What has been happening to higher education in Laos?

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In August 2024, the Laotian Times alarmingly wrote about a ‘record low’ in candidates registering for the entrance exams of the National University of Laos (NUoL). It attributed the decline to rising living expenses (over 2023 there was a 31.2 % increase in consumer prices in Lao PDR) and low prospects of finding gainful employment in the domestic labour market following university graduation. Without dismissing these reasons, in this blog piece Roy Huijsmans puts the current ‘record low’ in broader perspective by asking what has been happening to higher education in Laos and in relation to whom? 

Laos’ higher education landscape is relatively small and young. Following the establishment of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) in 1975, the communist regime prioritised basic education for the masses because tertiary education is relatively costly and a much less egalitarian public investment. For (re)building a tertiary educated professional class the newly established, yet cash-strapped, Lao PDR largely depended on its socialist allies.(1)  In the period 1976-1980, more than half of the in total 4,603 Laotian students pursuing education beyond secondary level did so abroad in countries part of the, then, Soviet Block.  

An education reform paved the ground for the (re)establishment (2) of the National University of Laos (NUoL) in 1996. There was also an increase in Laotian students pursuing higher education domestically; partly forced due to the collapse of the Soviet Block and associated scholarships. Over the period 1996-99 the number of Laotian students in higher education nearly doubled (15,634, compared to 8,635 in 1991-95) whereas those doing so abroad increased only marginally (from 995 to 1,101).  

At present, NUoL has remained Laos’ most prominent university despite the establishment of additional public universities, and the rapid growth in private higher education institutes. Total enrolment in Laos’ public universities stood at 45,677 in 2008 (36,706 enrolled at NUoL). By 2008, 86 private higher education institutes were active in Lao PDR, enrolling a total of 20,000 students in 2007 (up from 4,000 in 2000). Still, enrolment at tertiary level has remained low at 12 per cent in 2021 (1.14 gender parity) following an all-times high of 19 per cent in 2012.(3)

In Laos, seats available for university enrolment are set top-down. Once announced, secondary school graduates can register for entrance exams. Registration can be done online, yet the actual exam must be taken in person. Because of quota set for several groups (women, ethnic minority groups), some students enter university regardless of taking (or passing) the entrance exam.(4) 

Piecing together various data sources , Table 1 shows that the number of candidates taking the 2024 NUoL entrance exam was indeed very low and even lower than 2021-22 Covid affected year. Table 1 further shows a gradual decline in the enrolment quota since 2020-21. Whereas the drop in ‘demand’ has received ample attention in Lao media, the opposite is true for the apparent reduced ‘supply’. It is also unclear if this NUoL trend is also reflected in enrolment trends of private higher education institutes in Lao PDR, or alternatively whether we see a shift from public to private higher education or into other forms of public education.(5)  

Table 1: NUoL student figures 2015-2024 

 

Pursuing higher education abroad has remained common in segments of the Laotian population. Yet, destinations and conditions have changed remarkably since the revolutionary days. Lao PDR ranks second on the list of international students studying in China (and many doing so on a Chinese government scholarship), others pursue higher education in Australia, the USA, Japan or in Europe, sometimes on scholarships of the host-country but not-uncommonly also self-financed reflecting the presence a class of super-rich. This latter group is relatively unaffected by the rising cost of living.  

For 2023, the World Bank calculated a 31.2 per cent increase in consumer prices in Lao PDR, following a 23 per cent increase for 2022. This has contributed to putting higher education out of the financial reach of the (lower) middle class in particular. In fact, increasingly Laotian students are leaving formal schooling prematurely. The total number of students taking the secondary year 4 exam dropped from 83,544 in 2022 to 68,850 in 2023 (-18%), while for the final secondary school exam (year 7) the number declined from 55,828 in 2022 to 50,276 in 2023 (-10%). Additionally, there is low prospects for gainful employment in Lao PDR following higher education graduation. This has been a challenge for long, including large numbers of young Laotian working across the border in Thailand. Perhaps what has changed most profoundly is the rise in technology related earning possibilities in the Lao PDR, ranging from platform-mediated food-delivery and ride-sharing work to using social media platforms for commercial activities, including in rural areas.  

In sum, the ‘record low’ in NUoL entrance registrations is likely because of young people of (lower) middle class background (including ethnic minorities) discontinuing their studies confronted by two intersecting realities. First, due to rising cost of living completing secondary schooling and pursuing higher education has become a substantially larger financial challenge. Second, there is easily accessible migrant work and a rise in domestic income earning opportunities. Both do not require higher education and contribute to reducing some immediate financial pressures. Against such a background, a call for more scholarships to ensure that Laotian higher education remains accessible also for those with fewer financial means is unlikely to make much of a difference.  

Endnotes

  1. During the 1970s about 10 per cent of the population of what is now Lao PDR fled the country, among them many of the higher educated elite.
  2. Following the communist take-over in 1975, Sisavangvong University in Vientiane (established in 1958 by the Royal Lao Government) was dissolved into various colleges.
  3. World Bank data show a gross enrolment rate for primary schooling of 97 per cent in 2022 (0.97 gender parity) and an all-times high of 122 per cent in 2012. For secondary education, the gross enrolment rate was 57 per cent in 2022 (0.95 gender parity) and an all-times high of 66 per cent in 2017 and 2018.
  4. Note also instances of cheating or side-stepping exams, e.g. https://laotiantimes.com/2016/09/14/students-to-resit-nuol-entrance-exams-after-questions-leaked/
  5. Government resolutions seek to channel students into shorter, and cheaper ‘courses at vocational training schools’ in ‘priority fields’ (Vientiane Times, p2, 28 July 2023). Yet the scale of these initiatives is unclear.
  6. From the academic year 2020-2021, there are more than 16,700 students who registered for the online exam, but more than 14,000 people came to the real exam, among which the university plans to enroll more than 9,000 students in all system.

 

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

                         About the Author: 
Roy Huijsmans

Roy Huijsmans is a teacher and researcher at the International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam. His research focuses on the role of young people in processes of development and change.

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IHSA Annual Lecture Reflection: Starvation crimes, network shutdowns, and obstacles to humanitarian action in Gaza and Sudan

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In this blog, IHSA Vice-President and Senior Research Fellow at the Food Studies Centre at SOAS (University of London) Susanne Jaspars summarises and expands upon a contribution to the roundtable that followed the inaugural IHSA Annual Lecture on “War and Humanity” held in Bergen in May 2024. The blog was prepared with the help of Tamer Abd Elkreem and information gathered from their research project on the effects of digitalising food assistance.   

Starvation as a crime against humanity 

For about a year now, there’s been talk about imminent famine- and now famine – in Gaza and parts of Sudan, with very little action. In this blog post, I discuss starvation as a war crime and crime against humanity, what can be done in practice to act on starvation crimes, and why blocking communications networks needs to be seen as such a crime.   

