From mayhem to momentum: How a week of protest changed Nepal forever

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In this blog, ISS MA Student, Sagar Jung Karki looks into the rise and success of the 2025 ‘Gen Z’ protests in Nepal, that grew into a society-wide protest movement against corruption in the Nepali government. The protests eventually ended with Nepali Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli stepping down. Sagar Jung Karki looks into the way that the protests developed, the reasoning behind their rise, and looks at what may happen in the coming months and years following the protests.

 

Caption: AI- Generated Abstract Simulation of Singha Durbar palace in Kathmandu on September 9, 2025

Introduction

In less than a week, the Generation Z (Gen Z) protests in Nepal toppled the government, dissolved the parliament and installed the country’s first female prime minister. This was more than a protest; it was a generational awakening that refined Nepalese politics. Moreover, the movement serves as a valuable case study for examining how conflict and development theories explain the tensions and aspirations driving it.

 

Causes of the Gen Z protest

The Gen Z protest that swept Nepal from 8 to 13 September 2025 became a defining moment in the nation’s history. It was partly inspired by similar youth movements in Bangladesh, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The protest deeply resonated with youths like myself in a country where power had switched between three entrenched political parties that had been ruling for decades. There were three main reasons for the upheaval. First, there is the rampant corruption, in a country with extremely high levels of inequality. Multiple corruption scandals were exposed by the media in recent years, including the fake Bhutanese refugee scam, the visit visa scam, the airplane purchase scam, and the Baluwatar land scam. These recurring scandals led to growing despair, especially among youths. Secondly, 26 social media platforms like Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube were completely banned on 4 September after being unable to register in the country.  Most of the Nepali population, specifically the youth, used these platforms for daily communication. Defying suppression and the gag on their freedom of speech and expression, the youths turned to Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) to criticize the politicians and their ‘Nepotism Kids’ (also known as Nepo Kids)as well as plan the protests. In the days before the protest, social media was filled with content mocking politicians’ families for flaunting wealth while ordinary people struggled to make a living. Third, another significant trigger for the protest was the viral video of a provincial minister’s car hitting a little girl on a zebra crossing and escaping the scene. These series of events forced the Nepali youths to march to the streets in protests hoping for change.

Source: Context News

The aftermath of the protest

The protest initially began peacefully with college students, youth activists and others protesting in designated areas. But the calm was shattered when police opened fire and killed 19 protesters. The next day, the demonstration intensified into vandalism and anarchy with key national assets – including the parliament, presidential residence and supreme court. Most of the politicians’ homes and properties across the country were destroyed. In addition, supermarkets, hotels, showrooms, and other public spaces sustained extensive damage. While many fled to hideouts with military help, some politicians narrowly escaped death at the hands of the youth mob.

Following mass pressure, Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli resigned on 9 September, creating a leadership vacuum. The following day, amidst the curfew, the youths trusted the army to restore order. The next day, amidst nationwide curfew, the army chief held talks with the president and Gen Z representatives. That evening, the youths used online voting via Discord to nominate former Chief Justice Sushila Karki as Nepal’s first female prime minister following the president’s approval. By 13 September, life returned to normal in Kathmandu and across the nation; however, there were 74 fatalities and an estimated financial damage of US$21 billion and left 10,000 people out of work. This has made the protest a tragic yet transformative moment in the nation’s history.

 

What this means for Nepal’s future

Elections for the House of Representatives have been announced for 5 March 2026, despite the opposition of the old parties. However, there are lingering questions about how the elections and the future unfold and whether the changes demanded by the protesters are formalized and institutionalized. Many youths, including the founder of Hami Nepali, have shown interest in contesting the election. For formal representation, however, Gen Z will need the formulation of new political parties and secure an election majority. This will be a difficult and time-consuming process, given the rural stronghold of the three old parties. There is another challenge as the old parties still hold a majority in the provincial and local government levels. Beyond politicians, addressing governance malpractices will require a range of institutional changes in bureaucracy and paradigm shifts in cultural practices. Such changes will take time, but for now, all eyes are fixed on the upcoming elections and whether Gen Z-led political parties will gain the majority to form a government.

Key Takeaways

At its heart, the Gen Z protest in Nepal was more than a political outburst, it was a clash between generations, power, and unmet promises. Political Scientist Henrik Urdal’s analysis of ‘youth bulges’ can be better understood through the lens of Conflict theory helps explain this tension. When a large youth population feels excluded from decision-making and struggles with economic insecurity, frustration builds. Nepal’s young people, digitally connected and politically aware, turned that frustration into collective action. Social media became their loudspeaker, uniting scattered voices into a nationwide movement. Ironically, government attempts to suppress dissent only confirmed the protesters’ belief that their leaders were out of touch, echoing conflict theory’s idea that repression often fuels, rather than calms, public anger.

From a development perspective, Nepal’s story reflects the tension between a weak state and a strong society. Years of corruption and poor governance weakened institutions, but civil society, especially youth groups, showed remarkable resilience. Organisations like Hami Nepal and online communities stepped up where the state faltered, proving that civic energy can fill governance gaps. Yet, as development theories reminds us, activism alone cannot replace institutional reform. The army’s temporary role in stabilising the situation showed both the trust citizens still have in traditional institutions and the fragility of democratic systems that depend on them.

Ultimately, Nepal’s Gen Z reminded the world that even in fragile democracies, young people can reshape political landscapes. Their protests were not just about anger, they were about reclaiming voice and accountability. For policymakers, the message is simple: when states fail to listen, societies speak louder.

Across Asia, and beyond, similar Gen Z movements are emerging, digitally savvy, and justice-driven. Among the countries experiencing crises and catastrophes, some have recovered and transitioned, while others have continued to suffer. It is yet to be seen whether these upheavals will bring in the demanded changes in the countries or fail to do so.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

 

About the author:

Sagar Karki

Sagar Jung Karki is a current MA in Development Studies student at the International Institute for Social Studies (ISS), specializing in Economics of Development (ECD). He previously worked for think tanks on development consulting projects in Nepal. His research interests are trade and investment policies, sustainability, globalization and development.

 

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Early Warning is one of the most important components of Disaster Risk Reduction – and one of the most successful!

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In this blog to mark the International Day of Disaster Risk Reduction (October 13), HSC Coordinator Tom Ansell dives into the role of ‘Early Warning’ systems and policies as part of Disaster Risk Reduction initiatives. They fit within greater DRR programming to make sure that people are warning in advance and can take precautions, or other measures, to prepare for an upcoming shock or hazard. The 2004 Asian Tsunami highlighted the need for more early warning systems for countries with Pacific and Indian Ocean coasts – these systems were triggered earlier this year after an 8.8 magnitude earthquake off the coast of Russia.

Photo Credit: UNDRR

Introduction – DRR on multiple levels

Managing the risks to people’s lives and livelihoods before, during and after a disaster (whatever the cause) requires looking beyond just ‘responding to a disaster’. Since the 1990’s, and the UN’s ‘International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction’, attitudes towards the disaster cycle have matured and within many emergency management agencies there is some reference to several ‘phases’ of a disaster in a ‘cycle’. For example, the Australian Emergency Management Agency refers to the ‘prevention, preparedness, response, recovery’ phases (now considered a bit old fashioned!). The ‘risk management approach’ is currently the most modern frame for disaster preparation for and responding to a disaster, which focuses on risks rather than timelines: “establish contexts, identify risks, analyse risks, assess risks, treat risks” – and repeat!

Risks are themselves a mixture of hazards/shocks (something that might cause a disaster), vulnerability (socioeconomic conditions that might exacerbate the hazard), exposure (how close people, livelihoods, etc, are to the hazard), and coping capacity (the resources and protocols in place to manage risk).

It’s all put together as the following formula:

Risk = Hazard x Vulnerability x Exposure
Coping capacity

To make a risk assessment, practitioners consider the severity of a risk, and the likelihood of it occurring, to make a compound ‘score’. Disaster Risk Management involves activities, policies, procedures and so on to mitigate risks (DRR), often by reducing vulnerabilities or exposure, or by increasing coping capacity.

So a systematic approach to DRR will approach all of these various components. It’s easy to see why knowing about a hazard early might make it easier to protect people and livelihoods. Or, in technical language: Early Warning increases coping capacity, by giving more time to prepare for a hazardous situation (by taking anticipatory action), thereby decreasing exposure! Within the humanitarian sector, programmes and interventions around this are usually referred to as Early Warning, Early Action (EWEA). Ideally, these activities should be contextual, appropriate, ‘people-centred’, community-based and/or managed, and inclusive.

What do Early Warning systems look like?

What an early warning system looks like is completely dependent on the context and hazard in question. The logic behind most early warning systems, though, is monitoring a hazard (say, a river level) and then triggering information sharing and next steps once a certain level of immediacy has been reached.

For example, the Syria Civil Defence (the White Helmets) co-developed an app-based early warning system for airstrikes, military activities, and knock-on emergencies during the Syrian civil war. A central command room processes incoming reports of, say, jets taking off from an air base, and then sends a warning via app and SMS to mobile phones in the region, with instructions to take cover. Prior to this system, early warnings of air strikes were spotted by people in watch-towers, and communicated by word of mouth and a walkie-talkie radio network, which led to delays in warning people about incoming danger. This app-based system could be used to warn of other incoming hazards, for example a particularly violent winter storm, upstream flooding, or seismic activity. The Netherlands utilizes a similar system for all manner of hazards, NL-Alert.

But whilst tech-enabled Early Warning systems have grown in the last 15 years, there are plenty of contexts where word-of-mouth, radio broadcasting, or an emergency network (the ‘telephone tree’ method) is the most effective way of getting information to people in time to evacuate, take precautions, or otherwise prepare. For example, if there is a river close to a community that periodically floods, people ‘upstream’ can monitor river levels, and spread the words to communities ‘downstream’ if there is particularly high water. This is also the case for knowledge passed down through the generations: if a particular species of animal usually leaves just before a violent storm, for example, this can serve as the ‘trigger’ to warn people.

Early Warning systems are equally useful for slow-onset disasters. An example here is part of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia, which is designed to reduce the risk of famine during poor harvests by offering cash-for-work and cash transfers for people that mainly rely on local agriculture for income and to maintain access to food. The programme is ‘activated’ when drought has been detected for a certain number of months, depending on the region.

Early Warning for Tsunami since 2004

On 26 December 2004, a large underwater earthquake off the coast of Indonesia triggered 50-metre high waves that killed over 220,000 people, as well as leaving more than 2 million people homeless in 15 countries. At the time, Indonesia was not considered an especially high-risk country for tsunami, meaning that the at the time there was little monitoring of underwater seismic activity, or sea level surface. The Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre was only able to find out about the impending disaster through internet news stories about devastation in Thailand (itself also unprepared for underwater earthquakes or tsunami at the time), and so couldn’t warn countries with Indian Ocean costs in time.

Following the destruction of the 2004 tsunami, national governments, UN agencies, and NGOs all put renewed efforts into reducing exposure to tsunami and oceanic hazards. At an intergovernmental level, the tsunami sped up development and adoption of the Hyogo Framework for Risk Reduction (now surpassed by the Sendai Framework). At a national level, Thailand created a multi-hazard oceanic early warning system, with tsunami detection buoys and information sharing with Indonesian, Australian, and Indian detection buoys. These signals are sent to a national coordination centre, whereupon various operating procedures are activated. A warning is then broadcast in five languages by fax, SMS, through ‘warning box’ speakers, radio relay towers, public tannoys, social media and through radio and TV warnings. The system will be developed further to give direct to mobile phone warnings in the coming decades.

Indonesia, meanwhile, has developed a network of 553 seismographs, as well as using oceanographic modelling and local hazard mapping for low-lying coastal areas. Once this network detects seismographic activity, procedures include public announcements, vertical evacuation routes, and evacuation signage.

Outside of the Pacific region, the destruction of the 2004 tsunami impelled Caribbean governments to put together the Tsunami and other Coastal Hazards Warning System for the Caribbean Sea and Adjacent Regions (ICG/CARIBE EWS), a multi-hazard coastal early warning system, and since 2011 have integrated the CARIBE WAVE exercise, which simulates a tsunami or underwater earthquake evacuation. In 2024, over 700,000 people were ‘evacuated’ during the exercise.

Unfortunately, well-functioning early warning systems are not enough to completely mitigate the risk of a large disaster, as the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami demonstrates. More than 20,000 people died during the quake and 39-metre tsunami wave, with knock-on effects including the Fukushima Daichi nuclear accident, despite Japan having a well-developed tsunami early warning system. The worth of all of this preparation work was evident this July, though. An 8.8 magnitude offshore earthquake occurred off the coast of Russian Kamchatka, triggering early warning systems and causing precautionary policies in several countries (including Japan, Indonesia, Russia, and China), including evacuations. The earthquake did cause tsunami-like waves, though did not have the same destructive force as the 2004 tsunami.

Conclusion – early warning as part of a multi-level DRR framework

Early warning systems, then, are a key part of reducing disaster risk, especially to climactic and environmental hazards. But we shouldn’t equate that with completely eradicating risks, or indeed think that early warning is the only part of risk management and reduction that should be concentrated on. Early warning systems work best as part of a full multi-level DRR framework, with training and education on detecting hazards, well-developed protocols for early action, evacuation, or other mitigation measures; and a general policy to reduce societal vulnerability through equitable policies, reducing socio-economic inequalities, and strong governance structures.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

 

About the Author

Tom Ansell

Tom Ansell is the coordinator and programme manager of The Hague Humanitarian Studies Centre, and the Coordinator of the International Humanitarian Studies Association. He has a study background in religion and conflict transformation, as well as an interest in disaster risk reduction, and science communication and societal impact of (applied) research.

 

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Exporting ESG: Can EU Standards Deliver Fair Sustainability in Global South contexts?

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In this blog, ISS Guest Researcher Kim-Tung Dao delves into the effects that European Union ESG (Environmental, Sustainability, and Governance) standards can have on export partners in the ‘Global South’. Whilst ESG regulations are an important tool for the EU to control corporate behavior, they can have unintended consequences on producers, including onerous paperwork, blocking access to markets, and creating hierarchies of knowledge and expertise. Rather than rigid models of compliance, the author argues for a more inclusive and flexible approach that concentrates on transformation.

Image Credit: Wikimedia

European Union ESG regulations are reshaping global business practices, but their impact on the Global South remains complex and contested. This blog looks at the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of EU ESG frameworks in countries in the ‘Global South’ and proposes pathways toward more inclusive and equitable sustainability governance that respects diverse contexts and knowledge systems.

The Global Reach of European ESG  Standards

Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) regulations have emerged as central pillars in re-shaping corporate behavior toward sustainability, particularly within the European Union. The EU positions itself as a global regulatory leader, and its recent frameworks: the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), and Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR)- impose increasingly strict rules on companies operating within or trading with Europe.

While these frameworks aim to foster responsible capitalism and ecological stewardship, their influence extends far beyond European borders, raising a critical question: How do EU ESG regulations shape economic, social, and ecological outcomes in the Global South? Can these standards genuinely promote sustainable development globally, or might they inadvertently entrench existing asymmetries and constrain development pathways in the very regions they intend to benefit?

Economic Development: Opportunity or Exclusion?

Access to Green Markets 

EU ESG regulations can function as powerful catalysts for production upgrading (the process of moving to higher-value activities in global supply chains), enabling firms in the Global South to participate in emerging “green” value chains in EU countries. When effectively implemented, these standards allow exporters to secure long-term access to premium EU markets, differentiate products through sustainability credentials, and capture price premiums for verified sustainable goods. The International Trade Centre has documented how producers aligning with non-tariff environmental and social standards often gain entry to more stable, higher-value market segments, particularly in sectors like specialty coffee, ethical textiles, and certified forestry products.

However, the economic reality for many small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) across Africa, Asia, and Latin America reveals a different picture. For these businesses, ESG regulatory compliance costs often represent a significant barrier. The financial burden of certification fees, auditing costs, and infrastructure investments can be prohibitive. Administrative complexity through extensive documentation and reporting requirements strains limited resources. Additionally, many SMEs face technical capacity gaps.  While the EU provides technical guidance documents, these often remain insufficient for practical implementation. The complexity of the regulations and guidance frequently drives SMEs to seek expensive external consultants, ironically often from EU or US firms, creating an additional financial burden and potential dependency that undermines the goal of empowering Global South businesses.

The EUDR starkly illustrates these challenges by mandating full traceability and due diligence for commodities like palm oil, cocoa, and soy. Research by ECDPM highlights how Indonesian palm oil producers, particularly smallholders, struggle with the mounting costs of compliance with traceability protocols (tracking systems). Without targeted support mechanisms, such regulations risk creating a “green barrier” to trade that disproportionately affects the most vulnerable actors in global supply chains.

Social Development: Empowerment or Imposition?

From a social perspective, ESG-driven supply chain due diligence can foster improved labor standards, gender equity, and protections against exploitation. As EU firms face increasing pressure to assess and mitigate human rights impacts across their value chains, this has stimulated rising investment in social infrastructure and monitoring systems. It has also encouraged greater stakeholder engagement with previously marginalized communities and advanced the development of grievance mechanisms and remediation processes (ways to raise complaints and fix problems). The Shift Project notes that ESG regulations can drive positive business and human rights outcomes when paired with effective enforcement and local capacity building. In sectors like cocoa and coffee, EU sustainability demands have encouraged certification schemes and community development programs, as documented in multiple Fairtrade Foundation reports.

However, these well- intentioned frameworks may inadvertently marginalize the very communities they aim to protect when not grounded in local contexts. While establishing fundamental workers’ rights is important, the challenge lies in how these standards are implemented. Many ESG standards emerge from European perspectives and risk disrupting informal economies that support millions of livelihoods, not because workers’ rights are inherently problematic, but because the implementation often lacks sensitivity to local economic realities. These frameworks often overlook local working traditions and traditional governance structures while imposing externally developed metrics that fail to reflect local contexts. In regions like West Africa, cocoa farmers often lack the support infrastructure to meet traceability requirements tied to deforestation monitoring, leaving them vulnerable to market exclusion. Moreover, rigid labor standards, if applied without considering local economic conditions and providing transition support, may displace informal workers without offering viable alternatives.

Environmental Governance: Protection or Appropriation?

Ecological Safeguards

Environmental sustainability constitutes the cornerstone of EU ESG policies. Regulations like the EUDR aim to curb global deforestation and biodiversity loss by demanding verifiable, sustainable sourcing. These measures can catalyze the restructuring of multinational supply chains to prioritize conservation, adoption of more transparent environmental practices, and increased investment in ecosystem restoration and protection. By raising environmental due diligence expectations, the EU is effectively internationalizing its Green Deal ambitions, potentially accelerating global progress toward climate targets and biodiversity conservation.

