16 Days of Activism Against GBV Blog Series| Holding Both Ends of the Line in the fight Against Digital Violence

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Prevailing responses to digital violence against women and girls are largely reactive— demanding justice after a case of revenge-porn, doxxing or cyber-bullying has already destroyed a life, livelihood or a sense of safety. This crisis has become an emergency: globally,16-58% of women have experienced a form of online violence, and in Nigeria 45% of women self-report experiencing digital violence. Yet we continue to treat symptoms while the architecture that enables digital violence remains unchallenged.

We are holding only one end of the line.

In this blog, Emaediong Akpan argues for a dual approach that addresses both the structural and the cultural dimensions of this crisis. First, we must hold tech platforms and legal systems accountable for the technological architectures that enable abuse. Second, we must transform how we prepare and support the next generation, beginning with digital literacy from childhood. This strategy is not about making users responsible for their own safety but about building communal resilience against the weaponized shame that is digital abuse’s core tactic. By treating survivors with unwavering belief and care, we challenge the culture of silence and place shame where it belongs—with the abusers and the systems that grant them anonymity and virality.

Photo Credit: UN Women


Beyond Reactions

Nearly half of the world’s women and girls, have no legal protection from digital violence. The uncomfortable truth in our fight for digital safety is that we are often act after the fact. There is an overwhelming number of safety nets—legal, social, psychological, to ‘protect’ women and girls after they have experienced harm in digital spaces. However, according to Amnesty International, 76% of women report altering their online behavior due to abuse. This statistic reveals the limitation of our reactionary approach. We are treating the consequences of digital violence but failing to confront the architecture that exposes women and girls to harm.

Our reactionary approach, though vital, is a partial victory at best — it means holding one end of the line. My call is to extend our hands and hold both ends.

The reactionary approach operates after the fact, after the harm has been done. It fails to confront the underlying issue: a digital ecosystem that is engineered through its architecture, business model and algorithms to facilitate and profit from such harm. To address digital violence against women and girls, we must adopt a dual-approach. This approach requires us to hold the line of platform accountability on one hand while engaging in foundational prevention rooted in early digital literacy and communal care on the other.

Understanding the Impact of Digital Violence on Women’s Participation in Public Life

Globally, 16-58% of women have experience online violence. In Nigeria, 45% of women self-report experiencing digital violence, with girls aged 12-17 and young women up to 35 being targeted. 85% of women globally have witnessed digital violence such as cyberbullying, false and misleading smear campaigns, doxxing, image and text-based threats and more. Although the forms of digital violence vary, the motive remains the same: to shame, silence, and exclude women and girls from public life. Below I explain the impact of two particularly insidious forms.

  • Cyber-Stalking: Research indicates that an estimated 7.5 million people have experienced cyberstalking, demonstrating that anyone with a smartphone, social-media or GPS-enabled device is vulnerable.  Data from domestic violence programs in multiple countries indicates that 71-85% of domestic violence perpetrators use technology from smartphones and GPS to spyware—to stalk, monitor and threaten survivors. The intimate violence of the physical world now follows women into every digital space, collapsing any boundary between public and private life.

 

What Do We Mean by ‘Digital Violence’?

Without a universal conceptualization, this phenomenon operates under a cluster of terms, each highlighting a different aspect of this menace.

I use “digital violence” throughout this piece because it is conceptually encompassing. It captures not only the act of violence (harassment, doxing) but also the structural nature of the harm. It points to a violent digital environment shaped by the algorithmic amplification of harm and the prioritization of engagement/virality over safety. Digital violence as a concept draws attention to the platform not as a neutral mirror of gender-based violence offline but as an active, participant in these acts of violence.

Holding Platforms and Systems Accountable

Our response ought to begin with the platforms whose digital architectures are designed to maximize ‘engagement’ irrespective of whether these engagements are driven by joy, outrage or hatred. The algorithms reward inflammatory contents with increased visibility, providing a fertile ground for digital violence to thrive. In adopting this approach, we must move beyond reactive content moderation to safety-by-design principles that places the responsibility on these platforms to mitigate systemic risks, including gender-based violence.