War causes famine through acts that undermine the means of survival of particular population groups. This includes acts of commission such as attacks on production, markets, restriction of access for humanitarian actors, and the obstruction of relief. Also acts of omission such as failures to act in response to warnings or signs of famine, and acts of provision: the selective provision of food to one side of the conflict. These tactics can be part of counter-insurgency operations but also yield benefits for some. For example from being able to sell food at high prices and buy livestock at low cost, or use cheap labour from displaced populations.      

Extreme famines are therefore the result of political acts or decisions (local, national, international), meaning we need to understand: Who committed the famine? How was it committed and why? Who were the victims? Who was involved? In contrast to famine, a crime is not ended, but criminals are deterred, detained, prosecuted.   

Legal frameworks such as International Humanitarian law (IHL) and International Criminal Law (ICL), specify starvation as a crime:  ‘It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population […] for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance … whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive’. The crime of starvation includes wilfully obstructing humanitarian aid. The term “objects indispensable to survival” includes more than food, encompassing water installations and supplies, irrigation works, medicine, clothing, shelter, fuel, and electricity. There is no pre-defined list as items indispensable to survival are evolving and context dependant.   

Also, in 2018, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2417 which condemns the use of starvation as a method of warfare against civilians and emphasised that it may constitute a war crime. I would like to discuss this a little further, in particular: 

How does reporting and accountability for starvation crimes work in practice? 

The Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) report twice yearly to the UN Security Council (UNSC) on Resolution 2417.  The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) can also write closed White Papers to the UNSC and individual donors (like FCDO or the EU) too.  But how is this being operationalised?  What and how are FAO and WFP reporting?  What are some of the obstacles?   

Consider the February 2024 FAO/WFP report to the Security Council on Gaza and Sudan – which is remarkably apolitical.  The report states the facts on displacement, impact on food systems, and obstruction of humanitarian access, and then what is prohibited under IHL. However, these are mostly passive statements such as: 

  • ‘Unprecedented levels of conflict-induced displacement … have occurred.’  
  • ‘Civilian infrastructure has been damaged (water, fuel, electricity, bakeries, farms)’ 
  • ‘Conflict has halted production, prices have increased’ 
  • ‘Humanitarian aid has been restricted’ 
  • ‘Hostilities have led to telecoms blackouts’
     

War seems to almost be external to people’s economies or society, something neutral.  Using the passive tense to describe acts of war and its effects removes politics and responsibility.  This is exactly the opposite of what is needed to understand starvation crimes.    

What’s not in the report is who is causing starvation and who should be held to account (although there are some exceptions about Israeli actions in Gaza – e.g on the effect of evacuations without putting adequate infrastructure and services in place). Yet, Sudan has a long history of aid manipulation and since April 2023 there is evidence of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) denying access to humanitarian aid, and of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) looting, destroying farms, and recruiting forces by threatening starvation. This presents an intensification of the long-standing extractive political economy, and involves regional and international actors.  Note that exports of gold, and livestock are continuing and crude oil exports were higher in December 2023 than in the previous year.     

The recommendations are all clearly needed but bland: restore humanitarian access, pressure warring parties to adhere to IHL, have an independent investigation.  With UN organisations reporting, how could it be otherwise? A focus on starvation crimes was supposed to put the politics back into famine analysis. But can UN resolution 2417 do it?  Questions remain on who should be reporting starvation crimes (states? resistance movements? activists? students?) and who should act on it.   

The South Africa case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) sets an important precedent,  in particular the amendment to the provisional measures in March 2024: to take all necessary and effective measures – without delay – for the provision of humanitarian assistance, in response to reports of famine and starvation.   Since then the International Criminal Court (ICC) is seeking a warrant for the arrest of Israeli leaders, in another unprecedented move, for  war crimes of starvation.   Even with these high-level actions, the crimes continue.   

In contrast, on Sudan there is mostly inaction.  While starvation and genocide in Gaza is played out daily on our television screens, such reports on Sudan are rare.  Recent warnings of famine, and statements by UN experts, have had little impact except to pressure warring parties to come to power-sharing agreements rather than holding them to account. 

Communications networks as objects indispensable to survival 

Of course, much of the lack of action in response to Sudan’s crisis is due the prioritisation of geopolitics and economic interests over humanitarian response and – ultimately – stopping the war.  Sudan’s invisibility is also a result of blocking and manipulating communications networks and connectivity. Most societies are digitalised, meaning that people are increasingly dependent on connectivity for their day-to-day activities or – in the case of Sudan – their survival.  Connectivity becomes important in relation to starvation crimes because:

  • Blocking communications networks hides information on violations of human rights and humanitarian law.    
  • Internet shutdowns disrupt social networks, remittances, food systems.   
  • Third, network shutdowns also block aid provision, not because it hinders the coordination, information and security of aid organisations, but aid itself is increasingly digitalised: pre-paid debit cards, electronic vouchers, and mobile money. 

In Sudan, the Bankak App from the Bank of Khartoum has been a lifeline since  the start of the April 2023 war because it could be used to transfer of money to crisis-affected people and local organisations. From early February, however, the RSF disabled all internet providers.  Soon after, Starlink Satelites were introduced in RSF-held areas, which ordinary people pay to use for internet connection but which were brought in and managed by the RSF. As such, control over communications has become a way of denying services and resources to the enemy, life or death for ordinary citizens, as well as a new way of profiteering. It also illustrates the moral dilemmas of providing aid in conflict and the challenges of reporting on famine crimes.  This does not mean we stop calling out starvation crimes, but rather highlights the importance for humanitarians to analyse famine as a political scandal that requires global as well as local action.  

 

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

                         About the Author: 
                           Susanne Jaspars

Susanne Jaspars is a Senior Research Fellow at the SOAS Food Studies Centre. She has been researching the social and political dynamics of food security, livelihoods and forced migration in situations of conflict, famine and humanitarian crises for more than thirty years. Susanne’s geographical focus is has been mostly Horn of Africa, specifically Sudan and Somalia with shorter periods in the Middle East, where she has worked as practitioner and researcher. She is currently the PI of an ESRC funded project entitled: ‘Digitalising food assistance: Political economy, governance and food security effects across the Global North-South divide.’ More information about Dr. Jaspars can be found on the SOAS website. 

 

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Rain or shine, the gig must go on – Platform workers navigate climate extremes

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Precariousness is an underlying factor in the gig economy. When combined with the climate crisis, this becomes an even bigger burden on gig workers. These ‘flexible workers’ are often not equipped to be flexible to the changing environment. They face the dilemma of navigating between algorithms and climate extremes, often forced to choose earnings over health. In this blog, Anna Elias explores how the vulnerabilities of the workers are amplified in the context of climate crisis. 

