Prabowo

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The electoral victory of the ex-general-turned-cuddly-populist Prabowo Subianto on 20 March marks the continuation of illiberal democracy in Indonesia. However, the moral panic that followed the announcement of his presidency may be exaggerated, writes Iqra Anugrah, who argues for a more nuanced analysis of Indonesia’s current and future political trajectory. The dangers for democracy posed by Prabowo’s impending rule is just a symptom of the larger problem of oligarchic rule in the Global South. English

Bhasa: Kemenangan Prabowo menandakan keberlanjutan demokrasi illiberal. Tetapi, kita tidak boleh terjebak oleh kepanikan moral. Yang kita butuhkan adalah analisis yang lebih bernuansa mengenai trajektori politik sekarang dan yang akan datang. Ancaman bagi demokrasi di bawah kekuasaan Prabowo merupakan gejala bagi persoalan yang lebih besar, yaitu kuasa oligarki di negara-negara Selatan.

Image by @illustruth

DEMOKRASI Indonesia berada di persimpangan jalan. Prabowo Subianto, seorang mantan jenderal yang aktif di masa kediktatoran Orde Baru yang dipimpin oleh mantan mertuanya, Soeharto, dan bereputasi buruk karena kasus-kasus pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia (HAM), telah resmi memenangkan pemilihan presiden. Terlepas dari klaim tentang penyimpangan prosedur pemilu dan upaya dari dua capres rival, Anies Baswedan dan Ganjar Pranowo, menggugat melalui Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK), Prabowo akan tetap dilantik pada Oktober nanti.

Bagi kalangan gerakan sosial, kemenangan Prabowo merupakan kabar buruk. Ada keresahan di antara para aktivis bahwa pemerintahan Prabowo akan memangkas kembali pencapaian perjuangan demokratik secara signifikan, seperti kebebasan berpendapat, berserikat dan berkumpul, dan aktivitas pers.

Akan tetapi, sentimen ini, meski sangat bisa dimaklumi, cenderung melihat agensi Prabowo secara berlebihan dan alpa dengan fakta bahwa justru di bawah dua periode pemerintahan Joko Widodo-lah demokrasi Indonesia menjadi semakin oligarkis dan illiberal. Maraknya gelombang populisme otoriter di tingkat global yang menjangkiti berbagai negara dan kawasan lain menunjukkan bahwa pertanyaan yang tepat bukanlah mengapa Indonesia tetap bisa mempertahankan kualitas demokrasinya, melainkan kapan Indonesia akan bergabung dengan tren global tersebut dan memiliki versi lokal Rodrigo Duterte atau Bongbong Marcos.

Menyikapi perkembangan politik ini, sosiolog politik Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir baru-baru ini berargumen bahwa demokrasi di Indonesia “akan berjalan seperti biasanya.” Meskipun mengakui bahwa akan ada kemungkinan belokan illiberal yang lebih dalam di bawah kepresidenan Prabowo, kawan Mughis mengkritik kecenderungan alarmis di lingkar-lingkar gerakan sosial dan media dan juga klaim bahwa Indonesia akan kembali menjadi rezim otokratik secara utuh di bawah pemerintahan Prabowo. Mughis berpendapat bahwa para elite telah mendapat keuntungan secara politik dan ekonomi dari demokrasi elektoral borjuis semenjak 1998. Tatanan rezim yang sekarang dengan demikian akan tetap bertahan.

Sementara itu, editor IndoProgress Coen Husain Pontoh mengkritik Mughis dan menyajikan analisis yang berbeda mengenai demokrasi dan perkembangan kapitalisme di Indonesia di bawah pemerintahan Prabowo. Menurut kawan Coen, yang berbagi keresahan yang sama dengan elemen-elemen gerakan sosial mengenai kenaikan otoritarianisme, kecenderungan represif di dalam kerangka demokrasi elektoral di bawah pemerintahan baru akan cenderung meningkat, tapi bukan karena personalitas Prabowo melainkan tekanan struktural dan logika akumulasi kapital itu sendiri, yang akan memaksa negara dan aktornya, yaitu pemerintahan Prabowo, untuk mewakili kepentingan kelas kapitalis melalui pelestarian eksploitasi dan dominasi yang akan semakin parah derajatnya.

Terlepas dari perdebatan di antara Mughis dan Coen, kedua analisis ini menyajikan pembacaan yang lebih bernuansa tentang masa depan demokrasi Indonesia di bawah pemerintahan Prabowo. Tulisan saya kali ini bertujuan untuk berkontribusi dan mengintervensi perdebatan ini.

Dalam hal interpretasi atas dinamika politik Indonesia di bawah Prabowo, analisis Mughis menurut saya memberikan pembacaan yang lebih jernih mengenai skenario-skenario politik yang mungkin terjadi. Di sisi lain, analisis Coen menekankan kerangka teoretik penting yang perlu diingat oleh setiap aktivis dan ilmuwan progresif dan kiri, bahwa negara kapitalis memiliki tendensi struktural untuk terus melanggengkan ekspansi kapital dan proses perampasan dan penghisapan nilai lebih yang dilakukannya.