Sovereignty Concerns

Yet, these ecological gains may come at the cost of local autonomy and environmental justice. As the Rights and Resources Initiative (RRI) and the authors of ‘Pluriverse: a post-development dictionary’ argue, a “one-size-fits-all” model of environmental governance often overlooks Indigenous knowledge systems that have sustained ecosystems for generations. It often ignores local conservation practices that balance human needs with ecological integrity and fails to account for diverse cultural understandings of nature-human relationships. This dynamic can lead to what critics term “green colonialism,” wherein sustainability is imposed through externally defined metrics that sideline plural understandings of environmental stewardship. Furthermore, in many parts of the Global South, livelihoods and ecosystems are deeply intertwined. Forest-dependent communities, shifting cultivators, and pastoralists may find their access to land and resources restricted under ESG frameworks focused primarily on carbon storage and biodiversity indicators.

Toward Inclusive ESG: A  Pluriversal Approach

To ensure that ESG regulation contributes to truly equitable sustainability, fundamental shifts in both process and substance are essential:

Co-creation and Shared Governance

Standard-setting must evolve from top-down prescription to collaborative co-creation. This requires meaningful engagement with diverse stakeholders from the Global South throughout policy design, representation of civil society, smallholders, Indigenous peoples, and local governments in governance bodies, and effective mechanisms for incorporating local knowledge systems and perspectives.

Capacity Building and Transition Support

The implementation gap must be addressed through comprehensive support systems. This includes dedicated funding for SMEs to upgrade practices and technologies, development of accessible and affordable traceability tools training programs that reach marginalized producers, and flexible implementation timelines that recognize different starting points.

Just Transition Integration

ESG frameworks must explicitly incorporate principles of justice and equity at their core. They should balance climate and ecological goals with social development imperatives, use context-sensitive indicators that respect diverse sustainability models, integrate benefit-sharing mechanisms that compensate communities for ecosystem services, and recognize the “pluriverse” of sustainability approaches beyond Global North conceptions.

Beyond ComplianceToward Transformation

EU ESG regulation represents a promising step toward responsible global capitalism, but the promise alone is insufficient. For ESG standards to support equitable sustainability in the Global South, they must transcend box-ticking compliance and embrace deeper, more inclusive frameworks. A pluriversal ESG model, one that integrates diverse knowledge systems, promotes justice, and fosters ecological stewardship, can offer a path forward. This requires humility, dialogue, and genuine co-governance from European policymakers and businesses. Without these elements, ESG frameworks risk reproducing the very inequalities they ostensibly seek to eliminate. The path ahead demands not just technical solutions but fundamental reconsideration of how sustainability is defined, measured, and governed. Only then can ESG truly deliver on its promise of a more equitable and ecological global economy.

 

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the author:

Kim Tung Dao

Kim Tung Dao is a recent PhD graduate of the International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam. Her research interests include globalization, international trade, sustainable development, and the history of economic thought.

 

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The Ruling Elites Put Democracy under Duress in Indonesia – and the People are fighting back

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Police violence against recent protests by civil society groups and social movements marks the biggest challenge for Indonesia’s Prabowo administration and tests the Indonesian political class’ commitment to democracy. In this blog Iqra Anugrah and Rachma Lutfiny Putri explain how Oligarchic agendas of the elites have led to disastrous policy choices, triggering the protest movement. Progressive politics, despite its lack of leadership and clear ideology and platform, should maintain this momentum by defending itself from state repression and forcing elite concessions.

Photo Credit: Maria Cynthia, Wikimedia

Recent anti-oligarchic protests across Indonesia have presented the biggest political challenge to the Prabowo administration since it took power in 2024. Repressive handling of the protests by the Indonesian police, which resulted in the martyrdom of Affan Kurniawan, a motorcycle taxi driver, and nine others along with the arrest of 3,337 protesters triggered a protest movement to spread like wildfire. All of this has happened in less than a year after Prabowo’s inauguration as president.

The gruesome nature of Affan’s death significantly raised political consciousness of the movement and the general public, but the collective anger behind it has been simmering for a while. Like other authoritarian populists, Prabowo had pursued a series of questionable policies prone to elite hijacking and rent-seeking, such as the Free Nutritious Meal programme and the Danantara sovereign wealth fund. But the causes for the recent protests were something more structural and paradigmatic: increasing inequality and precariousness, shrinking ‘middle class,’ growing military role in politics, and crackdown on democratic dissent. These were exacerbated by the contempt of several members of the parliament (MPs) toward the plight of the working people and the proposal to raise their allowances amidst economic hardship.

By the time of this writing, the clashes between the state and the movements had entered a period of protracted de-escalation. With the exception of some young liberal influencers who naively entered an appeasement dialogue with a few MPs, labor unions, women’s movements, and student activist groups still continue their grassroots advocacy and popular education works, while the police continue to detain those arrested.

Concrete policy shifts after this crisis are still unclear. Aside from the cancellation of the proposed housing allowance raise for MPs, the government has yet to meet other crucial demands: ending police violence, reducing excessive allowances for MPs and high-ranking officials, and addressing labor demands concerning fair wage and employment relations.

Deepening illiberal and authoritarian practices under Prabowo presidency suggest the limits of a democratic façade to oligarchic politics. This propelled widespread response from a broad alliance of grassroots social movements supported by the public and piggybacked by liberal-leaning groups and influencers. The ruling elites made only limited concessions to popular demands, while divisions between grassroots bases and liberal networks show how fragmented the civil society remains. The future will remain uncertain and bleak, but grassroots social movements can break this impasse by exercising their leadership and mobilizational power to force further elite concessions.

By Mori505 - Own work, CC BY 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=174069478
Photo Credit: Mori505 via Wikimedia

Drivers of the protests: the changing contour of oligarchic politics

The shift to a more brazen display of authoritarian politics in Indonesian democracy is not merely a product of changing elite political culture, but a logical consequence of the transformation of mechanisms of oligarchic extraction in the interests of the ruling class and the bourgeois state. At the international level, Indonesian economic and political elites try to tap into profits offered by the booming nickel industry. Domestically, these oligarchic elites have expanded their extraction targets from traditional sectors (e.g., land and coal resources) to ‘white elephant’ projects most notoriously the construction of the new capital city.

As detailed by the People’s Liberation Party, this heavy strain on the state budget is further compounded by the ambition of Prabowo, himself a top member of the oligarchic elites, to implement his flagship Free Nutritious Meal  programme, which has been poorly implemented, and increase military spending. This forced the central government to slash transfer funds for regional governments by 50 per cent in 2025. In turn, many local governments significantly raised property taxes, with some raising them by over 100 per cent.

These policies prompted various mass protests since the beginning of Prabowo’s tenure, ranging from anti-government protests in various cities to the famous anti-tax protest in Pati, Central Java, which forced the district head of Pati to resign.

Unsurprisingly, it becomes imperative for the ruling elites to further constrain democratic spaces to defend their interests. The tragic death of Affan, the excessive use of state violence, and the political elites’ lukewarm response to this crisis are clear signs of this development.

 

The nature of the protest coalition: Fragmentation amidst rising political consciousness

Responding to this elite assault, a series of protests started in late August. Of particular interest were the protests in Jakarta on August 28, the day Affan was martyred. They shared the same anti-government sentiment but differed in their policy demands and compositions of protest coalitions. Four participating groups can be identified:

1) labor unions, whose demands centered around wage increase and job security,

2) broad people’s coalition for climate justice consisting of farmers, fishers, grassroots women’s movements, and urban poor organizations,

3) student activists who rejected the proposed housing and other allowances raise for the MPs, and

4) motorcycle taxi drivers, whose mobilization intensified after the police’s armored vehicle ran over Affan.

These four groups, in varying degrees, continued their protests after Affan’s tragic death and intensifying police violence.

Afterwards, the coalitions and support for the protesters gained broad public support. Public jubilation and awe when witnessing the looting of the houses of problematic MPs, most notoriously the suspended MP Ahmad Sahroni, indicated the culmination of their collective anger.

But this brief period of political joy was punctuated by arson cases targeting public infrastructure in Jakarta such as bus stops and an optical server box, a pattern that spread to other cities. While there is a strong possibility that factions of the competing elites were behind these provocations, one should keep in mind that the youth participating in these urban riots saw their act as one of defiance and, we would add, protest against the sanctification of wealth and private properties of the elites.

These chaotic events, followed by increasing repression and control by the police and armed forces, led to the reappearance of a familiar trope in Indonesian politics: the dichotomy between peaceful and ‘anarchistic’ protesters. While we remain cognizant of elite manipulation behind these events and the excesses of street protests, we reject such dichotomy. Such as a false dichotomy, in our view, is cynically deployed by the ruling elites and the state to tame people’s militancy and divide the public. Further, as the case of violent attacks against student protesters resting at safe zones at Bandung Islamic University and Pasundan University showed, the police and armed forces have a long record of using the false dichotomy as a pretext to curb freedom of assembly and speech of dissident and marginalized groups.

As this chaos subsided, the latter phase of the protests witnessed the emergence of liberal influencers as accidental torchbearers of the movement. Political scientist Edward Aspinall argued that the proponents of this not-so-new counterculture of protest are student executive councils, unions and NGOs. His comprehensive analysis misses one new actor: liberal influencers with links to consultancy and ‘hip’ online media industries. Deliberately intervening into the ongoing dynamics, they summarized organic programmatic demands from various working-class and popular organizations into a laundry list of demands called the ‘17+8’ demands (a catchy reference to the Indonesian date of independence, 17 August).

While we recognize the value of such campaigns and their impact on raising political awareness among the urban middle class, we doubt their claims about actual campaign reach and policy impacts. We also criticize the inherent class bias and celebrity culture in their methods of activism which unfortunately sideline the role and agendas of actual working-class bases and organizations — groups whose agency played a key role in advancing the political aims of the protests and yet remains nameless and unseen. This attitude is emblematic of the cultural and political outlooks of the liberal/critical sections of the professional managerial class in Indonesia.

Our informal conversation with working-class activists involved in the protests and grassroots collectives reveal their anger and criticism toward the liberals. The main problem with liberal activism, in their view, is the lack of stronger labor and class demands and the dominance of liberal aesthetics and voice at the expense of aspirations and experiences of the most marginalized. From our conversation with them, we learned that the sacrifice of working-class activists at the frontline of the protests, including a dozen of ordinary labor and rural activists from our own personal networks detained or charged as provocateurs by the police, features mostly as statistics in mainstream media rather than stories of pro-democracy heroism.

Like their previous predecessors, liberal influencers are ‘floating’, divorced from the lived experience and consciousness of the masses. This detachment reveals a long-standing fault line in Indonesian civil society: between liberal and progressive–radical activism.

 

Take-away points

It is still too early to assess the impact and legacy of the 2025 protests, but we would like to highlight three important take-away points.

First, both ‘spontaneity’ and ‘leadership’ in mass movements are not opposites, but rather essential parts in a process to consolidate democratic leadership and institutionalization of social movements. As Rosa Luxemburg once reminded us, social reforms and spontaneity mobilized the oppressed, but revolutionary collectivity is mandatory to make their gains last.

Second, reflecting on the severity of state repression in recent protests, we reaffirm the right of the protesters to defend themselves against state violence through peaceful, and, under severe circumstances, disruptive methods. Our argument is not a provocation of violence but rather a view backed by research. A rigorous study has shown that disruptive actions by nonelites drive democratic deepening. Street protests and their dynamics are indeed the bloodlines of democracy.

Lastly, given the lack of success of the liberal influencers’ lobbying effort with the parliament, it is high time for grassroots working-class organizations to mobilize again. Only their leadership and political power can break this impasse.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

 

Disclaimer and acknowledgement: We maintain an active engagement with Indonesian social movements and our works since 2015 can be verified with various organizations, communities, and individuals that we have been working with. Currently we are conducting field research in Indonesia as Visiting Researchers at Agrarian Resource Center (ARC). In particular, we would like to thank our comrades at Progressive Islam Forum (FIP) and Kolektif SULU for insightful discussions on recent developments with them.

About the authors:

Iqra Anugrah

Iqra Anugrah is a Trapezio MSCA Seal of Excellence Fellow at the Department of Foreign Languages, Literatures and Modern Cultures at the University of Turin. He holds affiliate positions at the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) at Leiden University and the Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education, and Information (LP3ES) in Jakarta. His current project examines multi-strand conservatism in Indonesia.

 

Rachma Lutfiny Putri

Rachma Lutfiny Putri is a Wenner-Gren Wadsworth International Fellow and a PhD candidate at the Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology, Vrije Universiteit (VU) Amsterdam and a Visiting Fellow at Populi Center. Her interests include urban anthropology, value chain, informal work, and development studies.

 

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The need for ‘Impact’: whatever ‘Impact’ means

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What happened to the scholar that didn’t embrace new media? They ran out of cassette tapes! Awful jokes aside, it’s more and more important for scientists, and particularly social scientists, to be plugged in to society to better interact with it. A recent Economist article highlighted that academic research papers in the humanities and social sciences are getting harder to read, more convoluted and stuffed full of jargon and incomprehensible sentences. There is a perception in the ‘outside world’ (perhaps pushed by populist political currents!) that academics are starting to talk more just to other academics rather than to society at large, which is at the very least not conducive to a high level of public discourse. In some cases, it has led to the removal of experts from the policymaking process. At the same time, and partially thanks to the growing legions of science communications officers and the phenomenon of ‘cool geeks’, there are more opportunities than ever for (social) scientists to spread their ideas and research in accessible, bite-sized and socially engaged ways. Even the Lowlands Festival has a science pavilion to show off the latest research on everything from the psychology of perceptions of equality, quantum physics, the creative possibilities of generative AI and much more besides.

Tom Ansell,  Sarah Njoroge (MSc) and Gabriela Anderson intend this blog as a call to academics to think along, repackage their work into fun and digestible gobbets and make use of the science communications talent available to help boost our collective ‘impact’… whatever ‘impact’ means!

This image was taken at Research InSightS LIVE #4 Conflict Compounded: Implications of the war in Ukraine on global development challenges

Social science is best when it’s in conversation with society

Aside from the self-fulfilment element, and the satisfaction of personal curiosity, social scientific research has a function of providing evidence-based approaches to societal questions that can inform various stakeholders in how they act. That could be the government, organizations, businesses or people themselves. Like many forms of scientific enquiry, it serves to further human knowledge, and so (indirectly and ideally) improve people’s lives or the society that they live in. The link between the academic and the society in which they function should be one of constant conversation, where ideas are presented to people, and then validated or reconsidered through their experiences and their interaction with the everyday (this is also expressed by Anthony Giddens as the ‘double hermeneutic’). Of course, this sentence may spark flashing lights in the minds of many academics reading this, but in short – social science is rooted in society and so should seek to be in conversation with ‘real’ people all the time. A social scientist that hides away in a university is an isolated one! This means that researchers must have a way of being in conversation with people. At least part of that conversation must be a clear transmission of social science theories in a compelling and clear way, and knowledge sharing in a form that is digestible, interesting and (hopefully) means that people in the ‘real world’ can see their own lives and questions in cutting-edge research.

This is especially true in the last few years , where a significant portion of the world’s institutions face ‘alternative facts’ and the rise of public discourse strongly influenced by a ‘post-truth’ world. During the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, the need to provide accurate and evidence-based advice to the general public was literally a matter of life and death. Knowledge of the mechanisms of how an mRNA vaccine worked (the Moderna one) helped ensure that enough people went and received the jab to reach the critical mass of vaccinated people. Now imagine if the various biologists had remained hidden behind a wall of jargon and specific terminology, and all the while remained in their labs and refused to speak to the public in understandable language. Naturally, the immediate risks aren’t quite the same in social science research uptake, but the need for public trust and mandate is the same. Where the influence of rigorous social scientific research would help, however, is in government policymaking. Imagine how the new Dutch international aid policy would look had various members of ISS’ work been consulted in its drafting. We can’t make policymakers listen to good research, but we can make it as easy as possible for them to find, digest and be interested by it.

Avoiding extractivism and ‘closing the loop’

Considering the other side of the conversation between research and the public, we need to move beyond the effort of making sure our writing reflects our values as researchers to be ethical and non-extractive only during the research process. Research even in these most critical and conscious of times still teeters on the lines of opinion-mining, often masquerading through notions such as ‘collaboration’ and ‘co-creation’. Jamie Gorman expresses this quite well in the quote (almost jokingly): ‘What does a social researcher have in common with an oil rig operator? The answer is that both can be miners engaged in the extraction of a precious resource’. For social science researchers, that precious resource is knowledge. A key part of making sure that research is non-extractive is ‘closing the loop’ and making sure that the people that have contributed to the research are both involved and can get something out of it (something called participatory research).

The potential impact of research does not stop before and during the research process, it needs to extend into the dissemination and communication of said research. By looking beyond the production of a research to how it can be shared to an audience outside of the academic community, we allow for a greater reach through inclusivity, accessibility and even opening up for future potentials in participation and, most importantly, allowing research to be useable (from theory to practice and vice versa). How is this done? By sharing research in different mediums and through different mediums and media. Examples include translated versions, both in terms of language and even the softening of academic and ‘waffle’ jargon, different (relevant) and contextual forms of outputs, such as radio broadcasts (in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo), video abstracts, infographics, posters, dialogue cafes, podcasts, etc. In doing so, we reach people at their different levels in all their differences of backgrounds, making room for a greater impact from our research.

Moving from inaccessible papers to socially engaged media

So, how do we actually move from rigorous, well-researched ideas to public discourse and policy that reflect them? The best science communication doesn’t just ‘simplify’ research, it translates, distils, demystifies and engages. It meets people where they are, using formats that are accessible without compromising complexity, and applies sky high thinking to everyday life.

Take podcasts, for instance. The Good Humanitarian bridges the gap between academic research and humanitarianism and the real-world challenges practitioners face. MOOCS, or open access-learning, allows people – whether they have an educational background in social sciences or not – to engage with contemporary debates. Written and visual storytelling, from in-depth interviews, infographics and posters to interactive web experiences, has made complex and socio-political topics more digestible for a general audience. Live shows, such as Research InSightS LIVE or dialogue cafes invite people to listen and engage on topics in enjoyable, yet succinct formats. In addition, social media is increasingly becoming more important for visibility, and as a way to link research that proposes an alternate world to the people that can achieve it. Even platforms like TikTok have been effectively used to debunk misinformation and explain key social science concepts in under a minute, but all face potential challenges of course.

At the same time, researchers must be empowered to engage in these spaces. Not everyone who can run a hefty statistical model or analyse complex patterns can seamlessly translate these insights for public consumption. This is precisely where science communicators come in – not to dilute these ideas but to ensure that big ideas are clarified and shared widely. Closing the loop isn’t just an ethical responsibility in participatory research – it’s a vital step toward ensuring that knowledge serves people by feeding back into their livelihoods.

Science communicators do more than just support researchers. They can be catalysts for expanding the reach and impact of academic work at its inception. Research can often benefit from creativity and audience awareness that can make it resonate beyond academia. In other words, researchers and science communicators can make an excellent team – if they truly collaborate. That means not just seeing communicators as an ‘add-on’, but valuing their input, trusting their instincts and recognizing their ability to turn rigorous research into compelling narratives that engage policymakers, practitioners and the public alike, also extending their inclusion to before and during the research process, not only after.