‘Our economic system and our planetary system are now at war. Or, more accurately, our economy is at war with many forms of life on earth, including human life. What the climate needs to avoid collapse is a contraction in humanity’s use of resources; what our economic model demands to avoid collapse is unfettered expansion. Only one of these sets of rules can be changed, and it’s not the laws of nature.’ Naomi Klein (This changes everything: Capitalism vs. the climate).

Most parts of India suffered from extreme weather conditions this year. While the temperatures soared up to 50℃ in some cities, the monsoons that followed caused extreme havoc in others. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) report  predicts that India will lose 5.8 per cent of its working hours by 2030 due to extreme heat. What does this mean for a gig worker, for most of whom the city is their workspace, and for whom navigating the city constitutes a substantial part of their everyday life?

App based platforms have revolutionized the way urban dwellers travel, eat and purchase. While the gig economy has created numerous flexible jobs, it is also criticised for not effectively dealing with various issues such as workers’ wellbeing and social protection.

Flexible workers are not equipped to be flexible to the changing environment. In current research and policy discourses on gig work, the impact of climate change on the worker is often overlooked. While climate change has significant consequences to both their lives and livelihoods, it is only one among the many vulnerabilities they face. Gig workers already suffer from casualised, low-paid working conditions without access to long-term security, formal social protections and welfare. The pressure caused by these precarious conditions is further exemplified by extreme weather events. Beyond the immediate physical dangers posed by heatwaves or flash floods, these conditions increase the susceptibility of road accidents, thereby heightening the risk of traffic-related injuries.

As research has shown, in the gig economy, climate change is poised to act as a ‘wicked multiplier’ intensifying the vulnerabilities experienced by workers in developing countries. Gig workers in these countries are exposed to extreme weather conditions and endure long hours while navigating hazardous roads and traffic during heatwaves, storms, and floods. Those using two-wheelers to get around face additional challenges such as dust inhalation, impaired vision due to harsh sunlight, heatstroke, and the lack of shade on the roads. These conditions, along with algorithmic management and the promise of ‘lightning fast’ services, make gig workers vulnerable to exhaustion, dehydration, and severe health risks. That their earnings are dependent on the satisfactory execution of the gig exacerbates the precariousness of their situation.

Amidst this crisis, the responses from app-based companies are noteworthy. A prominent Indian food delivery platform issued the following statement: ‘please avoid ordering during peak afternoon unless absolutely necessary’. Yet in the platform economy, lower order volumes correspondingly diminish workers’ earnings. So, this seemingly well-intentioned request to customers aimed at reducing the delivery workers’ exposure to the intense afternoon heat, neglects the dilemma the workers face between making viable earnings and risking their immediate and long-term health. Another example is of a ride-hailing platform that introduced a ‘weather fee’ in Vietnam, which imposed an extra charge on an order whenever the local temperature hit 35℃. This was counter-intuitive, as it incentivized the already precarious worker to work extra hours regardless of the weather conditions, thus putting their lives at risk.

A common misconception is that extreme environmental situations affect only two -wheel drivers. Beyond the physical discomfort to themselves, even auto and taxi drivers face additional challenges of managing customer expectations and interactions on topics that are related to climate change.  For example, a common conflict between drivers and customers, especially during warm day-time hours is the driver’s reluctance to switch on the air conditioning, fearing higher fuel consumption. An Uber driver in Mumbai shares his experiences and strategy in coping with climate change:

”I don’t want to turn on the air conditioner in my car throughout the day. All the money I make goes on fuel charges. Over time, I realised that during the summer the best I can do is drive only during the night. The customers usually don’t insist on travelling with the AC on at night. Of course, I lose sleep and it affects my health. But I don’t have any other choice”. (Fieldnotes, Mumbai 2023).

Apart from highlighting the precarious nature of the work, these cases illustrate the importance of engaging all key stakeholders when developing solutions. Specifically, they emphasize the need to recognise the gig worker as an important stakeholder in the gig economy. They make clear that addressing climate challenges in the platform economy requires a collaborative effort from companies, workers, and the government.

App based platforms were once considered part of the sharing economy and hailed as harbingers of sustainability and collaborative consumption. However, with rapid expansion, they are now criticized for their significant environmental and social costs and for increasing road congestion and intensity.

Conversely, emerging research highlights the potential of platforms to be part of the solution, positioning them as essential stakeholders in sustainability efforts, emphasizing the need for collaborative approaches that integrate labour rights and climate justice. Platform companies have the best of technology and resources at their disposal to craft solutions that benefit their customers, workers and investors alike. For this, they need to view all stakeholders as equally important, create avenues for dialogue between them and work with them to incrementally build equitable solutions for both people and the planet.

Bibliography

  1. Economic survey of Asia. (1991). Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. https://www.unescap.org/kp/2024/survey2024
  2. Vu, A. N., & Nguyen, D. L. (2024). The gig economy: The precariat in a climate precarious world. World Development Perspectives, 34, 100596. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S245229292400033X
  3. https://x.com/zomato/status/1797179156528005204
  4. Dwivedi, Y. K., Hughes, L., Kar, A. K., Baabdullah, A. M., Grover, P., Abbas, R., … & Wade, M. (2022). Climate change and COP26: Are digital technologies and information management part of the problem or the solution? An editorial reflection and call to action. International Journal of Information Management, 63, 102456. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0268401221001493

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

                       About the Author:
                                Anna Elias

Anna Elias is a PhD researcher at International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), Erasmus University Rotterdam. Her research explores socio economic transitions brought about by digitisation, particularly its effect on livelihoods in the informal economy. With a strong professional background in the social impact sector, her expertise lies at the intersection of evidence-based research and evaluation, digital innovation, and sustainability.

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When the State Doesn’t love you back: Navigating identities as a Nigerian woman

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Although the Nigerian state is guided by a Constitution that confers on all Nigerian citizens equal rights regardless of gender and sexual identity, it has been adept at maintaining a system of patriarchy through institutions, policies, and procedures which has led to the differential treatment of men and women. This is what Chouinard refers to as “spatial differing”, and has several knock-on effects that translate to unequal outcomes for some Nigerian citizens. In this blog, Emaediong Akpan explores how the state confers citizenship on its people: who has the right to participate in the affairs of the state? And to what extent such rights can be exercised and enjoyed by all?

Does the State have a character? And is it Gendered?

“The state is a masculine institution,”  assigning rights and belonging along gendered patterns. In allocating these rights, the state decides who belongs in the state and to what extent a person can lay claim to their citizenship. This is both a legal and social decision that affects the feeling of belonging and inclusion The struggle for inclusive citizenship is not new, and from voting rights to property rights, women have had to constantly negotiate with the state about what rights they can enjoy, but not in the same way that men do. This is because Nigerian women are often at a disadvantage, working against multiple levels of assumption, and negotiating male-dominated spaces.