Pembacaan yang ingin saya tawarkan adalah sebagai berikut: Saya lebih bersepakat dengan pembacaan Mughis mengenai kondisi demokrasi Indonesia di bawah kekuasaan Prabowo, seraya mengamini bahwa kita tidak boleh melupakan natur dari negara kapitalis dan kecenderungan represifnya, yang digaris bawahi oleh Coen.

Tetapi, pembacaan Mughis bahwa proses perebutan dan bagi-bagi kekuasaan di antara para elite sebagai faktor utama di balik stabilitas demokrasi illiberal terlalu uni-dimensional. Di sisi lain, meskipun Coen secara tepat mengingatkan kita tentang tendensi struktural dan otoriter dari negara kapitalis, analisisnya luput melihat bahwa kuasa kapital, meski determinan, termediasi efeknya oleh sejumlah faktor. Implikasinya, corak dan manifestasi dari tendensi otoriter ini akan berbeda-beda bentuknya di lokasi-lokasi geografis yang berbeda.

Oleh karena itu, dalam hemat saya, analisis yang lebih komprehensif perlu melihat tiga faktor. Pertama, karakteristik dari kompetisi elektoral di antara para elite politik; kedua, relasi antara demokrasi dan kapitalisme oligarkis di Indonesia; dan ketiga, aspirasi politik dari para pemilih itu sendiri. Dengan melihat ketiga faktor ini, saya berkesimpulan bahwa alih-alih kembali kepada kediktatoran ala Orde Baru, Indonesia di bawah Prabowo akan menyaksikan kelanjutan demokrasi illiberal.

Elit Politikus Tetap Berkuasa, Tetapi Kekuasaannya Tidak Mutlak

Politikus Indonesia dari berbagai partai dan tingkatan pemerintahan telah menikmati dan dengan sukses memanfaatkan sistem pemilu yang relatif bebas dan terbuka sejak 1999. Elite-elite lama yang mapan secara cepat beradaptasi dengan permainan elektoral borjuis ini dan memantapkan posisinya tatkala Indonesia mengalami transisi politik dari kediktatoran menuju demokrasi, sebuah kesempatan yang juga dimanfaatkan oleh pemain-pemain baru seperti kelas kapitalis/kalangan pebisnis lokal.

Di level nasional, para elite dengan mudah dapat berbagi kekuasaan dan berbagai jenis “rampasan perang” di antara mereka, seperti jatah dari anggaran negara dan jabatan menteri. Di tingkat lokal, para kepala daerah seperti bupati dapat memenangkan pemilu melalui jejaring patronase dan ijon politik dengan aktor kapitalisme ekstraktif, seperti perusahaan tambang.

Tentu saja, tingkah laku elite ini menunjukkan preferensi mereka, yaitu tatanan politik yang lebih otoriter, ditandai dengan terbatasnya ruang untuk partisipasi popular, oposisi, dan tuntutan redistribusi. Tetapi, ambisi ini terbatasi oleh sejumlah fitur struktural dan kelembagaan dari negara Indonesia itu sendiri, seperti kurangnya monopoli elite lokal secara langsung atas sumber daya ekonomi dan lembaga negara.

Kapitalisme Oligarkis dan Demokrasi Kawan, bukan Lawan

Kemudian, sebagaimana telah ditunjukkan oleh ahli ekonomi-politik dan sarjana kritis, demokrasi dan kapitalisme oligarkis dapat hidup berdampingan di Indonesia (juga di banyak masyarakat kapitalis lainnya). Demokrasi elitis di Indonesia tidak menjadi ancaman yang signifikan bagi kelas kapitalis. Ini terlihat dari respons positif kalangan bisnis dan investor yang menyambut baik hasil pemilu sebagai mekanisme untuk memastikan stabilitas politik dan transisi kekuasaan yang damai, yang dibutuhkan untuk pertumbuhan ekonomi dan investasi.

Nyatanya, di tengah absennya agenda sosial demokrasi minimum yang solid, seperti redistribusi kekayaan, program-program kesejahteraan sosial yang luas, dan kontrol kelas pekerja atas ekonomi dan politik, maka kalangan pebisnis tidak akan keberatan untuk memodifikasi aktivitas usaha mereka sesuai dengan norma-norma demokrasi formal. Kelas kapitalis tidak perlu mengandalkan represi politik yang bersifat eksesif, apabila mereka bisa memanfaatkan institusi elektoral dan demokrasi formal yang ada, satu hal yang telah mereka lakukan sejak awal reformasi.