If universities and research institutes truly want to make an impact, they need to rethink the way they communicate knowledge. The challenge isn’t just about writing readable research papers. It’s about shaping public discourse, informing policy and making social science a living, breathing conversation. After all, what good is knowledge if it’s locked away in academic journals?

 

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

 

About the authors:

Tom Ansell

Tom Ansell is the coordinator and programme manager of The Hague Humanitarian Studies Centre, and the Coordinator of the International Humanitarian Studies Association. He has a study background in religion and conflict transformation, as well as an interest in disaster risk reduction, and science communication and societal impact of (applied) research.

Sarah Njoroge

Sarah Njoroge (MSc) is a multi-skilled communications professional who tells stories on societal issues through videos, articles, podcasts and more. She has extensive experience writing, designing and co-producing content on international development. Sarah is currently a Digital Content Manager at RNW Media and formerly worked as a Communications Officer at ISS.

Gabriela Anderson

Gabriela Anderson is the community manager of The Hague Humanitarian Studies Centre and coordinates the Humanitarian Observatories Network. Graduating with a Master’s from the International Institue of Social Studies in 2022 with a focus on the Governance of Migration and Diversity, her research focuses on notions of (self-)representation, placemaking and the importance of inclusive communication in its various forms and through its different mediums, especially in areas of Conflict & Peace with both academic and practitioner related organizations.

 

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Mobilizing against patriarchy and caste on Twitter: How women in India use digital spaces to speak up against gender-based violence

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Digital spaces can amplify marginalized voices, but for many women, especially Dalit women in India, they often become sites of abuse. Navigating the intersection of gender, caste, and religion, Dalit women face systemic exclusion and violence, reinforced by both offline and online structures. While technology does not oppress all women equally, movements like #MeToo have helped Dalit women spotlight caste-based and patriarchal violence. In this blog, recent ISS MA graduates, Sri Lakshmi, and Emaediong Akpan explore how digital platforms both challenge and reinforce structural inequalities, revealing that technology is never neutral.

Image Credit: DALL-E

Dalit women in India

The Indian Hindu religious caste system (more than 3000 years old) has stratified Indian society into castes based on bloodline, occupation, and economic resources. The Brahman caste and other ‘upper’ castes have capitalized on their social position to exercise superiority and control over the ‘lower castes’ and therefore sustains an exploitative system. At the other end of the scale, the Dalit caste is deemed to have been rejected by God and is therefore ‘outside’ the caste system. While India has made progress in several social aspects, the sturdy caste system continues to prevail based on religious authorization. The Brahman caste has subjugated women from their own caste as well as ‘lower’ castes to maintain ‘caste purity’. This modus operandi is manifested in intense oppression and gender-based violence towards the Dalit women. ‘In every sphere of life, they (Dalit women) are in a pitiable position, worse off than the upper caste women’ due to the triple oppression exerted by men from their own caste and ‘upper castes’. The triple oppression here refers to casteism, patriarchy,and economic injustices that are manifested as gender-based violence, caste-based discrimination, and being limited to low-grade jobs that are poorly paid.

The Janus-faced nature of digital spaces in India: Reflections on the non-neutral nature of digital spaces

Digital technology has expanded communication, breaking traditional media barriers and enabling collective action. Today,people are leveraging digital spaces like Twitter (now X),and FaceBook to organize, draw attention to their struggles, and demand change.

In India, the dawn of digital spaces transformed social interactions, providing avenues for citizens to engage politically, communicate their demands. These spaces are considered revolutionary tools that promote global inclusion and equality. 

These spaces also act as a window into the broader Indian society, where norms and power interact to control individual actions. In navigating societal norms, digital spaces have been useful in helping Dalit women find community and access resources for mobilization. For example, Pallical, a Dalit rights activist, noted that ‘online space is refreshing and a space we never had earlier. There used to be limited regional media spaces, but we are now visible, and much of our anti-caste conversations are now happening on social media platforms’. For example, stories of how Dalit women were flogged and assaulted in public in the small city of Una led to government intervention only after it went viral on Twitter.

In this example, Twitter (and other digital spaces) served as a powerful public space for minorities and marginalized voices to circumvent traditional media; online, these actors could express opinions and opposition in a succinct format, as well as unite and organize swiftly in their capacity as ‘new social movements’. However, this is not the full picture. In these spaces, these marginalized groups are still unable to escape society and have been re-victimized in the spaces that also hold a ‘liberating’ potential’. This inability to ‘escape’ reality is why Wacjman states that technologies are not neutral; they do not exist outside of society but are a part of society. Within digital spaces, interactions are understood as performing gender roles that are deeply ingrained in society.

Digital spaces are a replication of gendered societal values and norms. One such replication is the backlash that followed the posting of an image showing a poster held by Jack Dorsey (former Twitter CEO) and Dalit Activists that read ‘Smash Brahminical Patriarchy’.

Image
Former Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey and Activists holding a Poster: Source Nalina

This sparked controversy and threats of boycotts on Twitter, ultimately emboldening casteism by forcing an apology for the poster and image. Despite knowing the impact of the caste system, Twitter conformed to the social norms in Indian society by stating that the poster ‘did not represent Twitter’s official position’. Twitter also apologized for speaking out against marginalization and social injustice in order to avert the risk of losing the Indian market which boasts about 8 million Twitter users. This singular act amongst many others reflects how technology is both a source and consequence of marginalization; first because of how it relates with society and second as a consequence of marginalization by reinforcing it through ‘mindless apologies’.

Twitter’s Denial of Siding with Dalits; Source: Bapuji and Chrispa

Gendered access and use of technology in India: The #MeToo case study in India

The #MeToo movement was a viral online movement of raising voices against the sexual harassment of women. Many women came forward to share their experiences using the hashtag #MeToo on Twitter and other digital spaces.

The Indian #MeToo movement leaves the original ‘Me’ behind

The Indian #MeToo movement was started in 2017 by Raya Sarkar, a woman from the Dalit caste. She used the digital space of Facebook to expose sexual harassment as a form of gender-based violence by male professors in Indian universities by curating a List of Sexual Harassers in Academia (LoSHA). Sarkar was berated for posting such a ‘name and shame list’ in an attempt to re-enact the historical silencing and disregard for the testimonies of sexual violence against Dalit women in India. After this, the movement was taken over by mainstream activists, especially on Twitter and this diffused any remnant attention on the marginalization of women from the Dalit caste. While there were several personal testimonies on Twitter in which Indian women shared their experiences of sexual harassment, the testimonies of Dalit women were absent and scarcely featured in the debates that ensued. Hence, Twitter became a tool used to exclude the voices of the most oppressed who suffer on account of their class, race, and gender. In this way, Twitter reinforced the marginalization of Dalit women.

Technology as a source and consequence of gendered relations: Exclusion and discrediting of marginalized voices

As stated earlier, digital spaces have been instrumental in helping marginalized groups draw attention to social injustices. However, platforms like Twitter are generally unsupportive and even hostile toward women from the Dalit caste. Their marginalization on Twitter reflects these women’s reality by mirroring the existing caste network. It is unsettling to witness the casual and rarely-questioned oppression on Twitter faced by Dalit women. The oppression includes casteist slurs, disparaging comments on darker skin tones, and implicit insults on how women who are academically, professionally, and financially successful, or who have a fairer skin tone, are told that they don’t ‘look’ Dalit. Twitter has also provided the space for misogynists to target Dalit women without any consequences. This shows how technology (digital spaces) embolden and exacerbate existing gender inequalities and caste-based marginalization’ . Gender- and caste-based social dynamics and technology therefore connive to leave women from the Dalit caste behind on Twitter.

Conclusion

While there are numerous accounts of the benefits of social movements that have been organized in digital spaces, the realities are not the same for all, especially for marginalized groups. This lends credence to Whelan’s position that technology does not oppress all in the same way, nor does it necessarily oppress all women. In India, Dalit women, despite having gained access to digital spaces to draw attention to the injustice they face, are often faced with violence based on their gender and caste. Thus, although Twitter helped to break the culture of silence around sexual violence and draw attention to the injustices faced by Dalit women, it did not influence social relations to address the root causes. Rather, it emboldened these root causes and became a space where Dalit women continue to experience violence. People who wield more power (upper caste and those with more access) decide and shape technology by deciding what information is important or true.

Digital spaces are double-edged – they expose women and marginalized groups to harm, yet remain vital for organizing social movements. Recognizing the lack of neutrality of these spaces remains crucial, as offline systems of oppression are often mirrored and reinforced online. While legal frameworks can play a role in addressing digital harms, they alone cannot dismantle deeply entrenched caste and gender hierarchies. Instead, the focus must shift to challenging the power structures that shape technology itself. The experiences of Dalit women show that technology can be both a tool of oppression and resistance. Ensuring that digital platforms do not further marginalize vulnerable communities requires holding innovators and policymakers to higher ethical standards while amplifying the voices of those fighting for justice.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the authors:

Sri Lakshmi

Sri Lakshmi is a recent graduate of the Master’s in Development Studies program at the International Institute of Social Studies. With nine years of experience working with students, caregivers, educators, disability inclusion organizations, and government officials. Sri is passionate about fostering inclusive spaces, bridging the gap between education and social impact.

Emaediong Akpan

Emaediong Akpan is a recent graduate of the Master’s in Development Studies program at the International Institute of Social Studies. With extensive experience in the development sector, Emaediong Akpan’s work spans gender equity, social inclusion, and policy advocacy. She is also interested in exploring the intersections of law, technology, and feminist policy interventions to promote safer online environments. Read her blogs 1,2, 3

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Beyond victimhood: The untold realities of Nepali brides in South Korea

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Nepali brides in South Korea are often portrayed as victims of violence, abuse, exploitation, slavery, and trafficking. But are these the only realities of Nepali brides? Nilima Rai in this article, challenges the dominant monolithic narrative of victimhood and sheds light on the other realities of these women – many of whom navigate such matrimonies with resilience, academic and professional achievements, and significant socioeconomic and cultural contributions in Korea and Nepal. Through patchwork ethnography, this article reveals Nepali brides’ overlooked agency, aspirations, achievements, and contributions beyond their image as victims.

Image by Sukanto Debnath

‘They call us Bhote ko budi,1 someone with Pothi Visa,2 who didn’t find a suitable man to marry, the victims of domestic violence and abuse, and someone who is miserably sitting in a corner and crying over their ill fate,’ one of the Nepali brides said. This illustrates the racist, sexist, and negative remarks the Nepali brides encounter in their day-to-day lives. This article discusses how the dominant narrative of victimhood further reinforces stigmas and prejudices of Nepali brides.

Transnational marriage in South Korea: Nepali brides

Transnational marriage between Nepali brides and Korean men began in the early 1990s when Nepali migrant workers entered Korea through the Industrial Trainee System.3 These brides, mainly belonging to socio-economically marginalised Tibeto-Burmese ethnic groups, are preferred4 due to their physical similarity to Korean people.

Nepali women participate in transnational marriage as an opportunity created by globalisation but with an expectation to fill the bride shortage vis-à-vis the ongoing crisis of social reproduction in South Korea. Like other foreign brides,5 Nepali brides make compromised choice of marrying foreign men and settling outside their country to escape poverty, attain upward mobility, or find access to labour markets that are otherwise denied to them.6  Conversely, Korean men7 rejected in the local marriage market due to their low socio-economic status and societal expectations of women seeking brides outside their racial/ethnic pool in countries such as China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Cambodia, Mongolia, and Nepal to name a few.

In Nepal, such marriages occur through commercial marriage brokers, mutual friends and relatives living and working in Korea. Since the early 2000s, Nepali women have entered transnational marriage through the marriage agencies/bureaus in Korea and Nepal.

The media’s victim narrative and its impact on Nepali brides

With the active involvement of the marriage brokers as matchmakers and the negative implications of such commercialised marriages, Nepali brides are often disparagingly depicted as ‘victims’ – the victims of trafficking, slavery, domestic violence, abuse, and deception. For more than a decade and even today, domestic and international news media have been replete with the sufferings of Nepali brides in Korea, portraying them as pitiful, bleak, wretched, sold, trafficked, and enslaved in Korean households. A rapid increase of unregulated marriage agencies in Nepal and Korea has resulted in increased numbers of fraudulent marriages engendering domestic violence and abuse of some of the Nepali brides. News media have widely reported cases of violence against Nepali brides along with their testimonies. Such efforts have highlighted the grave concerns of violence against those Nepali brides who experienced domestic violence and abuse. However, the paucity of research on the overall experiences of these brides, and the overwhelming representation of these women in media not only created their image as ‘women in peril’ and labelled them as ‘victims’ but also reinforced the already existing stigmas and prejudices against these women within the Nepali diaspora community in Korea.

These brides are subjected to gender-oppressive slurs by the Nepali diaspora community which sees them as ‘promiscuous’, ‘leftovers’, or someone who has a problem or is behaving strangely, thus ineligible to marry a man from their vicinity. The media’s tendency to depict Nepali brides merely as victims, the lack of research as well as the condescending attitudes of the Nepali diaspora community and the potential threat of oppressive slurs has often resulted in the silencing of Nepali brides.

‘Other Nepali brides in our community scolded me for allowing them to take my video and giving an interview to one of the media people,’ said one of the Nepali brides. This illustrates the negative implications of such narratives of Nepali brides fostering distrust and discontentment not only towards the media but also within the Nepali diaspora community. Some expressed their resentment through words, while others demonstrated it through their act of refusal, hesitation and constant need for reassurance that those approaching them were not affiliated with the media.

The realities of other Nepali brides

Narrating these women’s stories only through victimhood perspectives obscures the other realities of brides who claim to be empowered through economic gain, freedom of mobility and the acquisition of new knowledge and skills. These are the Nepali brides whose lived realities differ from those who suffer from violence and abuse.

‘Do we look like the victims of domestic violence or unhappy in our marital life, like how these journalists often portray us? Rather, I think I made the right decision getting married and coming here as I have more freedom to work, earn and live my life on my own terms,’ one of the Nepali brides said.

Similarly, another Nepali bride expressed her frustration, saying, ‘I am sick and tired of how these Nepali media represent us. A few years back, one of the journalists asked for our (her husband and her) photo, saying they wanted to cover the stories of Nepali brides. Still, in the end, they published our photo under the awful title and story that talked about how pitiful Nepali brides are. I am more than happy with my husband, who speaks fluent Nepali and actively contributes to Korean and Nepali literature and society. We both are hotel entrepreneurs. So, do you think my story fits into one of those stories published in the newspaper?’

Nepali bride with her husband tending their kitchen garden at Jeju-do, South Korea

The Nepali brides who were not victims of violence – and whose stories did not fit in with the articles published in news media – claimed to have made adjustments early on in their marriage, particularly in terms of language, food, and culture. They are now content with their familial relationships, have successfully established their professional careers, and are able to support their left-behind/natal families in Nepal.

These brides wish to be recognised as successful entrepreneurs, educators, nurses, police officers, poets, counsellors, interpreters, and promoters of Nepali culture, food, and language across the Nepali border. Instead of questioning their intentions in choosing a foreign spouse and vilifying them as ‘gold diggers’ – those who marry old Korean men for ‘card’/citizenship – and helpless victims of violence – who are beaten, battered, and abused by their husbands and in-laws – they want their achievements and contributions in both Korea and Nepal to be valued and acknowledged.

Furthermore, these women are often fluent in the Korean language and are pursuing/pursued further academic and professional endeavours in Korea; things they believe they could not have achieved in Nepal. Based on my research, Nepali migrant workers and students rely heavily on these brides to book public venues and bargain in local shops. They also rely on them for critical services such as translating/interpreting sensitive court cases and counselling in medical and mental health cases. Furthermore, these brides provide constant support and services as teachers and educators in schools, institutes, and migrant worker centres; provide health and safety orientations in factories and industries; act as counsellors to facilitate immigration procedures; work as nurses in hospitals, as police officers, established women’s shelters for migrant workers and provide all the necessary support in the rescue and repatriation of undocumented migrant workers.

Highlighting these women’s stories as achievers and contributors is not to trivialize the gravity of the issues related to violence against Nepali women/brides at all levels in and outside the country. The main aim of this article was to discuss the consequences of one-way narratives of victimhood that have negative implications on the lives of other Nepali brides who are happy with the positive outcome of their struggles in a foreign land. There is a need for in-depth research into the broader experiences of these women and for a multi-stakeholder dialogue and deliberation with state and non-state actors such as news media.

Endnotes

1. ‘Bhote’ is “a derogatory term for ethnically Tibetan people from northern Nepal (Gurung 2022, 1746). This kind of racial slur has been used against Nepali brides in Korea due to the resemblance or the similar physical features of Korean men with these ethnically Tibetan people.

Gurung, Phurwa.2023. ‘Governing caterpillar fungus: Participatory conservation as state-making, territorialization and dispossession in Dolpo, Nepal’ EPE: Nature and Space 6, No.3: 1745-1766.

2. In Nepal, the word ‘poth’” or ‘hen’ is a derogatory colloquial term often used as an oppressional slur that evinces male dominance or superiority over women (Lama and Buchy 2002).

Lama, Anupama and Marlene Buchy. 2002. ‘Gender, Class, Caste and Participation: The Case of Community Forestry in Nepal’ Indian Journal of Gender Studies 9, No.1: 27-41.

3. Before the Employment Permit System (2004), Korea systematised the inflow of migrant workers by introducing the Industrial Trainee System in 1991. Nepali migrant workers entered Korea through this trainee system. In 1990, 43,017 Nepali migrant workers were recorded in Korea.

Rai, Nilima, Arjun Kharel, and Sudeshna Thapa.2019. Labour Migration from Nepal-Factsheet: South Korea, Centre for the Study of Labour and Mobility and Foreign Employment Board, Nepal. https://archive.ceslam.org/fact-sheets/factsheet-south-korea

Based on my research findings, some Nepali brides were found to enter Korea through the trainee system in the early 1990s and later married Korean men.

4. Kim, Kyunghak, and Miranda De Dios. 2017. ‘Transnational Care for Left-Behind Family in Nepal with Particular Reference to Nepalese Married Migrant Women in Korea’ Global Diaspora and the Transnational Community: Migration and Culture.

5. Kim, Minjeong.2018. Elusive Belonging: Marriage Immigrants and ‘Multiculturalism’ in Rural South Korea. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

6. Based on the findings of the study.

7. Kim, Hansung, Sun Young Lee, and In Hee Choi. 2014. ‘Employment and Poverty Status of Female Marriage Immigrants in South Korea’ Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 23, No.2: 129-154.

This blog post is based on the empirical evidence collected from field research in South Korea and Nepal (2023-24) for my doctoral study.