The state is not a neutral entity, only concerned with the maintenance of law and order, rather it descends like a biased umpire into the arena of private life, regulating bodies and relationships. This is what French philosopher, Michael Foucault describes as bio-politics: [state] regulation of its people, taking the form of control over social interaction, health and reproductive rights, and the right to life amongst many others. For radical feminists, bio-politics is an indication of the state’s masculinity and commitment to protecting patriarchy. 

The organisation of state affairs does not occur accidentally, rather it is a deliberate effort to ‘exert a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations.’ This deliberate effort of the state generally works though subjection that is guided by economic structures and cultural norms that dictate gender roles.

In Nigeria, citizenship occurs at the national level, state, and local government levels. While a woman in Nigeria can claim citizenship  (on paper), true citizenship that is characterized by access to citizenship rights, including social benefits and political participation. True citizenship, then, is something she must consistently negotiate through the course of her life. This negotiation is limited by the state’s decision to favor patriarchy, and this results in the differential capacity of men and women to claim the benefits and privileges that come with being a citizen.

Gender and Citizenship in Nigeria:  Women as Outsiders Within

The 1999 Nigerian Constitution (As Amended) is the reference point for who can be conferred the status of a citizen and who can transfer citizenship. In the country, citizenship is conferred at the national level by birth, where either parents or a grandparent is a citizen of Nigeria or from a tribe indigenous to Nigeria. Under section 26(2), only a man can confer citizenship to his wife through marriage, in essence, a Nigerian woman who marries a non-Nigerian cannot confer this citizenship on her husband or her children. In this way, a Nigerian woman’s citizenship can be considered inferior in the sense that it cannot be transferred to another.

The situation becomes more dire with single mothers who try to navigate citizenship, especially when the father of their child is no longer present or refuses to be in their lives. Women in this situation must attach themselves to a Nigerian male if their child is to identify as a citizen of the country, even with the most basic form of identity, a certificate of birth. These women are left with no other choice than to give their children the names of absentee fathers, or that of a male member of their family to retrieve these certificates from the state. Citizenship is sexual, in the way that, it ‘empowers’ the genders that are beneficial to the state – men. In doing so, the state considers the man as the entity who is able to give life, and the woman’s role is reduced to a body that houses the uterus suitable to carry a (male) Nigerian child, but not confer citizenship upon that child.

Another way the state is implicit in fostering gendered power relations is in the refusal to enact policies to address forms of disempowerment such as protecting the rights of single women who are navigating the rental market in Nigeria. For decades, there has been an outcry of single women in the country with complaints of facing prejudice from property owners because “single women should not rent houses independently.” My first-hand experience as a single woman renting a home in 2014 lends credence to this conversation. My search for a home in Abuja, the country’s capital, was met with several rejections because of my status, but interestingly, this changed when I returned with a ‘hired partner’ and flaunted a shiny make-shift engagement ring. Surprisingly, the property owner was female. As noted by Sathiamma patriarchy is produced by a system, meaning that both men and women can be active gatekeepers of patriarchal norms and practices, albeit sometimes unknowingly. These attitudes are rooted in persistent patriarchal socio-cultural norms that view women as property belonging to men.

While national citizenship is relevant for macro-level discourses, a different form of citizenship also exists within the margins – state citizenship. This is perhaps the most challenging for Nigerian women to navigate. Identities within the Nigerian state are defined in a masculine way. As a Nigerian woman, your identity is often contested and changing in many ways. For instance, at the point of marriage, Nigerian women must pay a fee to the state to change their names to that of their new partner, while notifying the public through print media – in a change of name announcement – that her previous name (father’s name) has been abandoned. These changes must also be replicated across every identity document that she possesses – bank details, international passport, and state and local government identity documents. In the case that her state and local government of origin differs from her husband’s, she continues to be denied indigeneity (rootedness), never fully belonging to her father’s home or her husband’s.

Reflection

The redefinition of a state – as masculine and non-neutral – through a feminist lens provides the needed objectivity to ask critical questions on the state’s role in regulating the public and private lives of its citizens. By looking at how the Nigerian state interacts with Nigerian women through this lens, we can better understand its preconceived roles for female Nigerian citizens.

The Nigerian state is masculine and would continue to subject women’s identities to the whims and caprices of patriarchy whilst denying men who do not fit the ideals of masculinity the right to citizenship. This is operationalized in its administrative processes, how women can (or cannot) access basic needs like housing, and the way that women are treated when they participate in public affairs.

Unless we begin to interact with foundational institutions like the state using a feminist lens to dismantle the assumptions of its rationality, these current efforts at addressing gender inequality will not yield much.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the Author

Emaediong Akpan

Emaediong Akpan is a legal practitioner, called to the Nigerian Bar in 2015. She is currently pursuing a Master’s in Development Studies with a specialization in Women and Gender Studies at the International Institute of Social Studies ,Erasmus University Rotterdam. With extensive experience in the development sector, her work spans gender equity, social inclusion, and policy advocacy. Her research examines the effects of technology-facilitated gender-based violence on women and social movements, highlighting how digital spaces serve as sites for power contests and the policing of gender norms.

 

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“The principle of humanity in war’’: a reflection on the IHSA Annual Lecture 2024

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In this blog, Andrew Cunningham (Independent Humanitarian Practitioner and Board Member of the International Humanitarian Studies Association, IHSA) considers the principle of ‘humanity’ during conflict, and its interaction with other key humanitarian principles including neutrality, impartiality, and independence. He also looks at how humanitarians can integrate dignity into their work, and how these principles may develop in highly politicised and fast-moving times. This blog summarises a contribution to the roundtable that followed the inaugural IHSA Annual Lecture and is part of a series of blogs produced following the Lecture, which took place in Bergen in May 2024 under the theme of “War and Humanity”.

The principle of humanity is often overlooked when we talk about the humanitarian principles. Focus is normally placed on the ‘big three’ principles – impartiality, independence, and neutrality. The most important of these is impartiality, which is the promise of non-discrimination and lack of bias in aid provision. The idea is to help those most in need regardless of who they are. Impartiality is a central and required aspect of humanitarian’s identity.

Independence, which allows aid organisations to make their own choices outside political interference, is also a foundational principle and facilitates the adherence to impartiality. The promise made by independent humanitarian aid organisations to host governments and non-state actors is that they make their own decisions and are not political tools of foreign governments.

More problematic, and much debated, is the principle of neutrality, which at its core demands that aid organisations do not become involved in political controversies. But some organisations (for example MSF) view it as a limitation on witnessing, speaking-out, and public communications. Do aid organisation have the right, or even obligation, to affect the political situations which lead to humanitarian crises?

But at the top of the list is the principle of humanity. Humanity is the collection of humans, some have the ability to help others, and some are in need of help. For, humanitarian action is simply humans helping other humans in need. Humanity is also a term which denotes a set of characteristics which must be preserved, such as the dignity of the person and a whole set of ‘human’ rights. This may all seem self-evident, yet it is worth reflecting on this lest we stop grounding what we do in the basics.