Karenanya, tidak heran bahwa dari dulu ilmuwan politik Benedict Anderson memperingatkan kita bahwa pemilu di Asia Tenggara termasuk Indonesia merupakan indikasi bagi dominasi politik borjuis. Secara sinis, kita bisa menyimpulkan bahwa para elite memiliki kepentingan untuk mempertahankan demokras illiberal yang memiliki dimensi elektoral yang kompetitif, bebas, dan matang.

Pemilih Indonesia Mendambakan Pendisiplinan Demokrasi

Terakhir, kita tidak boleh luput melihat aspirasi politik para pemilih Indonesia secara saksama. Prabowo memenangkan pemilu dengan perolehan suara mayoritas, termasuk dukungan dari para pemilih Gen-Z. Prabowo juga terbantu oleh dukungan Jokowi, yang masih memiliki popularitas publik yang tinggi. Ini mendongkrak citra Prabowo sebagai penerus Jokowi yang setia dengan cita-cita developmentalisnya.

Kalangan aktivis dan intelektual boleh saja tercengang melihat ekspresi politik semacam ini, tetapi banyak pemilih melihat preferensi politik mereka sebagai pemenuhan hak demokratis mereka. Hasil jajak pendapat yang cukup baru dari salah satu lembaga survei terkemuka menunjukkan bahwa hampir 71% responden berpendapat bahwa kinerja demokrasi Indonesia baik atau sangat baik. Fenomena illiberalisme di masyarakat ini tidak hanya terjadi di Indonesia. Di Filipina, banyak pemilih kelas menengah dan menengah atas yang mengamini model demokrasi yang kuasi-otoriter dan eklusivis ala Duterte sebagai tanggapan dan kritik atas “kekacauan” dalam demokrasi liberal. Persoalan ini juga menunjukkan kurangnya daya tarik populis yang luas dari agenda dan program politik gerakan sosial selama ini.

This version of the article was first published on IndoProgress

The English version was published on Bliss

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the author:

Iqra Anugrah is a Research Fellow at the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS), Leiden University and a Research Associate at the Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education, and Information (LP3ES). He has conducted extensive fieldwork-based research on democracy, development, social movements, and local politics in Indonesia.

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The Indonesian democracy may change once Prabowo is president — but we need to look at the bigger picture

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The electoral victory of the ex-general-turned-cuddly-populist Prabowo Subianto on 20 March marks the continuation of illiberal democracy in Indonesia. However, the moral panic that followed the announcement of his presidency may be exaggerated, writes Iqra Anugrah, who argues for a more nuanced analysis of Indonesia’s current and future political trajectory. The dangers for democracy posed by Prabowo’s impending rule is just a symptom of the larger problem of oligarchic rule in the Global South.

Source: Made by Bliss using Canva.

Indonesian democracy is at a crossroads. Prabowo Subianto, a retired general who served in the army during the dictatorship of his former father-in-law, Suharto, and who has a tainted reputation due to his alleged involvement in human rights abuses, is set to become the next president of Indonesia. Despite claims of possible electoral irregularities and attempts by losing presidential candidates Anies Baswedan and Ganjar Pranowo to challenge the election results at the Constitutional Court, the official results have shown that Prabowo has won the presidential race.

For Indonesian social movements, his electoral victory is bad news. There is growing concern among activists that Prabowo’s presidency will roll back hard-won democratic achievements, including freedoms of speech, association, and the press. But this sentiment, while understandable, overstates Prabowo’s agency and overlooks the fact that it was during the two-term tenure of incumbent president Joko Widodo (Jokowi) that Indonesian democracy became increasingly oligarchic and illiberal. After years of subscribing to authoritarian populism — a worrying trend that is observed globally — it was only a matter of time before Indonesia was to have its own version of Rodrigo Duterte or Bongbong Marcos.

Responding to the election of Prabowo, political sociologist Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir recently argued that democracy in Indonesia “will keep on running just as it did before”. While acknowledging the real possibility of a deeper illiberal turn under Prabowo’s presidency, he challenged the alarmist tone in social movement and media circles and the claim that Indonesia would fall back into a full-blown autocracy under Prabowo’s rule. He argued that elites have benefitted politically and economically from electoral democracy since 1998. The current regime will therefore likely remain in place.

Mudhoffir’s assessment offers a more sober view of possible scenarios under Prabowo’s rule. However, his argument that struggles for and the sharing of power among elites is the main driver of the stability of illiberal democracy is too one-dimensional. I do agree that, rather than a return to dictatorship, Indonesia could witness the continuation of the illiberal democracy developed under Jokowi’s rule.

But in my view, a more nuanced analysis of the implications of Prabowo’s ascension to the presidency is necessary — one that would require us to look at three factors: 1) the nature of electoral competition among political elites, 2) the relations between democracy and oligarchic capitalism in Indonesia, and 3) the political aspirations of Indonesian voters. By looking at these three factors, we can better describe the overall characteristics of Indonesian democracy under Prabowo’s presidency and help concerned activists, social movements, and citizens to formulate their next steps.