 

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

 

About the author

Nilima Rai is a Ph.D. candidate in Gender Studies at Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario. Her research explores the lived realities of Nepali brides in South Korea. She holds master’s degrees in Development Studies from Erasmus University, the Netherlands, and in Conflict, Peace, and Development Studies from Tribhuvan University, Nepal, and the University of Ruhuna, Sri Lanka. Her interests include migration, marriage and labor mobility, social justice, women’s rights, and the intersections of conflict, disaster, and gender.

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Connected for Gender Equality: Digital Learning and Solidarity Building

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Gender Studies worldwide confront the double whammy of the academic field’s persistent urgency amidst heightened risk for its scholars and students. As a result, there is a pressing need for collaboration and solidarity among scholars working in Gender Studies to safeguard academic freedom for high-quality research and education and strengthen advocacy efforts in the face of growing challenges. Four Gender Studies hubs in Pakistan, Turkey, and the Netherlands have started creating and using digital spaces for knowledge creation, exchange, and mutual support.

Source : Wikicommons

Persistent urgency of Gender Studies to further a gender equality agenda

Rooted in feminist activism of the late 1960s, Gender Studies uniquely integrates theory, vision, and action to examine the role of gender in society and resulting inequalities and power differences. The discipline remains highly relevant. Despite global policy commitments to gender equality – from the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – gender-based violence and human rights violations as well as gender gaps in the economy and in decision-making positions persist.

In Pakistan, consistently ranked among the lowest in gender equality, the situation is dire. Gender-based violence, including abductions, (gang)rape, and domestic violence experienced by women, increased in 2023 compared to 2022. Transphobia has intensified, exemplified by the Federal Shariat Court’s declaring sections of the historic Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act 2018 in violation of Islamic law, even as transgender persons face ongoing violence and discrimination. State repression, including obstruction of annual Aurat [women’s] marches on International Women’s Day, further undermines efforts for gender justice.

To tap the potential of Gender Studies to counter such gender-based discriminations and gaps, the discipline’s Northern bias poses a formidable obstacle. Gender Studies curricula are still dominated by theories grounded in the global North, despite the discipline’s emphasis on intersections with local contexts and histories that produce specific forms of gendered structures and inequalities in society. For students in global South contexts like Pakistan, this creates the impression of an academic discipline that is antagonistic to students’ culture, dismissive of their lived realities and struggles, making engagement difficult. Therefore, to implement gender equality agendas effectively, indigenous gender perspectives are crucial.

Global rise of an anti-gender rights movement

This current dearth of a context-sensitive canon is aggravated by the global rise of an anti-gender rights movement, defined as “the transnational constellation of actors working to preserve the heteropatriarchal sex and gender power hierarchy in all areas of social, political, economic, and cultural life” (McEwen and Narayanaswamy 2023: 4). In recent years, misinformation about gender has been used to discredit and marginalise Gender Studies departments and scholars.

These global dynamics are reflected in our respective countries. In Turkey, discussions on anti-gender rights movements and policies have intensified amid democratic backsliding and the construction of a conservative, binary-unequal gender regime. In 2019, the Turkish Council of Higher Education removed the Position Document on Gender Equality from its website and cancelled the related “Higher Education Institutions Gender Equality Project.” This political backlash has pressured Gender Studies centres to rename themselves, e.g., as Centre for Women’s Studies or Department of Family Studies, in line with the government’s conservative stance. Consequently, gender equality and LGBTIQ+ activism and visibility among students on university campuses are suppressed, leaving Gender Studies scholars feeling marginalised and oppressed.

In Pakistan, state bodies have long expected Gender Studies to focus on patriarchal assumptions about gender relations such as home management. In 2020, a petition was filed in the Lahore High Court requesting the State of Pakistan to ban the academic discipline, arguing that it conflicts with the country’s religious and cultural values. On university campuses, transgender faculty staff involvement in Gender Studies is actively discouraged, reinforcing binary gender norms despite South Asia’s long history of gender diversity. Moreover, in both Pakistan and Turkey, gender scholars are framed, discredited and policed as promoting a Western agenda.

The Netherlands, known for its strong gender equality commitments, is not immune to the rise of anti-gender rights politics. As part of a major overhaul of the Dutch policy for development cooperation that significantly reduces support for international partners and orients it more towards Dutch interests, the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Aid recently announced to end international funding for women’s rights and gender equality, threatening to halt progress in its commitment to pursuing a feminist foreign policy.

Countering anti-gender rights backlash through transnational digital collaboration in Gender Studies

Against the backdrop of persistent gender inequalities, Northern-centric theorising of gender and backlash against Gender Studies, we have started experimenting with transnational digital collaboration between the institutions in which we are based in Pakistan, Turkey, and the Netherlands. This approach offers an effective way to address these intertwined challenges to gender equality through context-sensitive engagement.

In practice, this has involved a pilot in transnational hybrid teaching module in Gender Studies between the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) of Erasmus University Rotterdam and the Centre for Excellence in Gender Studies (CEGS) at Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad as well as the establishment of an online platform that connects Gender Studies centres in different parts of Turkey by the Center for Gender Studies at TED University Ankara. Together with the Department for Gender and Development Studies at the University of Balochistan Quetta, we plan to scale these experiences.

We believe that this initiative has the potential to transfer context-sensitive Gender Studies knowledge to a broader audience while modernising higher education institutes and enhancing curricular relevance. It also fosters transnational solidarity among scholars, providing a safe space to share work, address concerns, and collaboratively navigate challenges to gender equality in academia and beyond.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the authors:

Karin Astrid Siegmann works as an Associate Professor of Gender and Labour Economics at the International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS).

Saad Ali Khan is an Assistant Professor at the Centre for Excellence in Gender Studies at Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad (CEGS) and a Visiting Fellow at the ISS.

Rabbia Aslam is an Assistant Professor at the CEGS. Her doctoral research investigated Gender Studies as an academic field in Pakistan.

Bilge Sahin works as an Assistant Professor in Conflict and Peace Studies at ISS where she incorporates gender perspectives into her teaching and research.

Alia Amirali is an Assistant Professor at the CEGS as well as a feminist organizer.

Selin Akyüz is an Associate Professor at TED University Ankara, specializing in gender studies, political masculinities, and feminist methodologies.

Aurangzaib Alizai holds the position of an Assistant Professor in the Gender and Development Studies Department at the University of Balochistan Quetta.

Tuğçe Çetinkaya is a PhD candidate in the Department of Sociology at Middle East Technical University Ankara where her doctoral research explores the gender and class dynamics of local environmental struggles.

Zuhal Yeşilyurt Gündüz is Professor and heads the Center for Gender Studies as well as the Political Science and International Relations Department at TED University in Ankara.

Muhib Kakar is an academic and researcher specialised in Gender Studies.

Amna Hafeez Mobeen is a lecturer and researcher at CEGS. She recently completed her doctoral dissertation at Pakistan’s National Institute of Pakistan Studies (NIPS).

 

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US Congress backs diaspora-driven efforts for Tamil self-determination

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On 15 May 2024, US Congressman Wiley Nickel introduced House Resolution 1230, which addresses long-standing grievances of the Tamil community. Endorsed by over 50 Tamil diaspora organisations worldwide, the resolution symbolises hope amid frustration over Sri Lanka’s lack of accountability. Although its path to becoming law is uncertain, the resolution reflects shifting geopolitical dynamics and marks a significant moment in US policy regarding the Tamil diaspora’s pursuit of self-determination. With a new president in place, Sri Lanka may also have the opportunity to reshape its approach to the Tamil question. In this blog, Shyamika Jayasundara-Smits delves into the potential impacts and wider implications of this resolution.

Source: East Asia Forum

On 15 May 2024, US Congressman Wiley Nickel introduced House Resolution 1230, marking the latest congressional effort to address the long-standing grievances of the Tamil people. The resolution recognises the hundreds of thousands of lives lost during Sri Lanka’s nearly 30-year long armed conflict. It also seeks to ensure nonrecurrence of past violence, including the Tamil Genocide, by supporting the right to self-determination of Eelam Tamil people and their call for an independence referendum.

The resolution received moderate partisan support and was endorsed by over 50 Tamil diaspora organisations across fifteen countries who have been working to advance the Tamils’ quest for justice and self-determination. House Resolution 1230 certainly boosted the morale of the global human rights community and the Tamil diaspora, who have grown increasingly frustrated with Sri Lanka’s lack of accountability and have been torn between hope and despair under different US administrations and their allies.

The resolution emerged as the United States faces global scrutiny over its complicity in Israel’s genocidal violence in Gaza and for dragging its support in implementing a two-state solution. The resolution, though important for Tamils, underscores the double standards in US policy regarding justice and accountability for war crimes. While the demand for justice for Tamils is stronger than ever, the Tamil diaspora cannot expect much from the United States or most liberal Western states, given their diminishing moral authority.

House Resolution 1230 is a step forward in advancing the February 2023 declaration issued by six major US-based Tamil organisations urging the government to do the ‘right thing’. Dr Murugiah Muraleetharan — President of the Federation of Global Tamil Organizations — shared that ‘only by serving justice to the Tamils and returning their sovereignty, can peace and stability be established in the region. A permanent solution is important, and Independence Referendum is the democratic, peaceful and correct approach’.

Both the 2023 and 2024 resolutions clearly advocate for an internationally monitored independence referendum for Eelam Tamils, echoing the 1976 Vaddukoddai resolution introduced by Tamil political elites in Sri Lanka. The new resolution adopts a maximalist approach by reigniting hopes of securing an independent state. This approach can be viewed as a tactical manoeuvre within the current geopolitical landscape, which may not favour such a drastic measure. Instead, it seeks to advance achievable goals, such as addressing justice grievances, returning of land, promoting regional economic development and ensuring human rights.

One pertinent issue is how much pressure diaspora groups can exert on the United States and its allies to ensure Sri Lanka complies with human rights laws and is held accountable. This is especially crucial amid current US–China geopolitical contestations in the Indian Ocean, where Sri Lanka is viewed as an important ally to deter China’s influence.

Since the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in May 2009 by the Government of Sri Lanka’s armed forces, a number of House Resolutions have been introduced. These have been accompanied by high-profile US-backed UNHCR resolutions calling for a credible investigation into possible war crimes committed by the state armed forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. But these efforts have been overlooked by Sri Lankan authorities.

Continued pressure from Tamil diaspora groups has encouraged some progress under the Biden administration, which imposed personal sanctions on four senior Sri Lankan military officials between 2020 and 2022.

Given the history and lifespans of resolutions introduced in Congress regarding Sri Lanka, the new resolution shows slim chances of proceeding to the next stages required to become law. This limits its potential to demand binding action from the Sri Lankan state. Despite this potential outcome, receiving the US Congress’s acknowledgment and support holds symbolic significance for the Tamil diaspora.

As the United States prepares to elect its next president, the outcome will also impact the fate of the new resolution and US interest in human rights in Sri Lanka. The resolution will have a better chance of progressing under a Harris presidency, which may signify a continuation of the Biden administration’s policies.

The chances of the resolution gathering support on the Sri Lankan side seem likely under the newly appointed leftist President Anura Kumara Dissanayake. Dissanayake’s campaign failed to secure the endorsement of the Illankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi — one of the largest Tamil political groups representing the north and east. But there is hope for a locally grown solution to the Tamil question with home based political groups if Dissanayake remains true to his past sentiments and have the courage to ‘interrogate the JVP’s chauvinistic past, embrace minority communities, and support their struggles for justice and equality’.

During a 2018 parliamentary debate, Dissanayake compared his party, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, now part of his ruling coalition, to the Tamil National Alliance. He pointed out that both parties represented people in the south and north who have suffered the most under a repressive state.

Meanwhile, India, a regional US ally, has already signalled its commitment to finding a lasting solution to the Tamil issue through power devolution within a united Sri Lanka. This was highlighted during Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar’s visit shortly after President Dissanayake assumed office. The new president has expressed similar views to that of India. Dissanayake’s success in the November 2024 parliamentary elections will be pivotal for advancing these efforts, as both domestic and diaspora Tamil groups are well-positioned to shape these developments.

This article was first publish on the East Asia Forum 

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the Author:

Shyamika Jayasundara-Smits

Shyamika Jayasundara-Smits is an Assistant Professor in conflict and peace studies at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), Erasmus University, Rotterdam.

 

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AI and Emerging Tech for Humanitarian Action: Opportunities and Challenges

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Source: AI Generated

In this blog, members of the Humanitarian Observatory Initiative South Asia (HOISA) including Anisa Abeytia, Shanyal Uqaili, Mihir Bhatt and Khayal Trivedi consider the applications of AI and other emerging technologies for humanitarian action. With UNHCR and other organisations adopting AI-enhanced planning, mapping, and prediction tools, what are some of the ethical dilemmas and challenges posed for tech-enabled humanitarian action? How can we make sure that humanitarian principles are kept to by non-human actors? And what is ‘responsible AI’?

The use of digital and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence in the humanitarian sector is not new. Since the advent of these technologies, particularly in the last two decades, the sector has gone through several transitions as data collection, storage, and data processing have become increasingly available and sophisticated. However, the recent contemporary advances in computational power, along with ‘big data’ now at the disposal of the public and private sector has allowed for a widespread and pervasive use of these digital technologies in every sphere of human life – notably also in humanitarian contexts. AI, quite rapidly, is reshaping the humanitarian sector with projects such as Project Jetson by UNHCR, AI supported mapping for an emergency response in Mozambique, AI chatbots for displaced populations, and more besides.

Humanitarian workers therefore must pose the following questions. How can responsible AI along with emerging technology be used for humanitarian action? And what are the priority areas and conditions that the humanitarian sector should put forth while employing these technologies? And does emerging technology present any ethical challenges for the sector?

There is an enormous potential in AI technology, with its ability to predict events and results that can help in international humanitarian action. With the rate at which disasters and conflicts are increasing in the past few years, the humanitarian sector particularly in terms of funding, is simply not at par in providing the relief and responses to the degree that the world requires1. In this light, strengthening disaster resilience and risk reduction by building community resilience through initiatives such as better early warning systems become crucial.

Case Study: Using AI to forecast Seismic Activity

A study using hybrid methodologies was conducted to develop a model that could forecast seismic activity in the region of Gazientep, Türkiye (bordering Syria). The system was trained using the data gathered after the massive 7.8 magnitude earthquake in early 2023, which was then followed by more than 4,300 minor tremors. To create the algorithm, key dimensions and indicators such as social, economic, institutional and infrastructural capacity from open-source websites, were identified. During the research, two regional states were identified to have extremely low resilience to earthquakes. Incidentally, this area is also home to a large number of Syrian refugees. After gathering two years of seismic data from more than 250 geographers on the ground and other open sources, two Convolutional Neural Network models were applied

that could predict 100 data points (with 93% accuracy) in future, which is amounts to about 10 seconds in future, . The study underlines the regional challenges in data collection. Several indicators were omitted due to the absence of openly availability data. This highlights the influence of power asymmetry, which allows for biased results and conclusions, thereby pushing researchers away from new understandings. A case-in-point, data pertaining to areas/neighborhoods where Syrian refugees reside was not gathered and thus excluded by default from the research findings. Despite these political challenges, there is great potential in this technology when provided with relevant data sets. AI becomes the model it is trained to be and therefore it is important to have a complete a data set to prevent reproducing real world/human biases

Fears of techno-colonialism and Asymmetric Power Structures

This case highlights the need for transparent, complete, and bias-free data sets, which remain a challenge in most parts of the world. Further, who owns these data sets? Who oversees data collection and training, and what is omitted? As AI and various deep learning methodologies transform our world, fears of techno-colonialism, techno-solutionism and surveillance are omnipresent.

Today’s post-colonial world, that in fact continues to carry forward colonial power hierarchies albeit in a new setting with changed roles, is ridden with inequalities. And these inequalities and pre-existing biases both in data and in people, are then transferred to the AI because of the way it is being (or not being) trained. Even ‘creative’ AI tools are still a conglomeration of the data that they are trained on.

AI and deep learning methodologies are tools that can be targeted to provide a solution. They require input of data, and if the data carries bias or racism to some degree then the output will also reflect that2. Questions such as, who is training the AI, what funds are being used, and who is the recipient of the effort, become critical to answer. Unfortunately, very few companies and countries in the world have the capacity to create data sets that train AI. These are often large conglomerates that work for profit in a capitalist ideology where a human centered approach is at best secondary. The decision power therefore lies in the hands of few, thereby forming a new form of colonialism.

Is AI then a tool or a medium to keep the status quo (of power structures)? Because if the few people in power, driven by capitalism, are invested in maintaining the power structures, then how will AI be of help in decisions about resource allocation? This points also to the much-needed democratization of AI and these tools. The human centric AI otherwise will remain a paradox.

Looking at Responsible AI and humanitarian principles

Can we employ AI that does no harm? For AI and similar tools to therefore be viable and inclusive, one must ensure transparency and inclusion in data gathering that forms the data sets. This requires conscious effort that is not technology driven, rather policy driven that invites people with diverse thought processes from diverse communities and especially minorities and vulnerable populations to be in a position of action and not just participate. One way is to rethink the humanitarian sector and its functioning. The other is to have a more community centered approach while thinking of AI applications, as James Landay puts it. He describes that in a community centered approach, the members of the community discuss and decide how and which resources must be allocated to what, according to their own priorities and needs. This method stands in contrast to the top-down politics, where communities are merely seen as consumers or beneficiaries.

Drawing from Edward Soja’s theory, Anisa Abeytia (2023) distinguishes and adds a fourth sphere or space to the already formed three-layer model by Soja, which Abeytia argues to be relevant in the use of AI.

According to the model, “Firstspace” is the geographic location that includes human, non-human (living and nonliving) entities and environments. “Secondspace” is our communal areas (library, schools, etc.). “Thirdspace” is the liminal landscape – the way people accept or reject ideas and technologies such as their apprehensions and fear to new transitions and change. And lastly, Abeytia adds a Fourthspace to represent the digital world which is as real as physical geographies today. An important rubric to measure viability of an AI application is how it will affect each of these spaces – the personal, the communal, the transitional and the digital space. For example, we can witness the use of AI affecting all four spaces in the project run by University of Utah and a refugee resettlement agency that used Virtual Reality (VR) headsets as a reception and resettlement tool to assist refugees to integrate into American societies.

Survey: What are the needs of the sector?

As members of the humanitarian sector, we must strive to develop our own solutions to the challenges we face, ensuring inclusivity for all. The identification of these challenges should also come from within the sector itself. Recently, a survey was conducted among key stakeholders to identify areas where AI could make a significant contribution. The most commonly highlighted areas of interest were as follows:

● Can AI assist in creating bias free intelligence that improves victim-state relationship with others?

● Can AI be utilized in measuring intolerance and widening hatred between communities, thereby causing riots such as in the UK and South Asia?

● Can AI provide guidance in identifying uncertainties of risks and resilience, along with humanitarian action insights that we have not spotted?

● Can AI conduct contribution analysis for impact evaluation?

● How to employ AI to identify methods of empowerment in decision making and developing strategies to offer universal humanitarian assistance?

● How can we harness the power of AI in analyzing epidemic preparedness and response improvement in health crises like monkeypox or Covid?