Humanity, dignity, and solidarity

Dignity is a consequence of attending to the humanity of those caught in a crisis. We all want to be treated with dignity at all times, of course. But those caught up in conflict are even more starved of dignity as their isolation, sense of abandonment, and fear of violence grows.

Humanitarian action doesn’t always do the best job at attending to the dignity of the individual, as so often masses of people are affected by war and are engaged with by organisation as populations. One way in which people in danger can be afforded dignity is the proximity of aid workers to those being assisted. No one wants to ‘feel like a number’ and be just a recipient of material aid or a beneficiary.

A feeling of human solidarity is also important, as this example of my work in Chechnya shows: After several years working in Chechnya during the last war, I was checking-in with the staff at a hospital we had long been supporting. We had been providing a lot of medical supplies and I was asking about its usefulness. But the chief doctor stopped me at a certain point and said that yes, the material aid had been needed, and appreciated. But that was not the most crucial factor. In turns out that not being forgotten, being treated with dignity by people who cared, was the most important aspects of our intervention. Solidarity can be seen as a mix of caring enough to help and being willing to share a moral, if not always a physical, space, with those caught-up in a crisis.

Does digitalisation lack humanity?

One way in which humanitarian aid may be diverting from this idea is through the ‘digitalisation’ of aid delivery. No one wants to only deal with an app on their smart phone or be forever linked to a set of biometrics which defines one’s aid category. There is more to aid than this transactional way of providing it. Proximity to human aid workers is vital to reinforce a person’s sense of dignity. In the search for efficiency and greater outputs (as opposed to outcomes), have we gone too far? Is there still room for the proximity of humans helping other humans? And where is the locus of dignity in this version of aid?

Wars provide a difficult terrain to navigate. The threat of violence to aid actors as well as those living in the crisis makes being proximate hard. The chief doctor I mentioned above had not been visited for quite some time by anyone form my organisation due to the violence in the area. But yet he knew we were sill ‘there’.

Conclusion

Let us return to the principle of humanity which is the highest order principle from which everything else is derived. Impartiality helps guide our operational choices – who we help and why. And independence and neutrality are ways of working which help provide the space to work. Together these all help make state and non-state actors comfortable with our motivations.

At its essence, we should never forget that humanitarian aid is humans helping humans, which requires proximity, dignity and solidarity. We should all remind ourselves periodically of the importance of the principle of humanity as the foundational humanitarian principle.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the author

Andrew Cunningham

Andrew has thirty years’ experience in the humanitarian sector, twenty-five years of which with MSF. Andrew has worked in a wide variety of contexts and geographical locations in Africa, the Former Soviet Union, and Asia. He has a PhD in War Studies from King’s College and has published a professional book in the Routledge Humanitarian Studies series on the topic of INGO-State relations. Andrew has served as a member of the Board of MSF International and is currently a board member of the International Humanitarian Studies Association. Andrew works as a researcher, strategic and operational evaluator, and governance advisor for various humanitarian organisations.

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Frugality Beyond Scarcity: Challenging Universal Narratives in Frugal Innovation

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This blog series, Rhiannon Matthias and Peter Knorringa aims to spotlight diverse cultural values related to frugality, their alignment with sustainable practices, and touch on questions linked to the legitimacy of frugal innovation. By incorporating indigenous perspectives and cultural narratives alongside other global viewpoints, this initiative seeks to bridge academic insights with public understanding, inspiring a more inclusive and nuanced dialogue on frugality.

Ruins on the Bolivian side of Lake Titicaca by Rhiannon Mathias

Frugal innovation is making headway as a relatively new concept in global discourses on sustainability, development, and ethical living. As outlined in the Handbook for Frugal Innovation (2023), this approach generally involves reducing the complexity and cost of goods and production processes while maintaining essential functionality and performance. While frugal innovation as a formal area of study is relatively new, the virtue of frugality and its associated practices have deep roots in many cultures worldwide. The Global South, encompassing regions and populations historically disadvantaged by global economic and political systems, has often been viewed as a primary target ‘market’ for or beneficiaries of frugal innovation(s).

Yet, simultaneously, the Global South holds a wealth of philosophical traditions that offer nuanced and potentially radical reconceptualization of frugality. These include concepts such as Ubuntu from Southern Africa and Buen Vivir from the Andean region, which emphasize interconnectedness, community, and prioritizing collective well-being over individual excess. However, these perspectives are frequently overlooked in the new frugal innovation discourse, which at times tends towards ahistorical and universalist takes. This universalizing tendency is, on the one hand, somewhat understandable in a new area of study that is also concerned with practical outputs and outcomes. On the other hand, it is not without consequences. As one contributor to the handbook astutely observes, “in trying to create a more universalized narrative the specific and local is erased.”

Challenging the Universal: The Importance of Local Perspectives 

The erasure of local nuances is not merely a theoretical concern; it has tangible implications for how frugal innovations are conceived, developed, and implemented across diverse contexts, potentially affecting their success and impact. To move beyond a simplistic “West vs. Rest” dichotomy, it is crucial to engage with the deeper ideological and cultural roots of frugality in the Global South. This engagement can stretch the discursive walls that encase frugality as a concept, allowing for more nuanced understandings.

These perspectives on frugality have evolved in different contexts of historical struggle and resilience. Through their exploration, it becomes possible to better see the potential pitfalls in practical outcomes and challenge notions of universality in frugal innovation discourse. How do societies that have long grappled with resource constraints and colonial legacies understand and practice the virtue of frugality?

African Humanism and Ubuntu: Collective Frugality Rooted in Interconnectedness 

At the heart of many Southern African philosophical traditions lies a profound understanding of human interconnectedness, most famously articulated in the concept of Ubuntu. Rooted etymologically in Tswana, Sotho, Tonga, Zulu, and many other Southern African languages, Ubuntu has a rich and evolving history that defies easy categorization. Gade (2011) demonstrates that the term ‘ubuntu’ has appeared in writing since at least 1846, with its meaning shifting significantly over time.

Initially defined as a human quality, Ubuntu later expanded to encompass notions of African humanism, philosophy, ethics, and worldview. The now-ubiquitous Nguni proverb ‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’ (often translated as ‘a person is a person through other persons’) only became widely associated with Ubuntu between 1993 and 1995, coinciding with South Africa’s transition to democracy. Ubuntu’s emphasis on interconnectedness and collective well-being presents a philosophical framework that fundamentally challenges individualistic notions of virtue. As Ramose (2003) explains, Ubuntu embodies a nuanced philosophy of human interdependence and collective well-being that goes far beyond its often-simplified translation, “I am because we are.”

This raises important questions: Does Ubuntu suggest a form of ‘collective frugality’ where virtue lies not in individual restraint, but in the equitable distribution and use of resources within a community? It is crucial to recognize that Ubuntu’s resurgence in post-apartheid South Africa has been deeply political. Eze (2010) argues that there’s a risk of Ubuntu being used as a “conceptual trick” to promote a false sense of reconciliation without addressing underlying structural issues. Moreover, the application of Ubuntu principles in modern, urbanized contexts presents challenges. How can ideas of communal resource-sharing be implemented in societies marked by significant economic disparities and individualistic economic structures?