Political elites remain powerful, but are kept in check

Indonesian politicians across parties and levels of government have benefitted from free and open electoral competition since 1999. Established elites quickly adapted to the new electoral game that arose as the country transitioned from a dictatorship to a democracy, and newer players such as local businesspeople have gained significant influence. At the national level, elites are able to easily share post-election “spoils” among themselves, which include a portion of the state budget and ministerial appointments. At the local level, district heads can win elections through acts of patronage or shady deals with extractive businesses, such as mining corporations. Obviously, these acts of elites demonstrate their preference for a more authoritarian arrangement marked by less popular participation, dissenting opinions, and redistributive demands, but their ambition is tempered by the structural and institutional constraints of the Indonesian state, such as the lack of a direct monopoly of economic resources and state institutions by local elites.

Oligarchic capitalism and democracy: friends, not foes

Secondly, as has been pointed out by political economists and critical scholars, democracy and oligarchic capitalism can coexist in Indonesia. Indonesia’s elitist form of democracy poses no significant threat to the interests of the capitalist class. This can be seen in how businesses and investors welcomed the general elections as a mechanism for ensuring political stability and a peaceful transfer of power needed for economic growth and investment. In fact, in the absence of solid social democratic demands for wealth redistribution, expansive social welfare programmes, and working-class control over the economy and political processes, the business community should be quite happy to adjust its operations in a formally democratic environment.

It is small wonder that a long time ago political scientist Benedict Anderson had warned that elections in Southeast Asia including in Indonesia are indicative of “bourgeois political dominance.” Put cynically, it is in the interests of the elites themselves to maintain an illiberal form of democracy with robust electoral dimensions.

Indonesian voters want a disciplined democracy

Lastly, one must not forget the political aspirations of Indonesian voters themselves. Prabowo won the election by a wide margin and enjoyed the support of the Gen Z voters. And the fact that Prabowo’s candidacy was supported by Jokowi, who remains popular among the Indonesian public, helps to enhance his image as a faithful successor of Jokowi’s brand of developmentalism.

One might balk at this political preference, but despite concerns from activists and scholars, most Indonesian voters see this as a genuine exercise of their democratic rights. A recent survey shows that close to 71% of respondents think that the quality of Indonesian democracy is either “good” or “very good.” This phenomenon of societal illiberalism is not exclusive to Indonesia. In the neighboring Philippines, especially upper- and middle-class voters have been embracing a quasi-authoritarian, exclusionary conception of democracy in response to the perceived “messiness” of liberal democratic procedures.

A contextual assessment is needed

This is not to minimize the potential dangers of Prabowo’s presidency, but it is important to contextually assess such dangers beyond moral panic. An alarmist take on the rise of an authoritarian-leaning president is a sign of knee-jerk liberalism, which is detached from the material concerns of the working people and steers us away from the important task of rejuvenating democratic class politics.

Most likely, democratic “stability” under Prabowo’s presidency will be a perverse one. Free electoralism will remain the only game in town, but episodic repressions of democratic rights and the contraction of democratic spaces will continue, especially in semi-urban and rural areas. Oligarchic control of politics and economy too will continue.

The increasing fragmentation of Indonesian social movements, partly due to their disagreement in engaging Jokowi’s government, makes resisting authoritarian tendencies in the upcoming Prabowo administration an arduous task. But hope should not be lost. Despite the rise of conservative politics, a new cohort of student and social movement activists has emerged and for the first time in recent years a new Labor Party, which was formed by leading labor unions, managed to join the general elections this year.

Prabowo’s presidency will not lead to a return of a Cold War-style capitalist dictatorship. Nevertheless, it will herald a new dawn in the contemporary history of Indonesian democracy, where illiberal tendencies become the norms rather than exceptions.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the author:

Iqra Anugrah is a Research Fellow at the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS), Leiden University and a Research Associate at the Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education, and Information (LP3ES). He has conducted extensive fieldwork-based research on democracy, development, social movements, and local politics in Indonesia.

Indonesia’s Ascent to OECD Membership: A step closer toward gender-responsive climate change solutions?

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Indonesia’s interest in approaching developed country status is reflected in President Joko Widodo’s plan to join the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) instead of the (Brazil, Russia, India, China) alliance. The historical relationship between Indonesia and the OECD has become stronger since 2007, promoting initiatives for growth and information sharing. Access to information, materials, and money for gender-inclusive climate programmes would be easier with the OECD’s support, improving transparency and accountability and allowing adaptive management to handle gender and power dynamics effectively. In this blog, a PhD researcher at the International Institute of Social Studies Irma Nugrahanti poses questions on the potential of the membership.

Image by Ahmad Syahrir on Pexels.

Recently, President Joko Widodo has expressed an interest in joining the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as a member instead of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) coalition. During his G20 visit to India, he started to seek support from OECD countries such as France.