It is essential to actively investigate the use of AI and emerging technologies across the identified spheres. Efforts to make AI more equitable should include advocating for inclusive methodologies, creating transparent and diverse data sets, and amplifying the voices of Indigenous, marginalized and vulnerable populations.

While working towards more equitable systems, several critical questions arise: How can these projects be funded? Are they viable in a landscape where only a fraction of resources reaches those in need? What is the carbon footprint of developing AI and deep learning tools? How can Indigenous knowledge from resilient communities be integrated into AI systems? Each of these issues warrants thorough discussion, and every major humanitarian organization should address them.

Further reading:

Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 8th ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019; Luciano Floridi and Josh Cowls, “A Unified Framework of Five Principles for AI in Society”, Harvard Data Science Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2019.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

 

Authors: Anisa Abeytia, Shanyal Uqaili, Mihir Bhatt and Khayal Trivedi are members of the Humanitarian Observatory Initiative South Asia (HOISA)

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What has been happening to higher education in Laos?

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Source: Author

In August 2024, the Laotian Times alarmingly wrote about a ‘record low’ in candidates registering for the entrance exams of the National University of Laos (NUoL). It attributed the decline to rising living expenses (over 2023 there was a 31.2 % increase in consumer prices in Lao PDR) and low prospects of finding gainful employment in the domestic labour market following university graduation. Without dismissing these reasons, in this blog piece Roy Huijsmans puts the current ‘record low’ in broader perspective by asking what has been happening to higher education in Laos and in relation to whom? 

Laos’ higher education landscape is relatively small and young. Following the establishment of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) in 1975, the communist regime prioritised basic education for the masses because tertiary education is relatively costly and a much less egalitarian public investment. For (re)building a tertiary educated professional class the newly established, yet cash-strapped, Lao PDR largely depended on its socialist allies.(1)  In the period 1976-1980, more than half of the in total 4,603 Laotian students pursuing education beyond secondary level did so abroad in countries part of the, then, Soviet Block.  

An education reform paved the ground for the (re)establishment (2) of the National University of Laos (NUoL) in 1996. There was also an increase in Laotian students pursuing higher education domestically; partly forced due to the collapse of the Soviet Block and associated scholarships. Over the period 1996-99 the number of Laotian students in higher education nearly doubled (15,634, compared to 8,635 in 1991-95) whereas those doing so abroad increased only marginally (from 995 to 1,101).  

At present, NUoL has remained Laos’ most prominent university despite the establishment of additional public universities, and the rapid growth in private higher education institutes. Total enrolment in Laos’ public universities stood at 45,677 in 2008 (36,706 enrolled at NUoL). By 2008, 86 private higher education institutes were active in Lao PDR, enrolling a total of 20,000 students in 2007 (up from 4,000 in 2000). Still, enrolment at tertiary level has remained low at 12 per cent in 2021 (1.14 gender parity) following an all-times high of 19 per cent in 2012.(3)

In Laos, seats available for university enrolment are set top-down. Once announced, secondary school graduates can register for entrance exams. Registration can be done online, yet the actual exam must be taken in person. Because of quota set for several groups (women, ethnic minority groups), some students enter university regardless of taking (or passing) the entrance exam.(4) 

Piecing together various data sources , Table 1 shows that the number of candidates taking the 2024 NUoL entrance exam was indeed very low and even lower than 2021-22 Covid affected year. Table 1 further shows a gradual decline in the enrolment quota since 2020-21. Whereas the drop in ‘demand’ has received ample attention in Lao media, the opposite is true for the apparent reduced ‘supply’. It is also unclear if this NUoL trend is also reflected in enrolment trends of private higher education institutes in Lao PDR, or alternatively whether we see a shift from public to private higher education or into other forms of public education.(5)  

Table 1: NUoL student figures 2015-2024 

 

Pursuing higher education abroad has remained common in segments of the Laotian population. Yet, destinations and conditions have changed remarkably since the revolutionary days. Lao PDR ranks second on the list of international students studying in China (and many doing so on a Chinese government scholarship), others pursue higher education in Australia, the USA, Japan or in Europe, sometimes on scholarships of the host-country but not-uncommonly also self-financed reflecting the presence a class of super-rich. This latter group is relatively unaffected by the rising cost of living.  

For 2023, the World Bank calculated a 31.2 per cent increase in consumer prices in Lao PDR, following a 23 per cent increase for 2022. This has contributed to putting higher education out of the financial reach of the (lower) middle class in particular. In fact, increasingly Laotian students are leaving formal schooling prematurely. The total number of students taking the secondary year 4 exam dropped from 83,544 in 2022 to 68,850 in 2023 (-18%), while for the final secondary school exam (year 7) the number declined from 55,828 in 2022 to 50,276 in 2023 (-10%). Additionally, there is low prospects for gainful employment in Lao PDR following higher education graduation. This has been a challenge for long, including large numbers of young Laotian working across the border in Thailand. Perhaps what has changed most profoundly is the rise in technology related earning possibilities in the Lao PDR, ranging from platform-mediated food-delivery and ride-sharing work to using social media platforms for commercial activities, including in rural areas.  

In sum, the ‘record low’ in NUoL entrance registrations is likely because of young people of (lower) middle class background (including ethnic minorities) discontinuing their studies confronted by two intersecting realities. First, due to rising cost of living completing secondary schooling and pursuing higher education has become a substantially larger financial challenge. Second, there is easily accessible migrant work and a rise in domestic income earning opportunities. Both do not require higher education and contribute to reducing some immediate financial pressures. Against such a background, a call for more scholarships to ensure that Laotian higher education remains accessible also for those with fewer financial means is unlikely to make much of a difference.  

Endnotes

  1. During the 1970s about 10 per cent of the population of what is now Lao PDR fled the country, among them many of the higher educated elite.
  2. Following the communist take-over in 1975, Sisavangvong University in Vientiane (established in 1958 by the Royal Lao Government) was dissolved into various colleges.
  3. World Bank data show a gross enrolment rate for primary schooling of 97 per cent in 2022 (0.97 gender parity) and an all-times high of 122 per cent in 2012. For secondary education, the gross enrolment rate was 57 per cent in 2022 (0.95 gender parity) and an all-times high of 66 per cent in 2017 and 2018.
  4. Note also instances of cheating or side-stepping exams, e.g. https://laotiantimes.com/2016/09/14/students-to-resit-nuol-entrance-exams-after-questions-leaked/
  5. Government resolutions seek to channel students into shorter, and cheaper ‘courses at vocational training schools’ in ‘priority fields’ (Vientiane Times, p2, 28 July 2023). Yet the scale of these initiatives is unclear.
  6. From the academic year 2020-2021, there are more than 16,700 students who registered for the online exam, but more than 14,000 people came to the real exam, among which the university plans to enroll more than 9,000 students in all system.

 

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

                         About the Author: 
Roy Huijsmans

Roy Huijsmans is a teacher and researcher at the International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam. His research focuses on the role of young people in processes of development and change.

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Rain or shine, the gig must go on – Platform workers navigate climate extremes

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                                     Image by Unsplash

Precariousness is an underlying factor in the gig economy. When combined with the climate crisis, this becomes an even bigger burden on gig workers. These ‘flexible workers’ are often not equipped to be flexible to the changing environment. They face the dilemma of navigating between algorithms and climate extremes, often forced to choose earnings over health. In this blog, Anna Elias explores how the vulnerabilities of the workers are amplified in the context of climate crisis. 

‘Our economic system and our planetary system are now at war. Or, more accurately, our economy is at war with many forms of life on earth, including human life. What the climate needs to avoid collapse is a contraction in humanity’s use of resources; what our economic model demands to avoid collapse is unfettered expansion. Only one of these sets of rules can be changed, and it’s not the laws of nature.’ Naomi Klein (This changes everything: Capitalism vs. the climate).

Most parts of India suffered from extreme weather conditions this year. While the temperatures soared up to 50℃ in some cities, the monsoons that followed caused extreme havoc in others. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) report  predicts that India will lose 5.8 per cent of its working hours by 2030 due to extreme heat. What does this mean for a gig worker, for most of whom the city is their workspace, and for whom navigating the city constitutes a substantial part of their everyday life?

App based platforms have revolutionized the way urban dwellers travel, eat and purchase. While the gig economy has created numerous flexible jobs, it is also criticised for not effectively dealing with various issues such as workers’ wellbeing and social protection.

Flexible workers are not equipped to be flexible to the changing environment. In current research and policy discourses on gig work, the impact of climate change on the worker is often overlooked. While climate change has significant consequences to both their lives and livelihoods, it is only one among the many vulnerabilities they face. Gig workers already suffer from casualised, low-paid working conditions without access to long-term security, formal social protections and welfare. The pressure caused by these precarious conditions is further exemplified by extreme weather events. Beyond the immediate physical dangers posed by heatwaves or flash floods, these conditions increase the susceptibility of road accidents, thereby heightening the risk of traffic-related injuries.

As research has shown, in the gig economy, climate change is poised to act as a ‘wicked multiplier’ intensifying the vulnerabilities experienced by workers in developing countries. Gig workers in these countries are exposed to extreme weather conditions and endure long hours while navigating hazardous roads and traffic during heatwaves, storms, and floods. Those using two-wheelers to get around face additional challenges such as dust inhalation, impaired vision due to harsh sunlight, heatstroke, and the lack of shade on the roads. These conditions, along with algorithmic management and the promise of ‘lightning fast’ services, make gig workers vulnerable to exhaustion, dehydration, and severe health risks. That their earnings are dependent on the satisfactory execution of the gig exacerbates the precariousness of their situation.

Amidst this crisis, the responses from app-based companies are noteworthy. A prominent Indian food delivery platform issued the following statement: ‘please avoid ordering during peak afternoon unless absolutely necessary’. Yet in the platform economy, lower order volumes correspondingly diminish workers’ earnings. So, this seemingly well-intentioned request to customers aimed at reducing the delivery workers’ exposure to the intense afternoon heat, neglects the dilemma the workers face between making viable earnings and risking their immediate and long-term health. Another example is of a ride-hailing platform that introduced a ‘weather fee’ in Vietnam, which imposed an extra charge on an order whenever the local temperature hit 35℃. This was counter-intuitive, as it incentivized the already precarious worker to work extra hours regardless of the weather conditions, thus putting their lives at risk.

A common misconception is that extreme environmental situations affect only two -wheel drivers. Beyond the physical discomfort to themselves, even auto and taxi drivers face additional challenges of managing customer expectations and interactions on topics that are related to climate change.  For example, a common conflict between drivers and customers, especially during warm day-time hours is the driver’s reluctance to switch on the air conditioning, fearing higher fuel consumption. An Uber driver in Mumbai shares his experiences and strategy in coping with climate change:

”I don’t want to turn on the air conditioner in my car throughout the day. All the money I make goes on fuel charges. Over time, I realised that during the summer the best I can do is drive only during the night. The customers usually don’t insist on travelling with the AC on at night. Of course, I lose sleep and it affects my health. But I don’t have any other choice”. (Fieldnotes, Mumbai 2023).

Apart from highlighting the precarious nature of the work, these cases illustrate the importance of engaging all key stakeholders when developing solutions. Specifically, they emphasize the need to recognise the gig worker as an important stakeholder in the gig economy. They make clear that addressing climate challenges in the platform economy requires a collaborative effort from companies, workers, and the government.

App based platforms were once considered part of the sharing economy and hailed as harbingers of sustainability and collaborative consumption. However, with rapid expansion, they are now criticized for their significant environmental and social costs and for increasing road congestion and intensity.

Conversely, emerging research highlights the potential of platforms to be part of the solution, positioning them as essential stakeholders in sustainability efforts, emphasizing the need for collaborative approaches that integrate labour rights and climate justice. Platform companies have the best of technology and resources at their disposal to craft solutions that benefit their customers, workers and investors alike. For this, they need to view all stakeholders as equally important, create avenues for dialogue between them and work with them to incrementally build equitable solutions for both people and the planet.

Bibliography

  1. Economic survey of Asia. (1991). Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. https://www.unescap.org/kp/2024/survey2024
  2. Vu, A. N., & Nguyen, D. L. (2024). The gig economy: The precariat in a climate precarious world. World Development Perspectives, 34, 100596. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S245229292400033X
  3. https://x.com/zomato/status/1797179156528005204
  4. Dwivedi, Y. K., Hughes, L., Kar, A. K., Baabdullah, A. M., Grover, P., Abbas, R., … & Wade, M. (2022). Climate change and COP26: Are digital technologies and information management part of the problem or the solution? An editorial reflection and call to action. International Journal of Information Management, 63, 102456. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0268401221001493

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

                       About the Author:
                                Anna Elias

Anna Elias is a PhD researcher at International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), Erasmus University Rotterdam. Her research explores socio economic transitions brought about by digitisation, particularly its effect on livelihoods in the informal economy. With a strong professional background in the social impact sector, her expertise lies at the intersection of evidence-based research and evaluation, digital innovation, and sustainability.

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Disaster Risk Reduction doesn’t (always) need to be expensive: introducing Frugal DRR

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Photo credit : Pixabay

In this blog, to mark global Disaster Risk Reduction Day, Tom Ansell (HSC Coordinator) considers whether disaster risk reduction activities can be made less-resource intensive through Frugal Innovation. Whilst Frugal DRR shouldn’t be considered a money-saving replacement for development and infrastructure work, it does provide an opportunity for communities to reduce their vulnerability and increase their capacity for dealing with the consequences of hazards that could include extreme weather, geological hazards, or other environmental hazards.

What is DRR? And what’s wrong with the term ‘natural disasters’?

Disaster Risk Reduction, according to the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) is activities that are “aimed at preventing new and reducing existing disaster risk and managing residual risk, all of which contribute to strengthening resilience and therefore to the achievement of sustainable development.” So, in simple terms, activities that work to prevent and mitigate risks to reduce the effects of disasters. It’s important to note here that we use the term disaster in connection with hazards like earthquakes, floods and others while avoiding the ‘natural disaster’, as this ignores the social dimension of disasters.

People across the world live in places that have different levels of risk and have different vulnerabilities in the face of these risks. More than the hazard itself, a much larger defining factor for how much damage, social upheaval, and loss of life occurs is how vulnerable people are, and how prepared they are for when a potential hazard becomes a disaster. In other words, an earthquake of magnitude 8 will have significantly different effects in a wealthy country with a strong governance system, to a much poorer country with (for example) a fragmented government. In the words of Margaret Arnold at the World Bank, “the key lesson is that disasters are social constructs. People are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and natural hazards due not just to their geographical context, but their financial, their social status, their cultural status, their gender status, their access to services, their level of poverty, their access to decision making, and their access to justice.”

For example, Tokyo often suffers from extreme stormy weather: as many countries with a Pacific coast do. The city of Tokyo, however, also has one of the largest storm drains in the world to help divert water resulting from storms or extremely heavy rainfall. The project, completed in the 1990s and costing around 3 billion US Dollars, means that though the city is often affected by tropical cyclones and typhoons, there is typically much less loss of life in the Tokyo area than others affected by the same typhoon – especially as the city of Tokyo has well-developed evacuation routes, early warning and information systems, and more besides.

This example serves to demonstrate the purpose of DRR activities: to prevent risks and – where this is not possible – to minimize the overall damage caused by extreme weather. As the ‘no natural disasters’ movement emphasizes, reacting after the event is a less intelligent way to respond to disasters, compared to prevention, pre-preparation, and planning is a much more productive and intelligent way to ‘respond’ to disasters. Various frameworks for ‘good’ risk management activities have been devised, including the Hyogo Framework (2005-2015) and Sendai Framework (2015-2030).

Are DRR activities always expensive?

In the example above, of the city of Tokyo, a major contributing factor to mitigating climate risks for the city involved constructing a large piece of public infrastructure. Similar projects have taken place around the world, for example the Delta Works in the Netherlands , the Thames Barrier in the UK, or the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway West Closure Complex in New Orleans in the USA. These three examples are all related to storm surges, flooding, or other water-related hazards. But (expensive) risk-reducing infrastructure also exists to mitigate the effects of rockfall (for example in Interlaken in Switzerland), avalanches (for example the Gazex system), or to stabilize land vulnerable to landslides through enormous retaining walls (for example in West Bengal, India).

At this point, it might seem that all DRR activities are exceptionally expensive, very large public infrastructure that are only available to the very wealthiest regions in the world. But that would be a serious oversimplification of what smaller groups of citizens, with or without the support of institutions, can achieve to mitigate risk and so reduce their vulnerability. DRR activities also include mapping areas that will be most affected by an extreme event, creating evacuation routes, developing information systems and early-warning systems, training citizens on flood-proofing their homes, or even making informational videos on what to do should a disaster strike.

This is not to say that large infrastructure projects aren’t important: indeed they can be transformational. However, it is important to emphasize that DRR activities are not always expensive: even though an all-round DRR plan for a place will likely include both more expensive infrastructure, less economically-expensive activities can also make a difference.

Can ‘Frugal Innovation’ inspire low-cost but effective interventions?

In order to develop new ideas around lower-cost (frugal) risk reduction activities, it is useful to dive into the world of Frugal Innovation. The International Centre for Frugal Innovation (ICFI), based at ISS and part of LDE, considers the practice and approach to be a potentially transformative way of finding new solutions to growing societal problems, in a non-excessive way. Andre Leliveld and Peter Knorringa, in an article from 2017 setting out the potential relationship between Frugal Innovation and development, note that the field sprouted from multiple sources but takes much inspiration from jugaad practices in South Asia. Jugaad is an excellent catch-all term (borrowed from Hindi, and with similar terms in Punjabi, Urdu, and various Dravidian languages including Telugu and Malyalam) for low-cost and often ingenious solutions to nagging problems; as well as the kind of mindset that allows the creative thinking around these solutions to occur. Whilst the term and thinking is often used in business (to create products for people with less purchasing power), it is very versatile.

Utilising some of the thinking inherent within Frugal Innovation in relation to DRR activities requires taking a solutions-oriented approach, and making use of existing resources, skills, or initiatives to reduce vulnerability by mitigating risk.

Painting and planning: Frugal Disaster Risk Reduction in action

How urban communities adapt to heatwaves across India is an interesting way to demonstrate how integrating Frugal Innovation techniques into Disaster Risk Reduction carries the potential for meaningful reduction in vulnerability.

Heatwaves have the potential to be very destructive, and one solution that is being rolled out across several areas that have a high number of informal dwellings in cities including Mumbai and Nagpur is the low-cost but high-yield technique of painting roofs white (to reflect the sun) and installing secondary ‘shade roofs’ on buildings. This can reduce inside temperatures by several degrees on the hottest of days. Similarly, a network of inexpensive recording devices has been installed to track ‘hotspots’ in the city, which can inform where communal ‘cooling zones’ need to be set up local city corporations or voluntary groups. And, in Ahmedabad in the north-west of India, a ‘Heat Action Plan’ was developed by the city corporation and scientific partners that is estimated to have prevented hundreds of fatalities.