Our laws should specifically criminalize forms of digital violence including but not limited to cyber-stalking, disinformation, revenge porn, and doxxing. Although the Nigerian Violence Against Persons Prohibition Act 2015 is a good starting point, its effective application to address digital violence requires both amendment and judicial activism. The Act currently lacks explicit provisions for image-based sexual abuse, cyber-stalking, and platform liability. Courts must be willing to interpret existing provisions broadly while legislators work to close these gaps. We need legal frameworks that recognize the unique harms of digital violence—its permanence, its viral spread, its capacity to follow victims across every platform and into every space.

Digital Literacy as a Complimentary Strategy

Preventive approaches have been critiqued —often rightly—for placing the responsibility on potential victims while absolving platforms of responsibility. My suggested approach does not absolve platforms of their responsibility. Rather, I argue that building communal resilience is not a parallel response but a complimentary strategy in this fight against digital violence. Even in a utopia with perfectly regulated platforms, harm can exist. The goal is to change the social and psychological terrain on which these attacks land.

Fostering a child’s critical consciousness does not excuse a platforms toxic design; it can help mitigate the effect of that design. This is the inoculation I speak of—not against infection, but against the shame that digital violence weaponizes. Where young girls and women have the nonjudgmental support of their community, it becomes harder to manipulate them into feeling shame and equips them to identify, and resist abusive dynamics.

Building Communal Resilience from the Cradle

Today’s children are digital natives in a profound sense. Globally, one in three internet users is a child. In high-income countries, 60% of children use the internet by age five. In Africa, with the world’s youngest population and smartphone adoption surpassing 50%, children are primary users of family devices, entering complex digital publics with little to no guidance. This strategy ought to begin with digital literacy.

Critical consciousness from early childhood: Teaching children to question what they see online, who benefits from this content? Who might be harmed? Why is this being shown to me? This is media literacy adapted for an algorithmic age.

Bodily autonomy and consent: Children need to understand they have the right to set boundaries online, to say no to requests for images or information, and that consent given under pressure is not consent at all. These conversations must happen before children encounter coercion, not after.

Trusted adult networks: Every child should be able to identify at least two adults they can turn to if something online makes them uncomfortable or afraid. This requires adults who respond without panic, judgment, or punishment—a significant cultural shift in many contexts.

Community response models: When digital violence occurs, the community’s response matters as much as the legal one. Schools, religious institutions, and community organizations must be prepared to support survivors with unwavering belief rather than interrogation, with resources rather than blame. In Nigeria, organizations like the International Federation of Women Lawyers, Feminist Coalition, and StandToEndRape have pioneered such models, but they need to become the norm, not the exception.

The evidence supports this approach. In Finland, where comprehensive digital literacy has been integrated into education since 2014, young people report higher confidence in identifying misinformation and manipulation online. In South Korea, where digital citizenship education is mandatory, rates of cyber-bullying have declined even as internet usage has increased. Nigeria has the capacity to develop contextually grounded approaches that respond to our specific realities of digital violence.

Conclusion: Holding Both Ends of the Line

The fight against digital violence is a struggle for the future of public space, discourse, and democracy itself. A singular focus on post-harm justice, while morally imperative, is strategically incomplete. It addresses the symptoms but does not prepare the next-generation for these realities. We must confront digital violence by contesting the exploitative architectures of platforms and by building a critically conscious population from the cradle. This dual-approach is critical in this moment.

We must confront digital violence by contesting the exploitative architectures of platforms while simultaneously building a critically conscious population from the cradle. We must demand that platforms redesign their systems for safety while teaching young people to navigate these systems with critical awareness. We must prosecute abusers while building communities that refuse to shame survivors.

This dual approach is not a compromise, it is recognition that structural change and cultural transformation must advance together. One end of the line without the other leaves us perpetually playing catch-up, counting casualties, offering comfort after the fact.

It is time to hold both ends of the line. Our daughters are counting on it.