 

Indonesia is already a familiar face to the OECD

Indonesia is not new to OECD partnership having been a critical partner of the OECD since 2007, where the nation’s relationship with the Organization has greatly deepened. For example, in order to participate in knowledge exchange on creative ideas to accelerate development, Indonesia joined the OECD Development Centre in 2009. In 2012, Indonesia became the first Key Partner of the OECD to sign a Framework of Cooperation Agreement (FCA), and a Privileges and Immunities Agreement in 2013. Furthermore, Indonesia opened the OECD’s first Southeast Asian regional office in Jakarta in 2015. Additionally, Indonesia helped establish the OECD Southeast Asia Regional Programme in 2014 and held one of its initial co-chair positions from that year to 2017.

This application comes with an expectation to increase Indonesia’s per capita income. The average annual per capita income of OECD members is over $10,000 USD. According to a World Bank report, Indonesia’s current gross national income (GNI) per capita is $4,500, and it is categorized as an upper-middle-income country. The goal is for this GNI to increase to $5,500 in 2024.

If Indonesia’s application is successful, this means Indonesia will move closer to becoming an ‘economically developed’ country. Indonesia can use the OECD standards as a benchmark and as best practices and will also receive support for its development initiatives. Indonesia will be the third Asian country (after Japan and South Korea) to become an OECD member. With a GDP that ranks 16th internationally based on market prices and 7th based on purchasing power parity (PPP), Indonesia has one of the most significant economies in the world. Only three other OECD nations have economies that are larger than Indonesia on a PPP basis: the United States, Japan, and Germany.

 

What does this mean to climate change and gender inequality issues in Indonesia?

Since 2014, Indonesia has been using climate change budget tagging to differentiate between climate-relevant and development expenditures based on the intended impact of the activity. This practice followed the objective-based definitions of climate-relevant activities and expenditures from OECD Rio Markers. The adoption of Indonesia’s climate budgeting, which is also responsive towards gender, has the potential to move significantly with Indonesia’s membership in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

First, this participation can make it easier for the country to have access to crucial knowledge and best practices, such as technical help and policy guidance, improving the government’s capacity to incorporate gender issues into climate budgeting successfully. Additionally, better data collecting and research assistance would help Indonesia detect and rectify gender inequities in climate policies. Indonesia could benefit from studying how OECD members incorporate gender-responsive budgeting into their policies to address environmental and climate concerns. For instance, examining the practices of OECD countries such as Ireland, where the development of a tagging system has been instrumental in linking budget allocation line items to key dimensions such as equality, green initiatives, well-being, and alignment with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Additionally,  Austria has demonstrated the efficacy of gender budgeting methods, extending their implementation to the city level since 2006. The budgeting method played a crucial role in shaping sustainable practices, as seen in the development of green cities. Third, by fostering peer review and accountability systems, the OECD would encourage transparency and accountability in the allocation of funds for gender-inclusive climate programs. Indonesia can have better access to climate finance sources that give priority to projects that take gender equality into account, enhancing its ability to address the unique climate-related difficulties faced by both men and women.

Lastly, Indonesia can generate accurate performance measurements for its climate policies, particularly those pertaining to gender equality, by using OECD markers and indicative lists. This makes it possible to monitor development more effectively and spot potential problem areas. On the basis of OECD principles, regular monitoring and evaluation can help with adaptive management, enabling Indonesia to modify its climate policies and projects in response to gender dynamics and power relations.

Even though Indonesia has to go through a rigorous process to become an OECD member, Indonesia could benefit a lot from the OECD to achieve a stronger economic and inclusive governance system. The ongoing endeavour of the Indonesian government entails the implementation of a budget tagging system, designed to identify and monitor expenditures in accordance with the nation’s climate objectives while placing gender sensitivity first. By incorporating gender and climate change considerations into government budgeting and planning, this procedure aims to increase the efficiency, accountability, and fairness of resource allocation. Indonesia can further enhance its approach by linking budget allocations to various equality dimensions and Sustainable Development Goals, in accordance with OECD principles. Complemented by the knowledge-sharing initiatives with OECD members, this will ensure that a gender-responsive climate budget adheres to global standards. Overall, Indonesia’s membership in the OECD presents a significant opportunity for it to improve its gender-responsive climate budgeting procedures and, as a result, contribute to more just and efficient climate action.

References:

Antara (2023) Indonesia’s OECD Bid: Jokowi Requests for Support from France, Tempo. Edited by P.G. Bhwana. Available at: https://en.tempo.co/read/1770317/indonesias-oecd-bid-jokowi-requests-for-support-from-france (Accessed: 19 September 2023).

Muthiariny, D.E. (2023) Indonesia Seeks OECD Membership, to Be First in ASEAN, Tempo. Available at: https://en.tempo.co/read/1758337/indonesia-seeks-oecd-membership-to-be-first-in-asean (Accessed: 19 September 2023).