Developing evacuation routes, making sure that citizens are prepared for what to do in a disaster, small and uncomplicated changes to people’s homes, or even utilising close-knit communities and communication networks as informal warning systems may not structurally reduce peoples’yet vulnerabilities yet can make a difference in preventing the worst of disaster impacts. And, whilst not as transformational as large public infrastructure projects, any gain in a communities’ resilience is an important step. Luckily ‘Frugal Innovation’ techniques show us that DRR doesn’t always need to be expensive.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the author

Tom Ansell

Tom Ansell is the Coordinator of the Humanitarian Studies Centre and International Humanitarian Studies Association.

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India’s Modi returns to power — but his victory is not as sweet as he’d hoped for

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India’s elections marked an unprecedented third term for prime minister Narendra Modi’s Hindu right-wing government. However, the victory was won by a narrower margin than expected, challenging Modi’s invincible image and signalling the resurgence of opposition parties. The electoral setback was driven by farmers’ protests and strategic voting by Muslims in crucial constituencies. This outcome could either embolden Modi to intensify his communal agenda and suppress dissent or compel him to moderate his stance due to coalition pressures, writes Haris Zargar.

In a dramatic anticlimax right out of a Bollywood movie, India’s voters have shredded Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s plans of a supermajority in the Indian Parliament as his ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) secured a third term to rule with a weakened mandate. The BJP’s seat share fell significantly short of both the predictions made by exit polls and the 400-seat target set by Modi before voting began. In the results announced on June 4, Modi’s ruling BJP secured 240 of the 543 seats in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian Parliament, falling short of the 272-seat majority required to form a government independently. In 2019, BJP had a clear majority with 303 seats.  

With the support of its allies, the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition, which amassed a total of 293 seats, is poised to form the new government. Modi’s political fate now remains in the hands of his two key partners, Janata Dal (United) in North India’s Bihar state and the Telugu Desam Party of Andra Pradesh in South India. The Congress Party (Indian National Congress — INC), principal opposition party and spearhead of the INDIA bloc, secured 99 seats, improving its 2019 tally of 53 seats. The INDIA bloc coalition secured 234 seats, making it strong opposition for the NDA coalition. 

The results are particularly significant due to the noticeable loss of support for the BJP in its traditional strongholds across India, especially in the bellwether state of Uttar Pradesh and the financial hub of Maharashtra. The electoral losses in these states, where BJP is regarded the dominant force, effectively breaks the perception of Modi’s invincibility and gives the opposition a shot in the arm that BJP’s hold can be challenged even in their fiefdoms. In Uttar Pradesh, which is ruled by the BJP and witnessed largescale state violence against Muslims, the NDA won 36 seats in 2024 out of 80 as against 62 in 2019, while the opposition INDIA alliance secured 43 seats. Likewise, in Maharashtra, NDA only secured 17 of the 48 seats while the INDIA bloc secured 30 seats.  

In this blog article, I show that the loss of power in traditional strongholds comes from the recognition that Modi’s polarising politics is witnessing a pushback from minorities, especially from oppressed castes and Muslims, who consolidated their vote in favour of candidates that are seen as viable opponents to the BJP.  

Pushback in Hindi heartland 

Modi’s hopes to return to power with a bigger mandate to reign with a sense of invincibility was rooted in his success in the Hindi heartland where the party traditionally does well. Modi, who has served as premier since 2014, is lauded by his Hindu right-wing supporters as a transformative figure who modernised the country and turned India into a global power.  

But his decade-long rule is principally characterised by detractors as turning India into an illiberal democracy and as a move towards an authoritarian regime. His incumbency has been marked by the brutal repression of political opponents and dissenters, by violence by militant Hindu nationalist vigilantes’ groups against Muslims and oppressed castes, and by the rise in communal rhetoric and Islamophobia.  

It is perhaps this surge in nationalist hate acts and rhetoric that has led the population to respond sharply, condemning Modi’s intention to quash the opposition and act against anyone that is not ‘traditionally Hindi’. It additionally highlights that Modi’s appeal as economic reformer with a developmental agenda for the country is waning even among the financially weaker sections of Indian society.  

A divisive poll campaign  

The electoral setback for Modi, 73, who has dominated Indian politics for over a decade with his communally divisive anti-Muslim rhetoric, comes against the backdrop of murmurs of his plan to push through the constitutional changes he yearns for to create a presidential system that would give him and his Hindu right-wing party greater powers. The opposition meanwhile pitched the elections as a battle to save the constitution.  

During the elections, the BJP’s campaign adopted an increasingly vitriolic tone towards Muslims. To consolidate the Hindu vote base, BJP leaders resorted to speeches laden with hate, dog whistles, Islamophobic tropes, and communally charged rhetoric. Modi himself made a series of anti-Muslim statements, referring to Muslims as “infiltrators” and characterizing them as “those who have more children.” 

The results reflect a growing dismay of ‘cult’ Modi. The BJP lost the key constituency of Faizabad, which houses the newly inaugurated Ram Mandir in Ayodhya, which was one of the biggest ideological promises in the BJP manifesto.  

A revitalized opposition 

The opposition INDIA bloc in contrast significantly gained in semi-rural and rural areas and received considerable votes from Muslims, Schedule Caste (SC), and Schelde tribes (ST) communities. The alliance performed better than what political analytics and pollsters had predicted. While its campaign was under considerable duress and faced unprecedented threats of raids or arrests by government agencies that have been weaponised by the Modi government to target its detractors and critics, the collective opposition managed an unexpected revival to challenge Modi’s election machinery. Often deemed as either fractured or in disarray, the opposition managed to set its own electoral agenda by targeting Modi and his performance rather than the script often set by BJP. The nationwide marches led by the Congress Party struck a positive note with the public.  

Farmers’ pushback 

Modi’s political mavericks’ persona moreover has arguably been dented by the protracted farmers’ protest that saw different landholding castes like Jats, landless agricultural labourers including Dalit and Muslims, and other agrarian intermediaries coming together against the BJP government. However, most critically, it is the consolidation of the Muslim voters, who have been facing the institutional violence of the Indian state and from the emboldened Hindutva far right, that has helped the INDIA bloc in several key constituencies. 

Little indication of change 

Although Modi has been re-elected to a third term, there is still little indication that his ruling right-wing party will shift its Hindutva agenda of communalism in the immediate future. The electoral loss may perhaps push his ruling BJP to sniff out any last opposition before the next elections, and we could see an escalation of clampdowns on opposition parties, civil society actors, the media, and minorities, who are deemed as eternal electoral foe of the BJP. It is highly plausible that Modi may double down on the implementation of a national register for citizenship and the controversial citizenship act that could render Muslims both disenfranchised and stateless.  

At a geopolitical level, Modi will continue its pro-America policy tilt, with greater trade and military relations with EU countries as well. Lastly, there is little indication that Modi will change his hawkish position towards his arch-rivals and neighbours China and Pakistan, which also means greater competition between Beijing and Delhi on seeking strategic influence in other regional nations including the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Afghanistan.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the authors:

Haris Zargar

Haris Zargar is a doctoral researcher at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) of Erasmus University Rotterdam, specializing in agrarian change, social movements, and Muslim revivalist thought. He holds degrees in Journalism from the University of Kashmir and Development Studies from SOAS, University of London. He has been a journalist for over 12 years, currently writing for the UK-based Middle East Eye.

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How a new conscription law is threatening everyday humanitarian action in Myanmar

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The compulsory enlistment of young men and women in war-stricken Myanmar following the enactment of a conscription law in February this year is adding a layer of complexity to a society already struggling with human rights abuses and a lack of safety for civilians. The conscription order is systematically depleting the youth who are pivotal to everyday humanitarian action, thereby posing a threat to humanitarianism in a country facing a massive humanitarian crisis, writes ISS PhD researcher Hyeonggeun Ji.

Over three years have passed since the Myanmar military seized power, ousting the democratically elected government. Until early last year, the junta currently in control of Myanmar showed unparalleled power over the joint resistance force, which consists of armed organisations opposing the government that emerged from the coup. However, the junta now faces many challenges, in particular a significant manpower shortage. According to several estimations, the junta’s armed forces once comprised between 300,000 to 400,000 troops, but this number has now dwindled to approximately 150,000 due to desertions and casualties.

To address this shortage, the military on 14 February this year enforced a conscription order, targeting men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27. In mid-March, it started enlisting the first batch of civilians by mail, with plans to draft 60,000 people annually. The military authority announced that the first batch of 5,000 troops would be called to duty in mid-April; however, the actual number summoned remains undisclosed so far.

Young people are fleeing en masse…

The announcement has been met with resistance. Young people, unwilling to kill or serve in military, have been compelled to flee abroad en masse — a  phenomenon frequently portrayed in the media as a mass migration or exodus — to avoid conscription. And two people tragically died of suffocation in a crammed queue days after the law was enacted while trying to obtain visas at the Myanmar passport office.

…leading to the loss of youth in Myanmar society

This sudden flight of young people signifies the loss of youth in Myanmar society, both in the sense of youths become forced to be soldiers opposing civilians and by leaving the country altogether. Moreover, the military is continuously trying to label young people as the ‘worst’ enemies due to their active and potential role in anti-coup and pro-democracy movement. In this context, recruiting them can be seen as part of a broader strategy to eliminate the presence of youth from the social fabric by turning young people into soldiers. Concurrently, it is possibly related to the junta’s manoeuvre to politicise aid for its political gain — the military regime could cite reduced humanitarian activity as a means to render people more compliant.

The humanitarian crisis is being exacerbated…

This development is compounding an existing humanitarian crisis. The war is violent — a recent report by Action on Armed Violence estimates this ‘under-reported war’ resulted in 2,164 casualties due to explosive weapons in 2023 alone, and according to a UN report, systematic military violence against civilians had displaced 2.6 million people and had forced another 600,000 to flee by December 2023. War-torn Myanmar moreover is marked by humanitarian needs; 18.6 million people — one-third of the country’s total population — struggle with precarious living conditions, hunger, a lack of clean water, illness, and human rights violations. And the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has sharply increased to nearly 2 million people over the past three years. Military forces are even brutally attacking IDP camps, where unarmed civilians have relocated after their homes were attacked. Affected people are grappling with trauma.

The international humanitarian system moreover is facing multi-layered constraints, making it difficult for humanitarian aid to reach affected people. At the international level, the attention of developed countries, whose resources and decision-making power are essential, to the war in Myanmar is woefully inadequate, partly due to the country’s perceived lack of economic potential. In addition to the utterly inadequate scale of international relief efforts and a lack of funding, the restriction of humanitarian aid and a hostile environment for aid workers have also prevented humanitarian workers from assisting people in need. Meanwhile, the junta jeopardizes the neutrality of humanitarian assistance by requiring international humanitarian organisations to hand over aid resource to military authorities.

…but everyday acts of humanitarianism persist

Despite these frustrations and limitations, humanitarianism persists in Myanmar, with local people and grassroots organisations sustaining alternative humanitarian approaches through everyday acts of humanitarianism. For instance, teachers are continuing to teach, which can give children access to psychosocial services in emergencies while also preserving their right to education. Another instance is the crucial role of diaspora organisations in reporting the local conditions in inaccessible conflict zones and by organising fundraising activities to provide help in the form of emergency relief, assistance for IDPs, and education support. These instances represent mere glimpses of the myriad everyday humanitarian practices conducted by diverse local actors within Myanmar and along its borders, operating beyond the boundary of the hierarchical global humanitarian system.

The youth embody humanitarianism…

Along with continuing humanitarian efforts led by diverse local actors, young people in Myanmar embody humanitarianism in their everyday lives. The role of youth in humanitarian practice is not new but has become intricately intertwined with social norms and culture over time. Young men and women in the country lead and support the social affair groups that organise cultural events, weddings, funerals, blood drives, and various community activities within their villages. Through this social environment, the youth have forged the virtue of helping others in voluntary and collaborative ways. Their important role was highlighted during COVID-19 as they demonstrated capacity to raise funds and circulate health-related information within the communities when external resources were insufficient for managing the pandemic situation.

As humanitarian needs escalate while external assistance remains limited, the volunteerism, leadership, and unity embodied by the youth for humanitarian action are now more critical than ever.

…and their erasure should be countered

But the Myanmar junta’s conscription law presents a systematic obstacle to youth-led everyday humanitarian action and, consequently, poses a threat to humanitarianism in Myanmar. A recent report, Forced to Fight, underlines the emerging signs of young people’s apprehension about conscription, noting how these fears significantly impede their social participation and how their absence is acutely felt within the society.

Currently, the limited attention paid to the issue focuses solely on the security of the youth, which is essential for discussing the conscription law; however, it neglects the broader implications for people and the society. I contend that the conscription law should be recognised as an instrument of power designed to dismantle humanitarian action sustained by everyday practices of local youth in collaboration with other actors on the ground. The failure to respond appropriately to this critical juncture could push humanitarianism in Myanmar to the brink of an existential crisis.

 

Funding statement

This blog article is part of the work of the Humanitarian governance, accountability, advocacy, alternatives project funded by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement No. 884139.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the author:

Hyeonggeun Ji is currently pursuing his PhD at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS). His research focuses on humanitarian governance for climate-related displacement in Bangladesh.

Hyeonggeun Ji

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Humanitarian Observatories Series | ‘Pagkakaloob’: The Filipino concept and practice of community philanthropy

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Community philanthropy has the potential to be a powerful driver of change in the humanitarian and development sector, working to ‘shift the power’ towards local populations and drive social progress. In this blog article, Loreine dela Cruz and Michael Vincent Mercado of the Humanitarian Observatory in the Philippines introduce the Filipino concept of ‘pagkakaloob’ and its key features, showing how it embodies a regional and global shift toward community empowerment.

Image by: Center for Disaster Preparedness Foundation.

 Before 2016, a revolution was quietly taking shape across the world. Outside conventional development’s reach, community philanthropy (CP) arose, marked by the emergence of community foundations, women’s funds, environmental funds, and other grassroots organizations and activities in countries as geographically diverse as Romania, Zimbabwe, Vietnam, and Mexico. These philanthropic efforts appeared, amongst other things, in reaction to failed development efforts, the closing of civil society space, and the promise of locally-led development.

Community philanthropy can have a transformative impact on the communities it arises from and has become recognized as a powerful tool for local development, enhancing community capacity, building trust, and pooling local resources for sustainable development, rooted in civil society and social justice movements. In this blog article, we discuss CP in the Philippines, where a local form of CP called pagkakaloob is changing how Filipinos view giving. Pagkakaloob goes beyond just money; it’s about giving your time, talent, and resources to create a more supportive and thriving community.

Community-based fundraising and sourcing in multiple contexts

Over the past few years, we have been involved in community philanthropy projects through the Assets, Agency, and Trust Program, where we work with GlobalGiving, the  Global Fund for Community Foundations, and the Nonprofit Finance Fund to promote community ownership and leadership in initiatives seeking to achieve long-term change. We are currently situated in the Philippines, where one of several Humanitarian Observatories supported by the Humanitarian Studies Centre and the Humanitarian Governance (Hum-Gov) project is located. The Philippines’ Humanitarian Observatory was established last year following the earlier establishment of observatories in the DRC, Ethiopia, South Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean.

Our work has shown that the concept of community philanthropy (CP) resonates deeply in the Philippines, where the culture of generosity is a fundamental trait. Filipino families, particularly the baby boomer generation, have established traditions such as preparing and sharing special meals with neighbours on Sundays, which fosters community bonds and conversations. Such activities are known as ‘pagkakaloob’, a Filipino term that exemplifies this spirit of giving. Pagkakaloob embodies community philanthropy, promoting generosity and interconnectedness. It encourages not just giving but also nurturing relationships based on care, compassion, and mutual growth — this act of sharing and caring also fosters a profound human connection.

Where did the practice originate?

Filipino virtue ethics is a relationship-oriented system shaped by Southeast Asian tribal traditions and Spanish Catholicism. It is based on two key concepts: “loób,” meaning “relational will,” and “kapwa,” meaning “together with the person.” These concepts support a unique set of virtues aimed at strengthening and preserving human relationships, which contrasts with the individualistic virtues in the Western tradition. In Filipino culture, “kapwa” is a deeply significant concept. It embodies the idea of seeing oneself in others, recognizing interconnectedness, and fostering mutual respect. Beyond social interaction, “kapwa” is about empathy, solidarity, and a collective sense of belonging. “Loób” on the other hand is the soul, encompassing emotions, thoughts, and will that guide one to act with kindness and find harmony within oneself and with others.

Why is this practice commonplace?

Pagkakaloob, sometimes equating to self-sacrifice, is a cherished value with the potential to impact the country’s social and political landscape significantly. Activities go beyond financial donations, embodying the sharing of time, knowledge, skills, connections, and networks for collective welfare. This ethos is supported by practices such as mutual aid (damayan), collective action (bayanihan), and resource sharing (ambagan), which are crucial for building self-reliant communities.

The Filipino value of pagkakaloob empowers communities to lead their own development. This approach shows how individuals, organizations, and communities can all grow together to achieve shared goals. This model of community engagement, rooted in Filipino values of generosity and solidarity, underscores the transformative power of collective action and empathy in addressing social challenges.

Key features of CP in the Philippines

The collaboration between the Center for Disaster Preparedness Foundation (CDP Foundation — the coordinator of the Humanitarian Observatory of the Philippines) and partner awardees of the Abot-Kamay Community Solidarity Fund (ACSF) exemplifies the Filipino values of community and solidarity in action. This partnership has successfully mobilized local communities, raising an impressive 529,440 USD through community philanthropy activities. This builds on an initial investment of 390,000 USD provided to 32 Philippines-based community organizations. The impact extends beyond financial resources; the partnership has fostered collaboration, attracting engagement and funding from at least 43 entities, including governmental institutions. This growing support highlights the increasing recognition of CP’s potential.

Monitoring and reporting on community philanthropy initiatives highlight a profound commitment to mutual support and giving among partners. This was evident during the “Pagtatasa” internal learning event, where 64 individuals from 32 partner organizations gathered to assess progress and share knowledge. Through this and other evaluation moments, we have identified several core values that empower communities in the Philippines:

  • Community solidarity. This refers to the community’s role and engagement in and co-ownership of solutions to local challenges. Values like companionship (pakikipagkapwa),involvement (mapanglahok), inclusivity, unity (pagkakaisa), and solidarity (pakikiisa) are important.
  • #ShiftthePower.This objective informs community-driven decision-making and negotiations with donors, underscoring the community’s capacity to voice and meet its needs and reflecting a commitment to involvement and inclusivity.
  • Prioritizing sustainable development.Communities concentrate on achieving a balance between ecological conservation, economic growth, and self-reliance, which reinforces the Filipino emphasis on the value of life and the community’s ability to sustainably fulfill its needs.
  • Dedication to reaching shared goals. Community members in community development activities show both individual and organizational dedication to trust-building, network formation, and engagement, indicating a shared vision and resolve to accomplish organizational objectives.