Viewing frugality through the lens of Ubuntu can open new possibilities for addressing resource management and sustainability challenges. It prompts us to consider how communal values, and interconnectedness can inform more holistic and equitable approaches to resource use, potentially offering solutions to the environmental and social challenges faced by modern societies.

Buen Vivir: Redefining Prosperity in Harmony with Nature 

Shifting focus to the Andean region reveals a complex set of concepts that offer profound challenges to dominant paradigms of progress and innovation. While often used interchangeably in academic and political discourse, the Kichwa concept of Sumak Kawsay (often translated as “Life in Plenitude”) and the more widely known Buen Vivir (Good Living) have distinct meanings and implications. At its core, Buen Vivir emphasizes harmony between humans and nature, community solidarity, and a broader conception of wealth beyond material accumulation. Gudynas (2011) describes Buen Vivir as suggesting that true well-being can only be achieved in the context of community, including the broader community of nature. In this framework, frugality isn’t about deprivation or scarcity, but about finding fulfillment in balance and reciprocity rather than excess.

Buen Vivir enriches the frugality discourse by reframing it within a holistic worldview that prioritizes ecological balance and communal well-being. It challenges us to consider frugality not merely as a means of resource conservation, but as a pathway to harmonious coexistence with nature and community. This perspective invites us to reimagine frugal practices as tools for fostering sustainable relationships between humans and their environment, rather than just methods for reducing consumption. It suggests that community-based, nature-aligned approaches to innovation and resource use can lead to more holistic and sustainable solutions. This paradigm offers potential alternatives to the environmental and social challenges posed by conventional models of economic development, emphasizing balance and reciprocity over unchecked growth and consumption.

Relatedly, the Spanish term for frugal innovation, “innovación popular,” evokes notions of community involvement and grassroots innovation. This linguistic connection invites consideration of frugality not just as individual restraint, but as a collective practice, aligning with the principles of Buen Vivir. It implies a bottom-up, community-led approach to innovation that resonates with the core tenets of Buen Vivir.

However, like Ubuntu, Buen Vivir has also been subject to political reconfiguration and co-option. Several Andean countries, notably Ecuador and Bolivia, have incorporated Buen Vivir principles into their constitutions and national development plans. While this represents a significant recognition of indigenous philosophies, it has also led to tensions and contradictions. Villalba (2013) points out that there’s often a gap between the rhetoric of Buen Vivir and the continuation of extractive economic policies that conflict with its principles. The concept has sometimes been used to legitimize government actions without fundamentally altering economic structures or power dynamics. This raises complex questions: How can a philosophy that emphasizes harmony with nature be reconciled with the pressures of economic development and modernization?

Reflections on Collective Frugality 

The examples of Ubuntu and Buen Vivir illustrate the richness and complexity of Global South perspectives on frugality and well-being. They offer profound challenges to dominant narratives of development and innovation, suggesting alternative ways of conceptualizing progress, community, and humanity’s relationship with nature. At the same time, their real-world applications reveal the challenges of translating philosophical principles into practice, especially in the face of entrenched economic systems and power structures.

Examining these philosophies, including their complexities and contradictions, allows for a more nuanced understanding of frugality as a virtue. This understanding goes beyond simplistic notions of “doing more with less” to encompass questions of equity, community, and ecological harmony. Approaching these ideas requires both an open mind and a critical eye. It is essential to resist the temptation to romanticize “local ways of life” or “indigenous knowledge systems.” Many people in Africa and the Andean region live in cities and participate in capitalist economies. The goal is not to present these philosophies as untouched alternatives to modernity, but to understand how they continue to evolve and inform contemporary debates about resource use, community, and well-being.

Expanding philosophical horizons and resisting the erasure of local specificities may provide new ways to think about frugality, innovation, and sustainable living in our interconnected world. As this series continues, subsequent entries will delve deeper into philosophical traditions from the Global South, exploring their implications for frugal innovation, sustainability, and global development.

This article was first published by the International Centre for Frugal Innovation

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the Authors

Rhiannon Matthias

Rhiannon Matthias

Peter Knorringa is a Professor of Private Sector & Development at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) at Erasmus University Rotterdam. His Chair focuses on the diverse roles and impacts of business on development. He does not perceive private firms as either the ‘enemy’ or the ‘heroic deliverer’ of development. Instead, he aims to advance a more empirical and nuanced debate on where and when entrepreneurs and firms are more likely to contribute to achieving more inclusive and sustainable development.

 

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Disaster Risk Reduction doesn’t (always) need to be expensive: introducing Frugal DRR

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Photo credit : Pixabay

In this blog, to mark global Disaster Risk Reduction Day, Tom Ansell (HSC Coordinator) considers whether disaster risk reduction activities can be made less-resource intensive through Frugal Innovation. Whilst Frugal DRR shouldn’t be considered a money-saving replacement for development and infrastructure work, it does provide an opportunity for communities to reduce their vulnerability and increase their capacity for dealing with the consequences of hazards that could include extreme weather, geological hazards, or other environmental hazards.

What is DRR? And what’s wrong with the term ‘natural disasters’?

Disaster Risk Reduction, according to the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) is activities that are “aimed at preventing new and reducing existing disaster risk and managing residual risk, all of which contribute to strengthening resilience and therefore to the achievement of sustainable development.” So, in simple terms, activities that work to prevent and mitigate risks to reduce the effects of disasters. It’s important to note here that we use the term disaster in connection with hazards like earthquakes, floods and others while avoiding the ‘natural disaster’, as this ignores the social dimension of disasters.

People across the world live in places that have different levels of risk and have different vulnerabilities in the face of these risks. More than the hazard itself, a much larger defining factor for how much damage, social upheaval, and loss of life occurs is how vulnerable people are, and how prepared they are for when a potential hazard becomes a disaster. In other words, an earthquake of magnitude 8 will have significantly different effects in a wealthy country with a strong governance system, to a much poorer country with (for example) a fragmented government. In the words of Margaret Arnold at the World Bank, “the key lesson is that disasters are social constructs. People are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and natural hazards due not just to their geographical context, but their financial, their social status, their cultural status, their gender status, their access to services, their level of poverty, their access to decision making, and their access to justice.”

For example, Tokyo often suffers from extreme stormy weather: as many countries with a Pacific coast do. The city of Tokyo, however, also has one of the largest storm drains in the world to help divert water resulting from storms or extremely heavy rainfall. The project, completed in the 1990s and costing around 3 billion US Dollars, means that though the city is often affected by tropical cyclones and typhoons, there is typically much less loss of life in the Tokyo area than others affected by the same typhoon – especially as the city of Tokyo has well-developed evacuation routes, early warning and information systems, and more besides.