The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (no date) OECD DAC Rio Markers for Climate, OECD DAC. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/dac/environment-development/Revised%20climate%20marker%20handbook_FINAL.pdf (Accessed: 19 September 2023).

OECD (no date) Key Partner Indonesia – OECD & Southeast Asia, The OECD and Southeast Asia. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/southeast-asia/countries/indonesia/ (Accessed: 19 September 2023).

OECD (no date a) Accession to the Organisation – OECD, OECD Legal Affairs. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/legal/accession-process.htm (Accessed: 19 September 2023).

World Data (no date) The 50 largest economies in the world (no date) Worlddata.info. Available at: https://www.worlddata.info/largest-economies.php (Accessed: 19 September 2023).

World Bank (2022) GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) – Indonesia, World Bank Open Data. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD?locations=ID (Accessed: 19 September 2023).

World Bank (2023) Gross domestic product 2022, PPP – World Bank, World Development Indicators database. Available at: https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_download/GDP_PPP.pdf (Accessed: 19 September 2023).

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

 

About the author:

Irma Nugrahanti is a Ph.D. researcher at the International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam. She is a six-time scholarship recipient and a gender equality and inclusive governance enthusiast. Her doctoral research focuses on the link between gender-responsive climate budgeting and climate change policies in Indonesia. Combining her years of experience in finance and policy advocacy with her research project, she aspires to fill the knowledge gap in understanding the intersectional gender-responsive budgeting practice to ensure the promotion and implementation of equity-responsive policies for climate change adaptation and mitigation responses in Indonesia.

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Revisiting ethnographic sites as an ongoing knowledge production practice

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Is it important for ethnographers to revisit the sites where they conduct their research once their projects have been completed? Returning to the site where I conducted my fieldwork six months later indicated that the answer is both yes and no. It makes me believe that ethnography practice is an ongoing knowledge production project, as people’s perspectives and practices are always evolving.

In January 2020, just before COVID-19 was classified a global pandemic, I made a journey to the site where I did my research six months prior. I had fruitful discussions with those I had engaged with for my research: about their definition of art as a form of activism (a main finding of my research), research as a knowledge production process where researchers and participants can work together, as well as about the dialogue between academic discourse and practices in the field.

When I conducted fieldwork for my Master’s degree at ISS in Pemenang village in Indonesia in July 2019, my ethnographic objective was to explore how a small art community called Pasir Putih navigated life after an earthquake devastated Lombok, the island on which the village is situated, in 2018. I immersed myself in the community for a month, stayed in their houses in order to observe their daily life activities, and conducted semi-structured interviews with them. I consider my study a mini-ethnography because while one month was quite short and what I did cannot be considered an exhaustive ethnography, I did more than interviewing the Pasir Putih artists. I did participant observation to investigate “the strange in the familiar” in the artist’s everyday lives—and to help me understand what’s beyond the things the research participants explicitly mentioned in the interviews.

As an organization, Pasir Putih strongly values knowledge production and knowledge-sharing activities, and so the initial agreement was that because they let me to stay with them for a month, I had to come back and share the research results with them. They often asked me, “What does the outsider think of us? About our conceptions of the arts?” Furthermore, for them it was important to have a conversation about the research that involved them as participants. As Sibawaihi, one of Pasir Putih artists, told the other people in community before I presented the research results, he believed that research would help them to reflect on their position as artists in the village community.

Pasir Putih is a small art community formed in January 2010 by five undergraduate students in Pemenang village and now comprising 13 active members, of which only two are women. Most of the research community members have a Bachelor’s degree in different fields, such as communication and education studies, and none of them have attained an art degree through formal education. They have attained their skills in art by doing. When I was in the field, the artists also contributed to the community as teachers for extracurricular art subjects in junior high schools in North Lombok. On their website, Pasir Putih define themselves as an “…organisasi nirlaba egaliter berbasis di Kecamatan Pemenang, Lombok Utara, Nusa Tenggara Barat oleh pegiat kultural, aktivis media dan seniman sejak tahun 2010” (“an egalitarian non-profit organization initiated and run by cultural and media activists and artists in Pemenang District, North Lombok since 2010”).[1]

After discussing my research with the community, they told me they felt my research encouraged them to define what it is that they do as artists. Sibawaihi mentioned that being involved in the research and hearing about the findings has made them realize that what they do as artists is important for people around them. I saw their work as ‘art as activism’, while the community used art as a way to express their value in the society around them. This idea of ‘art as activism’ was based on the theories I had engaged with during my Master’s research, and it differed from the idea the research participants had of themselves. Yet they found it an interesting observation. For them, art is what they do—not just for the village community, but also from and by the village community. They rejected the term ‘activist’ to avoid being considered superior to other people in the village.

They were also interested in how research could be seen as a part of the “documentation of knowledge” that might be useful now or in the future. They saw my research as “an archive for what we do that can be consulted in the future”. Interestingly, they were curious about what my lecturers at my university thought of art. “Did your teachers agree with our definition of art?” one asked. In other words, Pasir Putih artists were engaged in knowledge production not only during the research process, but also after that.