 

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the author:

Emaediong Akpan is a legal practitioner and an alumna of the International Institute of Social Studies. With extensive experience in the development sector, her work spans gender equity, social inclusion, and policy advocacy. She is also interested in exploring the intersections of law, technology, and feminist policy interventions to promote safer digital environments. Read her blogs here: 1, 2, 3, 4,5

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Beyond victimhood: The untold realities of Nepali brides in South Korea

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Nepali brides in South Korea are often portrayed as victims of violence, abuse, exploitation, slavery, and trafficking. But are these the only realities of Nepali brides? Nilima Rai in this article, challenges the dominant monolithic narrative of victimhood and sheds light on the other realities of these women – many of whom navigate such matrimonies with resilience, academic and professional achievements, and significant socioeconomic and cultural contributions in Korea and Nepal. Through patchwork ethnography, this article reveals Nepali brides’ overlooked agency, aspirations, achievements, and contributions beyond their image as victims.

Image by Sukanto Debnath

‘They call us Bhote ko budi,1 someone with Pothi Visa,2 who didn’t find a suitable man to marry, the victims of domestic violence and abuse, and someone who is miserably sitting in a corner and crying over their ill fate,’ one of the Nepali brides said. This illustrates the racist, sexist, and negative remarks the Nepali brides encounter in their day-to-day lives. This article discusses how the dominant narrative of victimhood further reinforces stigmas and prejudices of Nepali brides.

Transnational marriage in South Korea: Nepali brides

Transnational marriage between Nepali brides and Korean men began in the early 1990s when Nepali migrant workers entered Korea through the Industrial Trainee System.3 These brides, mainly belonging to socio-economically marginalised Tibeto-Burmese ethnic groups, are preferred4 due to their physical similarity to Korean people.

Nepali women participate in transnational marriage as an opportunity created by globalisation but with an expectation to fill the bride shortage vis-à-vis the ongoing crisis of social reproduction in South Korea. Like other foreign brides,5 Nepali brides make compromised choice of marrying foreign men and settling outside their country to escape poverty, attain upward mobility, or find access to labour markets that are otherwise denied to them.6  Conversely, Korean men7 rejected in the local marriage market due to their low socio-economic status and societal expectations of women seeking brides outside their racial/ethnic pool in countries such as China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Cambodia, Mongolia, and Nepal to name a few.

In Nepal, such marriages occur through commercial marriage brokers, mutual friends and relatives living and working in Korea. Since the early 2000s, Nepali women have entered transnational marriage through the marriage agencies/bureaus in Korea and Nepal.

The media’s victim narrative and its impact on Nepali brides

With the active involvement of the marriage brokers as matchmakers and the negative implications of such commercialised marriages, Nepali brides are often disparagingly depicted as ‘victims’ – the victims of trafficking, slavery, domestic violence, abuse, and deception. For more than a decade and even today, domestic and international news media have been replete with the sufferings of Nepali brides in Korea, portraying them as pitiful, bleak, wretched, sold, trafficked, and enslaved in Korean households. A rapid increase of unregulated marriage agencies in Nepal and Korea has resulted in increased numbers of fraudulent marriages engendering domestic violence and abuse of some of the Nepali brides. News media have widely reported cases of violence against Nepali brides along with their testimonies. Such efforts have highlighted the grave concerns of violence against those Nepali brides who experienced domestic violence and abuse. However, the paucity of research on the overall experiences of these brides, and the overwhelming representation of these women in media not only created their image as ‘women in peril’ and labelled them as ‘victims’ but also reinforced the already existing stigmas and prejudices against these women within the Nepali diaspora community in Korea.

These brides are subjected to gender-oppressive slurs by the Nepali diaspora community which sees them as ‘promiscuous’, ‘leftovers’, or someone who has a problem or is behaving strangely, thus ineligible to marry a man from their vicinity. The media’s tendency to depict Nepali brides merely as victims, the lack of research as well as the condescending attitudes of the Nepali diaspora community and the potential threat of oppressive slurs has often resulted in the silencing of Nepali brides.