This example serves to demonstrate the purpose of DRR activities: to prevent risks and – where this is not possible – to minimize the overall damage caused by extreme weather. As the ‘no natural disasters’ movement emphasizes, reacting after the event is a less intelligent way to respond to disasters, compared to prevention, pre-preparation, and planning is a much more productive and intelligent way to ‘respond’ to disasters. Various frameworks for ‘good’ risk management activities have been devised, including the Hyogo Framework (2005-2015) and Sendai Framework (2015-2030).

Are DRR activities always expensive?

In the example above, of the city of Tokyo, a major contributing factor to mitigating climate risks for the city involved constructing a large piece of public infrastructure. Similar projects have taken place around the world, for example the Delta Works in the Netherlands , the Thames Barrier in the UK, or the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway West Closure Complex in New Orleans in the USA. These three examples are all related to storm surges, flooding, or other water-related hazards. But (expensive) risk-reducing infrastructure also exists to mitigate the effects of rockfall (for example in Interlaken in Switzerland), avalanches (for example the Gazex system), or to stabilize land vulnerable to landslides through enormous retaining walls (for example in West Bengal, India).

At this point, it might seem that all DRR activities are exceptionally expensive, very large public infrastructure that are only available to the very wealthiest regions in the world. But that would be a serious oversimplification of what smaller groups of citizens, with or without the support of institutions, can achieve to mitigate risk and so reduce their vulnerability. DRR activities also include mapping areas that will be most affected by an extreme event, creating evacuation routes, developing information systems and early-warning systems, training citizens on flood-proofing their homes, or even making informational videos on what to do should a disaster strike.

This is not to say that large infrastructure projects aren’t important: indeed they can be transformational. However, it is important to emphasize that DRR activities are not always expensive: even though an all-round DRR plan for a place will likely include both more expensive infrastructure, less economically-expensive activities can also make a difference.

Can ‘Frugal Innovation’ inspire low-cost but effective interventions?

In order to develop new ideas around lower-cost (frugal) risk reduction activities, it is useful to dive into the world of Frugal Innovation. The International Centre for Frugal Innovation (ICFI), based at ISS and part of LDE, considers the practice and approach to be a potentially transformative way of finding new solutions to growing societal problems, in a non-excessive way. Andre Leliveld and Peter Knorringa, in an article from 2017 setting out the potential relationship between Frugal Innovation and development, note that the field sprouted from multiple sources but takes much inspiration from jugaad practices in South Asia. Jugaad is an excellent catch-all term (borrowed from Hindi, and with similar terms in Punjabi, Urdu, and various Dravidian languages including Telugu and Malyalam) for low-cost and often ingenious solutions to nagging problems; as well as the kind of mindset that allows the creative thinking around these solutions to occur. Whilst the term and thinking is often used in business (to create products for people with less purchasing power), it is very versatile.

Utilising some of the thinking inherent within Frugal Innovation in relation to DRR activities requires taking a solutions-oriented approach, and making use of existing resources, skills, or initiatives to reduce vulnerability by mitigating risk.

Painting and planning: Frugal Disaster Risk Reduction in action

How urban communities adapt to heatwaves across India is an interesting way to demonstrate how integrating Frugal Innovation techniques into Disaster Risk Reduction carries the potential for meaningful reduction in vulnerability.

Heatwaves have the potential to be very destructive, and one solution that is being rolled out across several areas that have a high number of informal dwellings in cities including Mumbai and Nagpur is the low-cost but high-yield technique of painting roofs white (to reflect the sun) and installing secondary ‘shade roofs’ on buildings. This can reduce inside temperatures by several degrees on the hottest of days. Similarly, a network of inexpensive recording devices has been installed to track ‘hotspots’ in the city, which can inform where communal ‘cooling zones’ need to be set up local city corporations or voluntary groups. And, in Ahmedabad in the north-west of India, a ‘Heat Action Plan’ was developed by the city corporation and scientific partners that is estimated to have prevented hundreds of fatalities.

Developing evacuation routes, making sure that citizens are prepared for what to do in a disaster, small and uncomplicated changes to people’s homes, or even utilising close-knit communities and communication networks as informal warning systems may not structurally reduce peoples’yet vulnerabilities yet can make a difference in preventing the worst of disaster impacts. And, whilst not as transformational as large public infrastructure projects, any gain in a communities’ resilience is an important step. Luckily ‘Frugal Innovation’ techniques show us that DRR doesn’t always need to be expensive.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the author

Tom Ansell

Tom Ansell is the Coordinator of the Humanitarian Studies Centre and International Humanitarian Studies Association.

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Israel Needs Critical Friends

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On Tuesday 8th October 2024, Dutch Scholars for Palestine (DSP) staged a walk-out across various academic institutions in the Netherlands. Participating in the walk-out in solidarity with the Palestinian people provided a profound opportunity to reflect on Alain Verheij’s discourse on critical friendship. This act of protest was not merely a statement of dissent; it was a collective rejection of the blatant complicity of our institutions in the ongoing slow genocide against the Palestinian people.

In this opinion piece, Irene van Staveren provides a slightly edited translation of Alain Verheij’s article where he reflects on the complex and often polarized discourse surrounding Israel and Palestine, particularly in the wake of the tragic events of October 7th. Drawing from both personal experiences and theological insights, the author advocates for a balanced approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—one that emphasizes critical friendship and prophetic critique. By engaging with the rich traditions of both Judaism and Christianity, the author seeks to encourage readers to confront uncomfortable truths, challenge blind support or condemnation, and foster a deeper understanding of the humanitarian crises affecting both Israelis and Palestinians.

Israel finds itself at the center of a polarized global discourse, especially following the tragic events of October 7th. While some Christians offer unconditional support, others provide unconditional criticism. This opinion article calls for a more balanced approach—one that offers critical friendship rooted in the prophetic traditions of both Judaism and Christianity.

On October 6, it was ‘Israel Sunday’ in Protestant churches across the Netherlands. The theme, as always, was to “give shape to the indelible bond with the people of Israel.” But in a year marked by heightened conflict, navigating this bond is more complex than ever. The leadership of the churches recognizes the sensitivity of this issue, publishing carefully worded statements that avoid offending anyone. Yet, this approach leaves us wondering: is the Protestant Church Netherlands (PKN) more concerned with maintaining neutrality than with standing up for justice?

A Personal Confession

Before diving deeper into this topic, let me offer a personal confession: in some ways, I might be called a Zionist (which is a highly contested term). I deeply understand the Jewish desire for a homeland, a response to centuries of persecution, culminating in the atrocities of the Holocaust. The persistent fear of antisemitism that haunts Israel is not misplaced; it’s a reality ingrained in the Jewish psyche, and rightfully so.