Oka, one of the artists who was a research participant as he initiated a film screening project to re-engage village communities after the 2018 earthquake, said that he was interested in the term ‘ethnography’. He related the methodology to what they do as community artists, such as staying in different villages to screen films. From Oka’s perspective, living in communities for several months is key to an ethnographic research methodology, because it helps the researcher to understand the research subject by regarding their daily practices as well as through daily conversations. Yet he felt that my stay should have been longer for me to be able to get a better grasp of their activities.

From my perspective, it was fascinating to have follow-up discussions with the research participants and to learn that they also benefited from (if I can use this term) the exchange of knowledge during the research project. As some of them expressed in the discussion, the findings of the research help them to reflect more on their perspectives and practices as artists/activists in the community. In addition, they saw my research as “archiving initiatives” related to what they had been doing, although the language barriers (I wrote the thesis in English) meant most of them could not access what I wrote. I saw the discussion that emerged about their art perspectives and practices among the Pemenang village community when I revisited the site as an interesting dialogue between academic research and practices in the field. Furthermore, ‘revisiting the site’ can be seen as an attempt to create more equal relations between researchers and the research participants in the field.

If I think back to the fieldwork, however, I realize that it was difficult to make the artists fully engaged in the research and vice versa. Given the time constraints, it was difficult for me to be fully involved in their projects. The data mostly came from semi-structured interviews rather than informal conversations with the artists. This means that my initial plan to create more equal relations with the participants was not fully successful. Despite that, the observations of the artists’ daily activities enriched the findings from the interviews.

[1] http://pasirputih.org/tentang-organisasi/, accessed on 27 September 2019

 

About the author:

Daya Sudrajat is a researcher and policy advocate in inclusive education issues based in Jakarta, Indonesia. She has a strong interest in knowledge production in marginalized communities and this led her to write a thesis about art as alternative development practice in North Lombok, Indonesia. She holds a MA degree from ISS Erasmus University of Rotterdam.

 

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Reclaiming control of Indonesia’s oceans by Salena Tramel

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At once unexplored and overexploited, the oceans surrounding Indonesia represent neoliberal development’s final frontier. But Indonesian activists are building a global movement to resist the financialisation and privatisation of the world’s oceans.

Indonesia, the largest archipelago in the world, holds some stunning coastal and deep-water resources. With more than 17,500 islands straddling two oceans, the sea is not only a way of life, but also a source of it.

Fisheries account for a significant part of Indonesia’s trillion-dollar economy – the largest in Southeast Asia. More than 30 percent of global maritime trade finds its way through the Strait of Malacca, which is among the busiest of international shipping lanes. Tourist havens are seemingly everywhere, from the palm-fringed beaches of Bali, to the abundant shallow-water reefs of the Coral Triangle.

Managing marine ecosystems is therefore an unsurprising priority for the vast number of actors that have a stake in Indonesia’s coastal economy. At once unexplored and overexploited, the oceans represent neoliberal development’s final frontier. The twin processes of ocean acidification and global warming, and related international political responses further complicate matters.

Blue economy 

New analysis was recently published in the journal Science, indicating that oceans are heating up 40 percent faster than a United Nations panel of experts predicted in a study carried out five years ago.

The study further concluded that in 2018, seawater temperatures reached an all-time high and were expected to escalate further in the coming years. Theses studies mirror those on land, where combined data from NASA and NOAA show that the five hottest years ever have occurred in the 2010s.

For many, marine ecosystem management, fisheries management, and climate change mitigation strategy are embodied in a redoubled commitment to the blue economy – the idea that the financialisation of oceans can reap economic profit and save the environment at once.

But what kind of development does the blue economy seek, and for whom? In Indonesia, small-scale fishers and their communities are holding fast to various manifestations of traditional knowledge that they see as key to ensuring the survival of the seas and of future generations.

Whose Oceans?

The Indonesian islands have long been at the forefront of oceanic policy and development circles, in large part because of their sheer numbers and strategic location.

One such high-level process held recently was the Our Ocean conference, which took place in late October in Bali. The meeting brought together a large number of powerful actors to debate some of the most pressing oceanic issues: climate change, fisheries, the blue economy, pollution, maritime security, and marine protected areas.

As is the case in many top decision-making spaces, representatives of governments, corporations, and intergovernmental institutions were given a seat at the table. Notably absent, however, were those closest to the sea – the fishers.

Marthin Hadiwinata, Chief Executive of the Indonesia Traditional Fisherfolk’s Union (KNTI), said: “Policies on marine issues cannot be addressed in the absence of fishing communities who have direct linkages to the ocean”.

Hadiwinata explained that the issue of marine pollution, for instance, most deeply affects people living around the coastal areas and small islands: “Rather than inviting fishers to share their solutions,” he added, “companies who are involved in mining and other forms of extractive industry that dump their waste into the sea are regarded as corporate partners in cleaning up dirty waters”.