‘Other Nepali brides in our community scolded me for allowing them to take my video and giving an interview to one of the media people,’ said one of the Nepali brides. This illustrates the negative implications of such narratives of Nepali brides fostering distrust and discontentment not only towards the media but also within the Nepali diaspora community. Some expressed their resentment through words, while others demonstrated it through their act of refusal, hesitation and constant need for reassurance that those approaching them were not affiliated with the media.

The realities of other Nepali brides

Narrating these women’s stories only through victimhood perspectives obscures the other realities of brides who claim to be empowered through economic gain, freedom of mobility and the acquisition of new knowledge and skills. These are the Nepali brides whose lived realities differ from those who suffer from violence and abuse.

‘Do we look like the victims of domestic violence or unhappy in our marital life, like how these journalists often portray us? Rather, I think I made the right decision getting married and coming here as I have more freedom to work, earn and live my life on my own terms,’ one of the Nepali brides said.

Similarly, another Nepali bride expressed her frustration, saying, ‘I am sick and tired of how these Nepali media represent us. A few years back, one of the journalists asked for our (her husband and her) photo, saying they wanted to cover the stories of Nepali brides. Still, in the end, they published our photo under the awful title and story that talked about how pitiful Nepali brides are. I am more than happy with my husband, who speaks fluent Nepali and actively contributes to Korean and Nepali literature and society. We both are hotel entrepreneurs. So, do you think my story fits into one of those stories published in the newspaper?’

Nepali bride with her husband tending their kitchen garden at Jeju-do, South Korea

The Nepali brides who were not victims of violence – and whose stories did not fit in with the articles published in news media – claimed to have made adjustments early on in their marriage, particularly in terms of language, food, and culture. They are now content with their familial relationships, have successfully established their professional careers, and are able to support their left-behind/natal families in Nepal.

These brides wish to be recognised as successful entrepreneurs, educators, nurses, police officers, poets, counsellors, interpreters, and promoters of Nepali culture, food, and language across the Nepali border. Instead of questioning their intentions in choosing a foreign spouse and vilifying them as ‘gold diggers’ – those who marry old Korean men for ‘card’/citizenship – and helpless victims of violence – who are beaten, battered, and abused by their husbands and in-laws – they want their achievements and contributions in both Korea and Nepal to be valued and acknowledged.

Furthermore, these women are often fluent in the Korean language and are pursuing/pursued further academic and professional endeavours in Korea; things they believe they could not have achieved in Nepal. Based on my research, Nepali migrant workers and students rely heavily on these brides to book public venues and bargain in local shops. They also rely on them for critical services such as translating/interpreting sensitive court cases and counselling in medical and mental health cases. Furthermore, these brides provide constant support and services as teachers and educators in schools, institutes, and migrant worker centres; provide health and safety orientations in factories and industries; act as counsellors to facilitate immigration procedures; work as nurses in hospitals, as police officers, established women’s shelters for migrant workers and provide all the necessary support in the rescue and repatriation of undocumented migrant workers.

Highlighting these women’s stories as achievers and contributors is not to trivialize the gravity of the issues related to violence against Nepali women/brides at all levels in and outside the country. The main aim of this article was to discuss the consequences of one-way narratives of victimhood that have negative implications on the lives of other Nepali brides who are happy with the positive outcome of their struggles in a foreign land. There is a need for in-depth research into the broader experiences of these women and for a multi-stakeholder dialogue and deliberation with state and non-state actors such as news media.

Endnotes

1. ‘Bhote’ is “a derogatory term for ethnically Tibetan people from northern Nepal (Gurung 2022, 1746). This kind of racial slur has been used against Nepali brides in Korea due to the resemblance or the similar physical features of Korean men with these ethnically Tibetan people.

Gurung, Phurwa.2023. ‘Governing caterpillar fungus: Participatory conservation as state-making, territorialization and dispossession in Dolpo, Nepal’ EPE: Nature and Space 6, No.3: 1745-1766.

2. In Nepal, the word ‘poth’” or ‘hen’ is a derogatory colloquial term often used as an oppressional slur that evinces male dominance or superiority over women (Lama and Buchy 2002).