These qualities and measures of success do more than chart the course of action — they fuel the spirit of pagkakaloob throughout the Philippines, setting a precedent for regional and global shifts toward community empowerment. Through the concerted efforts of each partner organization of the ACSF, a widespread movement of change and community philanthropy is ignited, showcasing the profound influence of collective values and actions.

Recognizing diverse community development pathways

The journey towards embracing ‘pagkakaloob’ and its potential to shift societal power dynamics in the Philippines is arduous yet vital. This path requires a fundamental shift in how we approach development, moving away from top-down methods and recognizing the immense potential within the communities themselves. Development actors and community leaders become crucial in this transformation. Their role is not to dictate solutions but to act as facilitators and supporters, enabling the collective power and truth of community-led initiatives to emerge and flourish.

The true power lies in the collective wisdom and untapped resources of community members. They are the co-investors in their own development, with a deep understanding of the challenges they face. By recognizing community assets and fostering community-led initiatives, we allow their ingenuity and dedication to drive meaningful and sustainable change.

In line with the proverb, “let a hundred flowers bloom, and a thousand schools of thought contend,” this underscores the importance of diversity in ideas and approaches for community development. By embracing a multitude of perspectives, we foster innovation and resilience, ensuring that development efforts are inclusive and representative of the community’s true needs and aspirations.

 

Further reading:

De Guia, Katrin. 2005. Kapwa: The Self in the Other: Worldviews and Lifestyles of Filipino Culture-Bearers. Anvil Publishing Inc.: Pasig City, the Philippines.

Edwards, Michael. ‘Forget billionaires: let’s build our own system to fund the transformation of society.’ openDemocracy, 23 June 2019.

Reyes, Jeremiah. 2015. Loób and Kapwa: Thomas Aquinas and a Filipino Virtue Ethics. PhD Dissertation, KU Leuven.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

 

About the authors:

Loreine B. dela Cruz is a development specialist with over forty years of professional experience in development and humanitarian work, particularly disaster risk reduction and management, climate change, human rights, and peacebuilding.  

Micheal Vincent DC. Mercado is a disaster risk reduction specialist and filmmaker whose career began in 2008 with the Center for Disaster Preparedness (CDP) Foundation as a student documentary producer.

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Tren illiberal akan semakin kuat di era Prabowo

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The electoral victory of the ex-general-turned-cuddly-populist Prabowo Subianto on 20 March marks the continuation of illiberal democracy in Indonesia. However, the moral panic that followed the announcement of his presidency may be exaggerated, writes Iqra Anugrah, who argues for a more nuanced analysis of Indonesia’s current and future political trajectory. The dangers for democracy posed by Prabowo’s impending rule is just a symptom of the larger problem of oligarchic rule in the Global South. English

Bhasa: Kemenangan Prabowo menandakan keberlanjutan demokrasi illiberal. Tetapi, kita tidak boleh terjebak oleh kepanikan moral. Yang kita butuhkan adalah analisis yang lebih bernuansa mengenai trajektori politik sekarang dan yang akan datang. Ancaman bagi demokrasi di bawah kekuasaan Prabowo merupakan gejala bagi persoalan yang lebih besar, yaitu kuasa oligarki di negara-negara Selatan.

Image by @illustruth

DEMOKRASI Indonesia berada di persimpangan jalan. Prabowo Subianto, seorang mantan jenderal yang aktif di masa kediktatoran Orde Baru yang dipimpin oleh mantan mertuanya, Soeharto, dan bereputasi buruk karena kasus-kasus pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia (HAM), telah resmi memenangkan pemilihan presiden. Terlepas dari klaim tentang penyimpangan prosedur pemilu dan upaya dari dua capres rival, Anies Baswedan dan Ganjar Pranowo, menggugat melalui Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK), Prabowo akan tetap dilantik pada Oktober nanti.

Bagi kalangan gerakan sosial, kemenangan Prabowo merupakan kabar buruk. Ada keresahan di antara para aktivis bahwa pemerintahan Prabowo akan memangkas kembali pencapaian perjuangan demokratik secara signifikan, seperti kebebasan berpendapat, berserikat dan berkumpul, dan aktivitas pers.

Akan tetapi, sentimen ini, meski sangat bisa dimaklumi, cenderung melihat agensi Prabowo secara berlebihan dan alpa dengan fakta bahwa justru di bawah dua periode pemerintahan Joko Widodo-lah demokrasi Indonesia menjadi semakin oligarkis dan illiberal. Maraknya gelombang populisme otoriter di tingkat global yang menjangkiti berbagai negara dan kawasan lain menunjukkan bahwa pertanyaan yang tepat bukanlah mengapa Indonesia tetap bisa mempertahankan kualitas demokrasinya, melainkan kapan Indonesia akan bergabung dengan tren global tersebut dan memiliki versi lokal Rodrigo Duterte atau Bongbong Marcos.

Menyikapi perkembangan politik ini, sosiolog politik Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir baru-baru ini berargumen bahwa demokrasi di Indonesia “akan berjalan seperti biasanya.” Meskipun mengakui bahwa akan ada kemungkinan belokan illiberal yang lebih dalam di bawah kepresidenan Prabowo, kawan Mughis mengkritik kecenderungan alarmis di lingkar-lingkar gerakan sosial dan media dan juga klaim bahwa Indonesia akan kembali menjadi rezim otokratik secara utuh di bawah pemerintahan Prabowo. Mughis berpendapat bahwa para elite telah mendapat keuntungan secara politik dan ekonomi dari demokrasi elektoral borjuis semenjak 1998. Tatanan rezim yang sekarang dengan demikian akan tetap bertahan.

Sementara itu, editor IndoProgress Coen Husain Pontoh mengkritik Mughis dan menyajikan analisis yang berbeda mengenai demokrasi dan perkembangan kapitalisme di Indonesia di bawah pemerintahan Prabowo. Menurut kawan Coen, yang berbagi keresahan yang sama dengan elemen-elemen gerakan sosial mengenai kenaikan otoritarianisme, kecenderungan represif di dalam kerangka demokrasi elektoral di bawah pemerintahan baru akan cenderung meningkat, tapi bukan karena personalitas Prabowo melainkan tekanan struktural dan logika akumulasi kapital itu sendiri, yang akan memaksa negara dan aktornya, yaitu pemerintahan Prabowo, untuk mewakili kepentingan kelas kapitalis melalui pelestarian eksploitasi dan dominasi yang akan semakin parah derajatnya.

Terlepas dari perdebatan di antara Mughis dan Coen, kedua analisis ini menyajikan pembacaan yang lebih bernuansa tentang masa depan demokrasi Indonesia di bawah pemerintahan Prabowo. Tulisan saya kali ini bertujuan untuk berkontribusi dan mengintervensi perdebatan ini.

Dalam hal interpretasi atas dinamika politik Indonesia di bawah Prabowo, analisis Mughis menurut saya memberikan pembacaan yang lebih jernih mengenai skenario-skenario politik yang mungkin terjadi. Di sisi lain, analisis Coen menekankan kerangka teoretik penting yang perlu diingat oleh setiap aktivis dan ilmuwan progresif dan kiri, bahwa negara kapitalis memiliki tendensi struktural untuk terus melanggengkan ekspansi kapital dan proses perampasan dan penghisapan nilai lebih yang dilakukannya.

Pembacaan yang ingin saya tawarkan adalah sebagai berikut: Saya lebih bersepakat dengan pembacaan Mughis mengenai kondisi demokrasi Indonesia di bawah kekuasaan Prabowo, seraya mengamini bahwa kita tidak boleh melupakan natur dari negara kapitalis dan kecenderungan represifnya, yang digaris bawahi oleh Coen.

Tetapi, pembacaan Mughis bahwa proses perebutan dan bagi-bagi kekuasaan di antara para elite sebagai faktor utama di balik stabilitas demokrasi illiberal terlalu uni-dimensional. Di sisi lain, meskipun Coen secara tepat mengingatkan kita tentang tendensi struktural dan otoriter dari negara kapitalis, analisisnya luput melihat bahwa kuasa kapital, meski determinan, termediasi efeknya oleh sejumlah faktor. Implikasinya, corak dan manifestasi dari tendensi otoriter ini akan berbeda-beda bentuknya di lokasi-lokasi geografis yang berbeda.

Oleh karena itu, dalam hemat saya, analisis yang lebih komprehensif perlu melihat tiga faktor. Pertama, karakteristik dari kompetisi elektoral di antara para elite politik; kedua, relasi antara demokrasi dan kapitalisme oligarkis di Indonesia; dan ketiga, aspirasi politik dari para pemilih itu sendiri. Dengan melihat ketiga faktor ini, saya berkesimpulan bahwa alih-alih kembali kepada kediktatoran ala Orde Baru, Indonesia di bawah Prabowo akan menyaksikan kelanjutan demokrasi illiberal.

Elit Politikus Tetap Berkuasa, Tetapi Kekuasaannya Tidak Mutlak

Politikus Indonesia dari berbagai partai dan tingkatan pemerintahan telah menikmati dan dengan sukses memanfaatkan sistem pemilu yang relatif bebas dan terbuka sejak 1999. Elite-elite lama yang mapan secara cepat beradaptasi dengan permainan elektoral borjuis ini dan memantapkan posisinya tatkala Indonesia mengalami transisi politik dari kediktatoran menuju demokrasi, sebuah kesempatan yang juga dimanfaatkan oleh pemain-pemain baru seperti kelas kapitalis/kalangan pebisnis lokal.

Di level nasional, para elite dengan mudah dapat berbagi kekuasaan dan berbagai jenis “rampasan perang” di antara mereka, seperti jatah dari anggaran negara dan jabatan menteri. Di tingkat lokal, para kepala daerah seperti bupati dapat memenangkan pemilu melalui jejaring patronase dan ijon politik dengan aktor kapitalisme ekstraktif, seperti perusahaan tambang.

Tentu saja, tingkah laku elite ini menunjukkan preferensi mereka, yaitu tatanan politik yang lebih otoriter, ditandai dengan terbatasnya ruang untuk partisipasi popular, oposisi, dan tuntutan redistribusi. Tetapi, ambisi ini terbatasi oleh sejumlah fitur struktural dan kelembagaan dari negara Indonesia itu sendiri, seperti kurangnya monopoli elite lokal secara langsung atas sumber daya ekonomi dan lembaga negara.

Kapitalisme Oligarkis dan Demokrasi Kawan, bukan Lawan

Kemudian, sebagaimana telah ditunjukkan oleh ahli ekonomi-politik dan sarjana kritis, demokrasi dan kapitalisme oligarkis dapat hidup berdampingan di Indonesia (juga di banyak masyarakat kapitalis lainnya). Demokrasi elitis di Indonesia tidak menjadi ancaman yang signifikan bagi kelas kapitalis. Ini terlihat dari respons positif kalangan bisnis dan investor yang menyambut baik hasil pemilu sebagai mekanisme untuk memastikan stabilitas politik dan transisi kekuasaan yang damai, yang dibutuhkan untuk pertumbuhan ekonomi dan investasi.

Nyatanya, di tengah absennya agenda sosial demokrasi minimum yang solid, seperti redistribusi kekayaan, program-program kesejahteraan sosial yang luas, dan kontrol kelas pekerja atas ekonomi dan politik, maka kalangan pebisnis tidak akan keberatan untuk memodifikasi aktivitas usaha mereka sesuai dengan norma-norma demokrasi formal. Kelas kapitalis tidak perlu mengandalkan represi politik yang bersifat eksesif, apabila mereka bisa memanfaatkan institusi elektoral dan demokrasi formal yang ada, satu hal yang telah mereka lakukan sejak awal reformasi.

Karenanya, tidak heran bahwa dari dulu ilmuwan politik Benedict Anderson memperingatkan kita bahwa pemilu di Asia Tenggara termasuk Indonesia merupakan indikasi bagi dominasi politik borjuis. Secara sinis, kita bisa menyimpulkan bahwa para elite memiliki kepentingan untuk mempertahankan demokras illiberal yang memiliki dimensi elektoral yang kompetitif, bebas, dan matang.

Pemilih Indonesia Mendambakan Pendisiplinan Demokrasi

Terakhir, kita tidak boleh luput melihat aspirasi politik para pemilih Indonesia secara saksama. Prabowo memenangkan pemilu dengan perolehan suara mayoritas, termasuk dukungan dari para pemilih Gen-Z. Prabowo juga terbantu oleh dukungan Jokowi, yang masih memiliki popularitas publik yang tinggi. Ini mendongkrak citra Prabowo sebagai penerus Jokowi yang setia dengan cita-cita developmentalisnya.

Kalangan aktivis dan intelektual boleh saja tercengang melihat ekspresi politik semacam ini, tetapi banyak pemilih melihat preferensi politik mereka sebagai pemenuhan hak demokratis mereka. Hasil jajak pendapat yang cukup baru dari salah satu lembaga survei terkemuka menunjukkan bahwa hampir 71% responden berpendapat bahwa kinerja demokrasi Indonesia baik atau sangat baik. Fenomena illiberalisme di masyarakat ini tidak hanya terjadi di Indonesia. Di Filipina, banyak pemilih kelas menengah dan menengah atas yang mengamini model demokrasi yang kuasi-otoriter dan eklusivis ala Duterte sebagai tanggapan dan kritik atas “kekacauan” dalam demokrasi liberal. Persoalan ini juga menunjukkan kurangnya daya tarik populis yang luas dari agenda dan program politik gerakan sosial selama ini.

This version of the article was first published on IndoProgress

The English version was published on Bliss

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the author:

Iqra Anugrah is a Research Fellow at the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS), Leiden University and a Research Associate at the Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education, and Information (LP3ES). He has conducted extensive fieldwork-based research on democracy, development, social movements, and local politics in Indonesia.

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Delhi Diaries: The Dystopian Reality of India’s slide into Fascism

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India’s mammoth general election has started — a process lasting several weeks as nearly one billion people cast their votes. Sophia Miller recently visited India, witnessing both excitement and fear in the run-up to the election as Indians ponder a possible third term of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and of the Hindu nationalist ideology (Hindutva) he furthers. What will another term of an increasingly fascist government mean for India and especially for its Muslim minority?

Hindu-nationalism is coloring the city of Delhi in shades of orange

During my last days in Delhi the city is being draped in orange. The flags are flying from garlands criss-crossing busy market streets and narrow alleys, from almost all shops, from every lamppost along the slow-moving traffic lanes, from cars, from auto rickshaws, even from bicycles whose underdressed owners are shivering their way through the exceptionally cold winter days of late January. On the edge of the roads, vendors with handcarts sell the neon-coloured flags displaying the god Ram and an endless repetition of Jai Sri Ram, Jai Sri Ram, the background soundtrack to the temple inauguration that for weeks has seen large swathes of the population high on Hindu-nationalism.

The as yet unfinished Ram Mandir (temple of Ram) in Ayodhya is being built on the ruins of the Babri Masjid, a mosque that was destroyed by right wing fanatics in 1992. They claim that the mosque was built at the birthplace of the Hindu God Ram and accept the 2000 people that died in the ensuing violence – most of them Muslim – as a fair price to pay for clearing the area. After almost three decades of legal and political battles, the Indian Supreme Court ruled in 2019 that a temple should be constructed on the land. The judgment more than anything else reflected the decay of the Indian judiciary – the executive by then had long stopped even pretending it follows the secularism enshrined in the Indian Constitution. To quote Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s words from the temple inauguration ceremony: “Ram is the faith of India, Ram is the foundation of India. Ram is the idea of India, Ram is the law of India”. Defying Hindu tradition and angering more than a few senior priests, Modi chose to place statues of gods and perform the consecration rituals before the temple’s construction was completed, determined to milk the issue to the last drop in his bid for re-election in the general parliamentary elections in spring this year.

In the last general election in 2019, 37% of voters gave their vote to Modi’s party BJP, but with India’s first-past-the-post system this translated into a landslide victory of 56% of seats in parliament. With the state institutions firmly in his hand, the opposition bogged down with in-fighting or jailed, and any notion of an independent media gone for good, some polls predict Modi might score up to 10 percentage points more this time around.

“You shouldn’t have invested all that money into the house,” says Mahi* matter-of-factly, pointing to the air conditioner that’s proudly attached to the raw brick walls of the single room that forms Nadiya’s home. “The elections are coming, they will tear down your house and all the money will be lost. What’s the use?”

I have to blink, blink again, and stop for a moment. The year is 2024, the country India, and this is a normal Tuesday afternoon conversation between two of my friends. Welcome to Modi’s Amrit Kaal, the golden era that will supposedly see the country transform bottom-up.

Nadiya lives in a predominantly Muslim, informal and low-income neighbourhood not far from a busy metro station in South Delhi. There is a dispute as to whose land the houses are built upon. The state claims it belongs to the archaeological survey of India while the residents, some of whom have lived there for more than 30 years, who have seen children born, marry, and in turn give birth, claim it for themselves. In 1995, the government demolished the neighbourhood. The residents rebuilt their houses brick by brick, just to see them demolished again in 2012, and then once more in December 2022, with hundreds of families becoming homeless overnight each time. It was due to mere luck that Nadiya’s house was left standing this time around, and there is no way of knowing when the bulldozers will come back. While these demolition drives are not a unique feature of Modi’s government, they have intensified under his rule and are usually conducted in poor and/or Muslim neighbourhoods, often following rallies of the Hindu far right. They are indeed common enough to have earned themselves the nickname ‘bulldozer politics’.

 

People in the ruins of their homes in South Delhi, 2012.  Source: Author

Born into an impoverished family with 6 children, Nadiya has worked herself through government schools and universities to complete an MA in Hindi, has learned sewing, parlouring and other marketable skills in free courses along the way, and has amassed years of work experience as a teacher in underpaid NGO jobs. Now, having to look after her own son, she tutors children at her home, often teaching 30 pupils at once in a room that can’t be larger than 10 square metres. Working 8 hours a day, 6 days a week, she earns a few thousand rupees per month which she combines with the 12,000 rupees (roughly 130 Euros) her husband makes.

“Where would I go?” Nadiya asks when Mahi brings up the bulldozers again. “I can’t afford to move anywhere else. Plus, I grew up here, my whole family lives here, my son’s school is in walking distance. Tell me, where else should I go?”

Hindu nationalist ideology, or Hindutva, is built on Brahminism and propagates a type of Hinduism that is not representative of the incredibly diverse belief system practiced by Hindus across the Indian subcontinent. The BJP wants people to forget that Hinduism was never a unified religion but rather a collection of beliefs, rituals, and practices, the most unifying characteristic of which was for a long time that they neither fell under Buddhism, Islam, Jainism, Christianity nor any of the many other religions practiced in the region.

Hindutva followers stand against this diversity. They antagonise lower castes, tribes, Christians, the broader political Left, disapprove of sexual self-determination and women’s freedom, but most important of all, they hate Muslims. In the eyes of Hindutva supporters, Muslims should accept their place as second-class citizens, or, as a popular slang says, go to Pakistan.