Blue carbon 

Likewise, climate change mitigation and adaptation projects often turn to the problems that caused the environmental crisis in the first place as a way of responding to it. Take for example Blue Carbon, where, as with other carbon sequestration programs such as REDD+ (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation), polluters are allowed to continue their practices so long as they purchase ‘offsets’ in ecosystems elsewhere.

Most often, the burden falls on the shoulders of peasant and indigenous rural working communities, converting their crops and gathering spaces into monocultures such as industrial tree plantations.

Blue Carbon applies this logic to mangrove, coral, and seagrass ecosystems, while small-scale fishers who work in these areas are treated as nuisances and prohibited from future access to their fishing grounds.

Blue Carbon has been championed in high-level policy spaces such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) processes, as well as through ‘big green’ organisations like the Nature Conservancy. It is currently being pioneered in Indonesia.

People’s movements 

Indonesian social movements and grassroots organisations have long been in the business of carefully protecting the islands’ cornucopia of natural resources. In the rapidly evolving marine sector, fishers are forced to be quick on their feet when putting their solutions on the national agenda.

KNTI, the small-scale fisher’s movement that is present in nearly all of Indonesia’s 34 provinces, is playing a leadership role in turning the tide of both discourse and policy towards justice and sovereignty for fishers. This task is done at scale, targeting national and transnational political dynamics.

When word of the Our Ocean conference and its lack of grassroots representation reached KNTI’s members, they were quick to clap back by organising their own participatory meeting: the Ocean’s People Conference. Unlike its ‘official’ counterpart, the parallel meeting reflected the diversity of Indonesia’s small-scale fisheries sector.

The gathering strategically took place in Jakarta – not just to make it more accessible, but also to shed light on marine megaprojects encroaching on the busy capital. The most notorious of these has been a land reclamation project supported by Indonesia’s former colonisers, the Dutch.

This project has been centred on protecting Jakarta from floods by installing a network of fake islands and a giant seawall in Jakarta Bay. While the Governor of Jakarta finally revoked some of the permits necessary to complete the project – thanks, in large part, to a strategic battle fought at the hands of social movements like KNTI – much of the damage had been done.

Local activists 

Ipah Saripah, a fishworker from North Jakarta, explained that the reclamation issue has profoundly impacted her family’s livelihood: “Even though the reclamation stopped, they’ve already constructed four islands,” she said, “and that development is right in the middle of our fishing areas.

“We have been bribed, intimidated, displaced, and even tortured to make way for this reclamation,” she added.

Saripah and other activists from the fishing communities feel that big reclamation projects like the one stalled in Jakarta Bay serve as a blueprint for coastal development in Indonesia. Similar megaprojects are being rolled out in other parts of the country, and they are woven together with the common thread of replacing traditional fishing practices with profit-seeking industries backed by big Asian and European capital.

That’s what the Ocean’s People Conference and related gatherings of people’s movements are attempting to shut down. Ibu Rofi’ah, a representative of a peasant organisation in East Nusa Tengarra, Indonesia’s southernmost province, said: “We are not looking for money, but for means to spread our knowledge.”

Ibu Rofi’ah travelled to Jakarta to explain how she played a leadership role when her community put an end to an iron-mining operation. Today she is working with fisheries cooperatives that find themselves in standoffs with corporations in the mining and tourism sectors.

Movement building

Members of KNTI recognise that their struggles reflect those of fishing communities elsewhere. To this end, the movement is an active member of the World Forum of Fisher Peoples (WFFP), a transnational social justice movement dedicated to serving the unique needs of fishers and fish workers.

Since the issues affecting fishers have become increasingly entangled – for instance, when climate change adaptation policies meet big capital – WFFP has doubled down on its attack strategies to protect the communities it represents.

A key part of that is actively promoting the Small Scale Fisheries Guidelines, which is the only comprehensive global governance instrument intended to protect fishers and traditional fisheries. KNTI has been doing this work across Indonesia, and making its demands global through social movement gatherings and even United Nations processes.

Marthin Hadiwinata said: “Here in Indonesia, we are pushing the government to immediately recognise and protect fishers’ rights. And at the same time, we are building the global movement to resist financialisation and privatisation of the world’s oceans.”

This article was originally published in The Ecologist: https://theecologist.org/2019/feb/01/reclaiming-control-indonesias-oceans?fbclid=IwAR2E4tVd0ylFjOcEJKqtD4EKG_mxVRaBVsd9dmyMyW-CNdGigsoA-Zep_74

18033356_10155194755021449_220274621249703711_nAbout the author:

Salena Tramel is a journalist and PhD researcher at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) in The Hague, where her work is centered on the intersections of resource grabs, climate change mitigation, and the intertwining of (trans)national agrarian/social justice movements.