Lama, Anupama and Marlene Buchy. 2002. ‘Gender, Class, Caste and Participation: The Case of Community Forestry in Nepal’ Indian Journal of Gender Studies 9, No.1: 27-41.

3. Before the Employment Permit System (2004), Korea systematised the inflow of migrant workers by introducing the Industrial Trainee System in 1991. Nepali migrant workers entered Korea through this trainee system. In 1990, 43,017 Nepali migrant workers were recorded in Korea.

Rai, Nilima, Arjun Kharel, and Sudeshna Thapa.2019. Labour Migration from Nepal-Factsheet: South Korea, Centre for the Study of Labour and Mobility and Foreign Employment Board, Nepal. https://archive.ceslam.org/fact-sheets/factsheet-south-korea

Based on my research findings, some Nepali brides were found to enter Korea through the trainee system in the early 1990s and later married Korean men.

4. Kim, Kyunghak, and Miranda De Dios. 2017. ‘Transnational Care for Left-Behind Family in Nepal with Particular Reference to Nepalese Married Migrant Women in Korea’ Global Diaspora and the Transnational Community: Migration and Culture.

5. Kim, Minjeong.2018. Elusive Belonging: Marriage Immigrants and ‘Multiculturalism’ in Rural South Korea. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

6. Based on the findings of the study.

7. Kim, Hansung, Sun Young Lee, and In Hee Choi. 2014. ‘Employment and Poverty Status of Female Marriage Immigrants in South Korea’ Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 23, No.2: 129-154.

This blog post is based on the empirical evidence collected from field research in South Korea and Nepal (2023-24) for my doctoral study.

 

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

 

About the author

Nilima Rai is a Ph.D. candidate in Gender Studies at Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario. Her research explores the lived realities of Nepali brides in South Korea. She holds master’s degrees in Development Studies from Erasmus University, the Netherlands, and in Conflict, Peace, and Development Studies from Tribhuvan University, Nepal, and the University of Ruhuna, Sri Lanka. Her interests include migration, marriage and labor mobility, social justice, women’s rights, and the intersections of conflict, disaster, and gender.

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Nth Room Crimes and intensifying gender conflict in South Korea: attempting to unite a highly divided society

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The horrific case of videos showing the sexual exploitation of women in South Korea being sold on the social media platform Telegram was recently uncovered, prompting a public outcry and leading to feminist action in the country. Known as the Nth Room Crimes, this case shows just how far South Korean society still is from eliminating the oppression of women and addressing skewed gender relations. The strong backlash from men against efforts to redress gender inequality makes matters even worse. This article shows that toxic masculinity in South Korea urgently needs to be addressed for any real change to take place and suggests some possible first steps.

Source: Voice of America https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/south-koreas-metoo-movement-challenges-workplace-sexual-harassment

Disclaimer

This article carries a trigger warning. It contains descriptions of events related to sexual exploitation that may be distressing to sensitive readers.

Between 2018 and 2020, thousands of videos of women being sexually exploited were sold on the social media platform Telegram by a pimp known as Doctor. A copycat followed suit and even more videos were sold online. As the sordid details of these horrific crimes, known as the Nth Room Crimes, were uncovered, South Korean society was shaken to the core. Besides the fact that the perpetrator was a young man with a ‘good background’, the extent of the crimes also led to widespread shock and disbelief. More than 60,000 people had paid using cryptocurrency to watch these videos, and over 100 women had been sexually abused in the videos, including more than 20 minors.

In response, South Koreans signed an online petition pressing for the identities of the perpetrators to be made public; over two million signatures were collected in a short period. The perpetrators’ real names were pasted in the media for all to see and condemn. Yet this is not enough. These events should lead us to urgently question the extent of misogyny in South Korea and to come up with ways to counter it. This article looks at how gender stereotyping and misogyny are well alive in South Korea and what effect it has on the efforts to press for real and enduring change.