The skyline with mosques and temples in the south of Delhi. Source: Author

Attending an urban upper-middle class wedding, it is almost possible to forget all these politics. The discussions centre on who is wearing what, how the bride and groom are looking, and what desserts are being served. Then an older man starts a conversation with me, a wealthy upper caste Hindu with an impressive moustache that seems to grow longer the more the talk drags on. When I mention that I come from Germany, he enthusiastically starts telling me about a box of knives he got as a gift from a German friend a few years ago. “They’re so sharp,” he says in Hindi, chuckling, “they don’t just cut vegetables – they could even cut a katua.”

Later, I learn that katua is a derogatory slang for Muslim men who have been circumcised. I also learn that the older man alone bought 1000 orange flags to decorate his exclusively upper caste Hindu colony for the Ram Mandir inauguration.

Among the 2019/20 protesters against the Islamophobic Citizenship Amendment Act, a law which would see fast-track citizenship granted to applicants from all major religions except for Islam, and which could contribute to stripping Muslims of their citizenship, there was a white student with a sign that read “I’m from Germany, your grandchildren will be very pissed at you.”

I think about it often these days. So many things I see in India are achingly familiar from what I studied at school, and sometimes I want to scream out of sheer frustration at how glaringly obvious it is that history is repeating itself.

I think of Berlin’s streets clad in swastika flags; of people boycotting Jewish shops the same way some Indians I know are now boycotting Muslim street vendors or maids; of laws banning kosher food or halal meat, restricting inter-religious marriage; of the prosecution of journalists, the imprisonment of political dissidents, the limitless surveillance of all citizens to make sure nobody will be able to escape; of the government forging and forcing a national uniformity on a territory that for the longest time was not one nation but the collection of various kingdoms in geographical proximity; of paramilitary ground forces like the SS marching in the street. Much like in Germany, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Hindu nationalists’ volunteer paramilitary organisation with more than 5 million members, has been practicing for indoctrination and pogroms. The RSS has dedicated branches for women and children and runs India’s largest school network. The second chief of the 100-year old organisation openly admired Hitler and asserted that India should treat her minorities the same way the Nazis treated the Jews. Looking at the country now, it seems there isn’t a long way left to go for his wish to finally come true.

I think of the government renaming Muslim cities, tearing down Muslim architecture, erasing Muslim contributions to history; of them rewriting the country’s history. I think of the fake news filling newspapers, TV channels, schoolbooks, WhatsApp chats. The lies, the endless lies. ‘We do this for the country. For the greater good. We do this for you’.

An Indian children’s book, published in 2016, that names Hitler as a great Leader among Barack Obama, Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, Narendra Modi and Aung San Suu Kyi. Source: Author

Is nobody else noticing? Does nobody else care? Nobody who matters, it seems, as countries and multinational companies keep doing business with India as if nothing is happening, exploiting its cheap wages, flexible environmental standards, and its government’s high demand for shiny new arms. It seems that nobody ever learns from history. (The Germans didn’t, for sure, or they wouldn’t be supporting Israel’s ongoing genocide in Palestine.)

Gaza has 2 million people, India maybe 200 million Muslims. Imagine: 100 times more spyware and arms to sell to a government that wants to get rid of them one way or another. In 2022 the Early Warning Project ranked India as the eighth most likely county in the world to see genocide. A recent poll found that almost half of all Indians said they were very much satisfied with Modi’s work. Sometimes I have nightmares of what they may do to Nadiya if they get the chance.

I don’t want to remember Delhi like that, draped in ugly neon orange, but the colour leaves an ugly aftertaste that doesn’t dissipate. Flying up and away through the layers of smog, I think of when I will return, and there is both yearning and fear in my heart.[/vc_column_text][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1713852542354{margin-top: -15px !important;margin-bottom: 10px !important;}”][vc_column_text]This article by Sophia Miller was originally published on http://www.tni.org under a Creative Commons Licence https://www.tni.org/en/article/delhi-diaries

A pseudonym was used in this article; the author’s identity is protected at her request due to the sensitive nature of the article.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the author:

Sophia Miller a project officer with The Transnational Institute’s War and Pacification programme.

 

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The Indonesian democracy may change once Prabowo is president — but we need to look at the bigger picture

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The electoral victory of the ex-general-turned-cuddly-populist Prabowo Subianto on 20 March marks the continuation of illiberal democracy in Indonesia. However, the moral panic that followed the announcement of his presidency may be exaggerated, writes Iqra Anugrah, who argues for a more nuanced analysis of Indonesia’s current and future political trajectory. The dangers for democracy posed by Prabowo’s impending rule is just a symptom of the larger problem of oligarchic rule in the Global South.

Source: Made by Bliss using Canva.

Indonesian democracy is at a crossroads. Prabowo Subianto, a retired general who served in the army during the dictatorship of his former father-in-law, Suharto, and who has a tainted reputation due to his alleged involvement in human rights abuses, is set to become the next president of Indonesia. Despite claims of possible electoral irregularities and attempts by losing presidential candidates Anies Baswedan and Ganjar Pranowo to challenge the election results at the Constitutional Court, the official results have shown that Prabowo has won the presidential race.

For Indonesian social movements, his electoral victory is bad news. There is growing concern among activists that Prabowo’s presidency will roll back hard-won democratic achievements, including freedoms of speech, association, and the press. But this sentiment, while understandable, overstates Prabowo’s agency and overlooks the fact that it was during the two-term tenure of incumbent president Joko Widodo (Jokowi) that Indonesian democracy became increasingly oligarchic and illiberal. After years of subscribing to authoritarian populism — a worrying trend that is observed globally — it was only a matter of time before Indonesia was to have its own version of Rodrigo Duterte or Bongbong Marcos.

Responding to the election of Prabowo, political sociologist Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir recently argued that democracy in Indonesia “will keep on running just as it did before”. While acknowledging the real possibility of a deeper illiberal turn under Prabowo’s presidency, he challenged the alarmist tone in social movement and media circles and the claim that Indonesia would fall back into a full-blown autocracy under Prabowo’s rule. He argued that elites have benefitted politically and economically from electoral democracy since 1998. The current regime will therefore likely remain in place.

Mudhoffir’s assessment offers a more sober view of possible scenarios under Prabowo’s rule. However, his argument that struggles for and the sharing of power among elites is the main driver of the stability of illiberal democracy is too one-dimensional. I do agree that, rather than a return to dictatorship, Indonesia could witness the continuation of the illiberal democracy developed under Jokowi’s rule.

But in my view, a more nuanced analysis of the implications of Prabowo’s ascension to the presidency is necessary — one that would require us to look at three factors: 1) the nature of electoral competition among political elites, 2) the relations between democracy and oligarchic capitalism in Indonesia, and 3) the political aspirations of Indonesian voters. By looking at these three factors, we can better describe the overall characteristics of Indonesian democracy under Prabowo’s presidency and help concerned activists, social movements, and citizens to formulate their next steps.

Political elites remain powerful, but are kept in check

Indonesian politicians across parties and levels of government have benefitted from free and open electoral competition since 1999. Established elites quickly adapted to the new electoral game that arose as the country transitioned from a dictatorship to a democracy, and newer players such as local businesspeople have gained significant influence. At the national level, elites are able to easily share post-election “spoils” among themselves, which include a portion of the state budget and ministerial appointments. At the local level, district heads can win elections through acts of patronage or shady deals with extractive businesses, such as mining corporations. Obviously, these acts of elites demonstrate their preference for a more authoritarian arrangement marked by less popular participation, dissenting opinions, and redistributive demands, but their ambition is tempered by the structural and institutional constraints of the Indonesian state, such as the lack of a direct monopoly of economic resources and state institutions by local elites.

Oligarchic capitalism and democracy: friends, not foes

Secondly, as has been pointed out by political economists and critical scholars, democracy and oligarchic capitalism can coexist in Indonesia. Indonesia’s elitist form of democracy poses no significant threat to the interests of the capitalist class. This can be seen in how businesses and investors welcomed the general elections as a mechanism for ensuring political stability and a peaceful transfer of power needed for economic growth and investment. In fact, in the absence of solid social democratic demands for wealth redistribution, expansive social welfare programmes, and working-class control over the economy and political processes, the business community should be quite happy to adjust its operations in a formally democratic environment.

It is small wonder that a long time ago political scientist Benedict Anderson had warned that elections in Southeast Asia including in Indonesia are indicative of “bourgeois political dominance.” Put cynically, it is in the interests of the elites themselves to maintain an illiberal form of democracy with robust electoral dimensions.

Indonesian voters want a disciplined democracy

Lastly, one must not forget the political aspirations of Indonesian voters themselves. Prabowo won the election by a wide margin and enjoyed the support of the Gen Z voters. And the fact that Prabowo’s candidacy was supported by Jokowi, who remains popular among the Indonesian public, helps to enhance his image as a faithful successor of Jokowi’s brand of developmentalism.

One might balk at this political preference, but despite concerns from activists and scholars, most Indonesian voters see this as a genuine exercise of their democratic rights. A recent survey shows that close to 71% of respondents think that the quality of Indonesian democracy is either “good” or “very good.” This phenomenon of societal illiberalism is not exclusive to Indonesia. In the neighboring Philippines, especially upper- and middle-class voters have been embracing a quasi-authoritarian, exclusionary conception of democracy in response to the perceived “messiness” of liberal democratic procedures.

A contextual assessment is needed

This is not to minimize the potential dangers of Prabowo’s presidency, but it is important to contextually assess such dangers beyond moral panic. An alarmist take on the rise of an authoritarian-leaning president is a sign of knee-jerk liberalism, which is detached from the material concerns of the working people and steers us away from the important task of rejuvenating democratic class politics.

Most likely, democratic “stability” under Prabowo’s presidency will be a perverse one. Free electoralism will remain the only game in town, but episodic repressions of democratic rights and the contraction of democratic spaces will continue, especially in semi-urban and rural areas. Oligarchic control of politics and economy too will continue.

The increasing fragmentation of Indonesian social movements, partly due to their disagreement in engaging Jokowi’s government, makes resisting authoritarian tendencies in the upcoming Prabowo administration an arduous task. But hope should not be lost. Despite the rise of conservative politics, a new cohort of student and social movement activists has emerged and for the first time in recent years a new Labor Party, which was formed by leading labor unions, managed to join the general elections this year.

Prabowo’s presidency will not lead to a return of a Cold War-style capitalist dictatorship. Nevertheless, it will herald a new dawn in the contemporary history of Indonesian democracy, where illiberal tendencies become the norms rather than exceptions.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the author:

Iqra Anugrah is a Research Fellow at the International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS), Leiden University and a Research Associate at the Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education, and Information (LP3ES). He has conducted extensive fieldwork-based research on democracy, development, social movements, and local politics in Indonesia.

Development Dialogue 19 | Why we need alternatives to mainstream education — and how the ‘Nook’ model of learning can show us the way

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Contemporary education models continue to reflect and perpetuate colonial educational priorities and by virtue are intricately tied to goals of shaping ‘children as future adults’ and creating a ‘productive’ workforce through education. In the process, they exclude marginalised groups of people, denying them the opportunity to learn and thrive. Alternatives to mainstream education models have been sought all over the world and are gaining traction. In this blog article, Anoushka Gupta discusses ‘Nooks’, alternative community learning spaces that non-profit organisation Project DEFY has introduced in several Asian and African countries, and shows how they are transforming the way in which people approach learning.

Learners working on projects during the design phase. Source: Project DEFY.

Situating systemic challenges within mainstream education models

The outdatedness of several mainstream education models in their failure to enable individuals and communities to respond to emerging challenges have long been recognised. Yet, not much has been done in terms of questioning the foundational principles of these models and in finding enduring alternatives. Such alternatives are needed particularly in Asia and Africa, where several systemic challenges confront educational systems.

It is well known, for example, that the founding principles of schooling systems rest on the assumption that child development is a linear process — it is thereby assumed that a child of a particular age must learn certain skills and competencies before progressing further[1]. As a result, as children move through school, their worth is increasingly tied to their performance in standardized examinations, placing immense pressure on them to do well and limiting opportunities to explore interests or enjoy the process of learning. Metrics to understand what constitutes ‘success’ over the years (through assessment results or further educational trajectories) have standardised experiences and divorced education from its local context[2].

Moreover, differences in material wealth and social location play an important role in understanding variations in ‘success’ defined through assessment results. For example, Dalit and Adivasi communities in India who were historically excluded from economic resources and formal educational systems face challenges in meeting the uniform testing criteria, which puts them at a disadvantage in many disciplines and professions even today[3]. In Uganda, high rates of teenage pregnancy and associated stigma reproduce exclusion and drive girls to drop out[4].

These instances demonstrate that mainstream schooling is built on rigid eligibility rules and criteria for success that fail to secure an environment where learners feel safe and heard and where they can explore their interests instead of sticking to uniform curricula, often detached from their own realities. In the next section, I will show how the Nook learning model seeks to contend with such hegemonic education models and creates safe spaces in which learners can thrive without excessive pressure to perform.

Questioning why we learn

First conceptualised in 2016 by Abhijit Sinha, founder of the India-based non-profit organisation Project DEFY,[5]Nooks are physical community learning environments located in under-resourced places that are accessible to learners irrespective of their age, gender, marital status, and socio-economic background. These spaces are built on questioning the fundamental purpose of learning, which for mainstream models often is creating a productive workforce by teaching them standardised knowledge and skills instead of centring interest as the main driver of learning.

Sinha’s experiment started in a small village in Karnataka, India. Disillusioned with his own educational experiences in one of India’s top engineering colleges, he envisioned a space equipped with basic tools and without strict instructions or rules that would push learners to really explore their interests and would encourage resourcefulness, teamwork, and innovation. These spaces later expanded, went through several iterations, and became the ‘Nooks’ they are today. And they continue to be adapted to new conditions and the needs of learners and communities. Since 2016, 41 Nooks have been set up and 32 are currently operational through partnerships with local organisations across Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, India, and Bangladesh.

The freedom to choose how (and what) to learn

Nooks follow ‘self-designed learning’ as the pedagogical orientation where the core belief rests on learners defining and designing their own educational goals in an enabling environment. Each space is equipped with basic tools, raw materials, the internet, and laptops and has two fellows who act as mentors.

The Nook follows a cycle-based structure comprising four stages:

  1. Exploration — fellow-guided sessions that introduce learners to diverse learning areas (from robotics to art to storytelling).
  2. Goal Setting — the identification and articulation by learners of a specific learning goal based on their interesteither from areas in the exploration stage or something totally different, as well as their definition of the steps and resources required to translate the goal into a project.
  3. Design — the execution by learners of the project, which they spend approximately three to six months on (the length of the cycle differs depending on the Nook).
  4. Exhibition — the presentation of their work at an event known as an ‘external exhibition’, which is used as a platform for showcasing learner projects to community members and external stakeholders.

Conversations, reflections, and enjoyment

In each cycle, beyond working on projects, learners gather twice a day in opening and closing circles to discuss any troubles they have faced, be it related to their project or something that bothers them in general. Reflections during these designated discussion hours are meant to build a sense of community in the Nook. Many learners have chosen to take up problems in their community – for instance, learners are trying to tackle environmental pollution in the Barishal Nook in Bangladesh. This approach to learning allows individuals to share challenges without judgment and allows them to flexibly explore their interests without assessments or pressures of completion. It intends to recentre the role of learners’ agency and to foster an understanding of individuals as part of a larger collective.

An opening circle in one of the Nooks. Source: Project DEFY.

The Nooks have also had a wider impact. First, self-designed learning naturally implies that projects differ across and within Nooks. A common thread, however, is that learners tend to pick up problems they see in their surroundings or delve deeper into an area they were curious about. In the Bulawayo Nook in Zimbabwe, for example, a learner articulated his desire to build an artificial limb, explaining, “Personally, I need it. I would also want to help other people in my community who are disabled once I achieve this goal. The cost of artificial legs is very expensive in the country so that is why I decided to make a cheaper and innovative one”.

Several learners also revealed that their goals challenged normative gendered ideas of learning and work. For instance, in the Gahanga Nook in Rwanda, a female learner spoke of how she intended to learn tailoring initially. However, with exposure to different areas, she discovered her interest in welding despite initial resistance from her family. With time and through encouragement from peers and fellows, she created a hanger and a garden chair, ultimately convincing her family to support her.

Lastly, Nooks foster a community identity. Before Nooks are set up, a community mapping exercise is carried out to understand how the space potentially adds value to the lives of community members. The eventual goal of each Nook is for learners to drive the concept independently. While Nooks are still young and learners running the Nook independently are yet to be located, several seeds of leadership from within Nooks have been sown. Beyond taking on day-to-day responsibilities, steering opening and closing circles, and mentoring fellow learners, the transition of several learners to Nook facilitator roles is encouraging.

Expanding the ‘idea’ behind and beyond Nooks — some final takeaways

Globally, enhancing access to schooling is hailed as a marker of development. Yet, the exclusion and disempowerment that are part of both the design and implications of such beliefs are rarely questioned. In contexts where disempowerment stems from wider socio-economic barriers that trickle down to schooling, Nooks demonstrate the value of learning spaces that allow flexibility to explore one’s interests without imposing restrictions on what to learn. In turn, the emphasis on contextual learning and engagement with community challenges as part of the learning journey seeks to upturn individualised notions of education.

Finally, while ‘community-led development’ is increasingly used as the go-to buzzword among development practitioners and donors, very few are truly willing to let go of predetermined criteria to measure the ‘output’ and ‘outcomes’ of education interventions. Truly recognising the agency of the learners and communities means first questioning our own metrics of what constitutes ‘success.’

This blog article draws on a recent working paper published by Project DEFY that can be accessed here

References:

[1] Prout, A. & James, A. (1997) ‘A New Paradigm for the Sociology of Childhood? Provenance, Promise and Problems’ in Prout, A. & James, A. (ed.) Constructing and Reconstructing Childhood: Contemporary Issues in the Sociological Study of Childhood. Second edition. London: Falmer Press. pp. 7-32.

[2] Ydesen, C. and Andreasen, K. (2020) “Historical roots of the global testing culture in education,” Nordic studies in Education, 40(2), pp. 149-166. DOI: 10.23865/nse.v40.2229

[3] See Ch2 ‘School Education and Exclusion’ in India Exclusion Report 2013-14. pp.44-75. Available at: IndiaExclusionReport2013-2014.pdf (idsn.org)

[4] Study-report-on-Linkages-between-Pregnancy-and-School-dropout.pdf (faweuganda.org)

[5] For more on Project DEFY, see https://hundred.org/en/innovations/project-defy-design-education-for-yourself

About the author:

Anoushka Gupta is a researcher based out of India. Her research interests include child and youth wellbeing, understanding social exclusion, and utilising participatory methods in community-based research. She has worked extensively with non-profit organisations primarily in India on educational quality and community-based learning models. She previously majored in Social Policy as part of the MA in Development Studies from the International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam and holds a Bachelor’s degree in History from St. Stephen’s College, University of Delhi.