A highly unequal society

Despite the flourishing of activities promoting gender equality in South Korea, women are still suffering the burden of highly skewed gender relations. Economic development has resulted in the increased participation of women in the labour market; however, only 4.5% of women occupied executive positions in South Korean companies as recently as 2019. Digital technologies have also contributed to the rise of feminist movements and awareness-raising about gender issues (Kim, 2017; Hasunuma and Shin, 2019). Nevertheless, they have also increased cyber gender-based crimes, including the phenomenon of spycams, misogynistic commentary on social media platforms, and the Nth Room Crimes discussed above. It is clear that the commodification of female bodies has been accelerated through those online activities.

The current situation in South Korea has several roots: nation-building based on neoliberalism, Confucianism, and toxic masculinity. Specifically, neoliberal national building efforts apply a ‘(neo)-Confucian’ philosophy that supports traditional gender hierarchies and divisions (Kim, 1996; Lee, 2014). This patriarchal system has led South Korean women to become and remain second-class citizens and the men to become the breadwinners or “salaryman” ‘who were middle-class men and full-time salaried employees during the post-war period’ (Taga, 2005, cited in Lee and Parpart, 2018).

In response to these developments, the country’s feminist movement has led several activities. It joined the #MeToo movement, the #Iamfeminist movement, and the post-it movement. After a public testimony by female prosecutor Seo Ji Heyon of harassment and intimidation by male seniors in 2018, which made news headlines, not only activists, but also many citizens started to speak up, showing how widespread sexual harassment and assault were and criticising structural gender inequality (Hasunuma and Shin, 2019). However, little has changed; as the case of the Nth Room Crimes shows, gender inequality and misogynistic attitudes are well and alive.

Source: BBC https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43534074

Contending discourses on the position of men: a nation divided

Some South Korean men have opposite views of the extent of gender discrimination in Korean society. In the view of young men, the social privileges enjoyed by men of the previous generation have been sharply diminished, and they feel isolated by the current government’s female-oriented policies (Kwon, 2019). Moreover, changing expectations about the role of men in running households and raising children has intensified gender conflict (Kwon, 2019). Furthermore, some Korean men feel disadvantaged when competing against women for job positions and feel that women have more opportunities to be appointed. Moreover, women are seen to benefit from self-improvement through employment and other opportunities made available to them, while men are conscripted, leading to widespread resentment among men towards women. Thus, while men’s opportunities to further themselves are perceived to decrease, those of women are sharply increasing.

Indeed, female participation in economic activity steadily increased between 2011 and 2019. However, The Economist in 2018 found that the gap between male and female labour participation remains large, with South Korea faring worst compared to other OECD countries (see graph below). Men still have an advantage over women in the labour market, yet they feel that women are unfairly benefiting from new opportunities for participation.

As seen above, men and women have different perspectives on gender inequality in South Korea. Lee and Parpart (2018) criticised inequitable gender divisions in terms of employment and emphasised that there is a need to deconstruct the silence on gender relations (p. 317). Nowadays, many South Korean women are attempting to make their voices heard and participate in the feminist movement, but some men are against it.

An ongoing dialogue between genders that is sorely needed is not yet taking place as men and women navigate gender conflicts separately instead of collaboratively.

But something is being done to attempt to change these conflicts. The Korean Institute for Gender Equality Promotion and Education (KIGEPE) under the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family of the Republic of Korea (MOGEF) has developed ‘GENDERON’, a knowledge-sharing platform seeking to promote gender equality and prevent gender violence through furthering education on gender equality. This platform offers free monthly educational video clips to introduce gender conflicts and gender-related laws to the public and encourages citizens to participate in discussions by offering incentives and staging competitions. Moreover, the MOGEF has attempted to develop an open forum for youth participation, giving young people the opportunity to directly propose policies related to gender equality and consult with relevant ministries.

Yet it is questionable whether these platforms are actually making a difference when it comes to such a deep-seated problem. Only those who seek to change the structural inequalities are likely to engage in discussions, and the discussions are likely to address just the tip of the iceberg. In the meantime, the support of young adult men for the current government continues to decline. It is clear than an active, open conversation between men and women is necessary to address gender hatred and conflict. Education programmes and measures to prevent online gender crimes can be a start. The media should also make an effort to adhere to the broadcasting ethics code in a way that would foster healthy discussions on gender inequality without amplifying gender conflicts. Above all, the government should pay attention to preventing men from feeling alienated in its preparation and implementation of gender-related policies and should encourage all genders to participate in an open conversation on gender issues that continue to divide this country.

References

BBC (2018) “#MeToo movement takes hold in South Korea”. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43534074 (Accessed: 4 February 2021).

Cho, Y (2020), “Nth Room case: How many years for ‘digital sex crime’ in Korea? [VIDEO]”, The Korean Times, October 22, Available at; https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2021/01/718_298005.html  (Accessed: 4 February 2021)

Kwon, J (2019) “South Korea’s young men are fighting against feminism”. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2019/09/21/asia/korea-angry-young-men-intl-hnk/index.html (Accessed: 4 February 2021).

GENDERON (2019). KIGEPE MEDIA, Available at: https://genderon.kigepe.or.kr/geme/inf/gemeIntro.do (Accessed: 4 February 2021).

Hasunuma. L and Shin. K (2019) “#MeToo in Japan and South Korea: #WeToo, #WithYou”, Journal of Women, Politics & Policy, 40:1, 97-111, Available at; DOI:10.1080/1554477X.2019.1563416 (Accessed: 6 January 2021)

Jeong, E, Y (2019), “South Korea’s Male-Dominated Workplaces in Spotlight After Sexual Harassment Accusations”, The Walls Street Journal, 20 August, Available at; https://www.wsj.com/articles/south-koreas-male-dominated-workplaces-in-spotlight-after-sexual-harassment-accusations-11597915806 (Accessed: 31 January 2021)

KIGEPE (2017), “main Project”, KIGEPE, Available at: https://www.kigepe.or.kr/eng/main/main.do?menuNo=22000 (Accessed: 4 February 2021).

Kim. K. (1996), “Nationalism: An advocate of, or a barrier to, feminism in South Korea”, Women’s Studies International Forum ,19, (1–2), pp 65–74, Available at; doi: 10.1016/0277-5395(95)00063-1. (Accessed: 4 February 2021).

Lee N (2014) “The Korean Women’s Movement of Japanese Military’ comfort Women’: Navigating between Nationalism and Feminism,” THE REVIEW OF KOREAN STUDIES, 17(1), pp. 71–92.

Lee, J. and Parpart, J. L. (2018) “Constructing Gender Identity through Masculinity in Csr Reports: The South Korean Case,” Business Ethics, 27(4), pp. 309–309. Available at: http://doi: 10.1111/beer.12191. (Accessed: 8 April 2021)

Statistics KOREA Government (2021) Index Korea, Available at: https://www.index.go.kr/potal/main/EachDtlPageDetail.do?idx_cd=1572 (Accessed: 4 February 2021).

The Economist (2019), “The glass-ceiling index”, Daily Chart , March 8,  Available at: https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2019/03/08/the-glass-ceiling-index (Accessed: 4 February 2021).

MOGEF(2019) “청년 참여 플랫폼, 청년이 주도하는 문화 혁신! [Youth participation outh participation platform, cultural innovation led by youth!(translated by author)]”, MOGEF, Available at: http://www.mogef.go.kr/nw/enw/nw_enw_s001d.do?mid=mda700&bbtSn=707617 (Accessed: 4 February 2021).

Yonhap (2020), “Sex crime chat room ignites public fury”, The Korea Herald, March 23, Available at; http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20200323000289 (Accessed: 4 February 2021).

Opinions do not necessarily reflect the views of the ISS or members of the Bliss team.

About the authors:

Inhwa Jeong is currently studying Economics of Development in the MA program from Development Studies at ISS. She has five years of development cooperation experience, specialising in project management. Her interests lie in the economic empowerment of marginalised people and particularly keen on gender and environmental issues.

Kanae Inage is in the MA program of Human Rights, Gender and Conflict Studies at ISS. Her research interests focus on gender-based violence and feminist movements specifically in East Asian areas.

 

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