My respect for the Jewish tradition runs deep. The Old Testament, is a cornerstone of my faith. I often find myself more drawn to its stories and lessons than to the New Testament. Jesus and Paul didn’t appear in a vacuum—they emerged from the rich religious and cultural context of Judaism, a tradition that continues to inspire and teach.

The Role of Prophetic Criticism

One of the remarkable elements of both Jewish and Christian scriptures is the role of the prophets. In many ancient societies, rulers were seen as divine or infallible. Not so in biblical Israel. There, kings were subject to the will of God, and when they strayed from this, the prophets were quick to call them out. No leader was above criticism; no action was beyond reproach.

This tradition of prophetic critique is one that modern Christians should embrace, especially when it comes to Israel. While Israel is often referred to as “the only democracy in the Middle East,”  it is worth noting that it still lacks a formal constitution. And while its military is often described as “the most moral army in the world,” but its actions, particularly in Gaza, raise significant moral questions.

Unconditional Support and Unconditional Hatred

Among Christians, you’ll find both extremes: some offer unwavering support for Israel, while others offer unwavering condemnation. The former group, often philosemites, blow shofars, wave the Star of David, and shout ‘shalom,’ while applauding every military strike. The latter group denounces Israel at every turn, seeing only injustice in its actions. Both positions, however, are flawed.

When we place Israel on a pedestal, either to worship or vilify, we strip its people of their humanity. Israelis are not mythical beings; they are human. They are people with fears, traumas, and hopes—people protesting against Netanyahu’s government, grieving for Gaza, or worrying for children who have been kidnapped or conscripted.

What Israel needs, particularly from its allies in the West, is not blind supporters or harsh critics. Instead, it needs critical friends—those who, like the prophets of old, are willing to speak uncomfortable truths out of a place of deep care. Unconditional support does nothing to advance peace, just as unconditional hatred only fuels further polarization.

The tragic events of October 7th, where countless lives were lost in attacks by Hamas, are a reminder of the spiral of violence that plagues the region. Yet, Israel’s large-scale retaliatory actions, which risk dragging multiple nations into conflict, demand scrutiny. If Western nations, including the Netherlands, continue to support Israel without question, they contribute to the cycle of violence rather than its resolution.

Conclusion

As we reflect on Israel Sunday, I hope that more of us will take up the mantle of critical friendship. Just as the biblical prophets held their leaders accountable, we too must be willing to offer constructive criticism to Israel, encouraging it to pursue peace and justice. Only then can we honor the shared traditions of Judaism and Christianity and contribute to a more just and peaceful world.

The original version of this opinion piece in Dutch can be found here.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the authors

Alain Verheij

Alain Verheij studied theology in Amersfoort (2012) and did a Research Master Hebrew Bible Studies at the University of Leiden (2014). His work involves storytelling based on the bible for groups, the media and churches.  He is a critical thinker and invited speaker. He writes a column for newspaper Trouw, and is author of several books (in Dutch), including books about God and Money, God and Me, and an Ode to the Loser.

Irene van Staveren is Professor of Pluralist Development Economics at the ISS. Professor Van Staveren’s field of research included feminist economics, heterodox economics, pluralist economics and social economics. Specifically, her fields of expertise lie in ethics and economic philosophy.

War between successive peoples is considered a moral evil, and indicates an increasing collapse of the values of human rights and law

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Source: Hosny Salah via Pixabay

The International Humanitarian Studies Association (IHSA), held its inaugural Annual Lecture on 23 May at the Literature House in Bergen, Norway. The lecture was given by Khaled Quzmar, General Director of Defence for Children International: Palestine (DCIP), and was held in collaboration with the Rafto Foundation and WAR-FUN project at the Chr Michelsen Institute in Bergen.

As the first part in a blog series to mark the lecture, IHSA Coordinator Tom Ansell has put together this blog in collaboration with Khaled Quzmar. It starts with an interview and is followed by the key points from Quzmar’s lecture.


How important is it that we see accountability for military crimes in the current Gaza war (especially in light of the indictment of the Israeli Prime Minister and Defense Minister for war crimes by the ICC)?

‘The decision of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to indict is an historic decision par excellence. We have been waiting for this since 1948 and later since 2014: after the entry of ICC jurisdiction over Palestine. It is a first step to achieving accountability for the international crimes committed by the Israeli army against Palestinians over many years.

‘Whilst the indictment did not address all the crimes committed against Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it is a symbolic message. It has a legal and political dimension indicating the possibility of no more immunity for criminals and no impunity for violence against Palestinians in the future.’

With ongoing atrocities in Gaza, there is likely to be a collective trauma amongst Palestinians. In your opinion, how might it be possible to re-humanize this conflict and the people in it once direct military action has ceased?

‘In my opinion, the civilian population in the Gaza Strip has been under a racist colonial military occupation since 1967, and the people have been refugees for 76 years. For the last 17 years they have lived under a strict military siege from land and sea, and under direct bombardment. Since the beginning of the Israeli military operation in 2024, they have cut off water, food, medicine and electricity, and destroyed homes and infrastructure. In this situation the civilian population do not expect justice, they just want the aggression and killing to stop.

‘The Israeli military and authorities need to treat people in Gaza as human beings that are part of society. People with the right, like other peoples of the world, to self-determination and to live in dignity, security and safety without occupation.

‘[After a ceasefire has been called] massive interventions will be required to provide all the necessities of life and to enable the population to enjoy human rights according to international law. Work will also be needed to help rid children of the psychological issues resulting from the aggression and deprivation of the last  230 days on top of the siege of the 17 years before that.’

In your role as Director of DCI-Palestine,you have direct experience of the importance of humanitarian organizations. What is their importance in the current conflict, and how can children’s rights in particular be safeguarded?

‘The work of human rights and humanitarian organizations is very important in order to help the victims and provide some services and assistance to them. But they also work to preserve hope for future generations, especially children. We are aware that the Israeli occupation wants to kill the hope of children and youth. Our work is to help victims build their capabilities in accordance with international law. Working as human rights defenders is to preserve hope and aspire to a better future and a just peace free of occupation and crime.’

The IHSA Annual Lecture 2024: ‘War and Humanity’

‘Human scientific efforts have been put towards generating ever-more deadly weapons, and conflicts are now most often settled militarily, rather than diplomatically; conflicts are no longer resolved through moral reason and law, nor through political negotiations, but through wars with well-organized armed forces.

‘Warring parties target civilians and civilian infrastructure as a weapon of war: war is no longer limited only to the battlefield. The different types of weapons and the killing, destruction and atrocities targeting the civilian population are now more prolific than ever before. It takes successive generations to overcome the results and consequences of war, to rebuild what was destroyed and provide the necessities of life.

‘The various legal and judicial efforts to enshrine the value of humanity in times of war have a number of shortfalls. Given that humanity is the opposite of war, human dignity requires the peaceful settlement of conflicts between and within societies. Individuals and groups should be treated in accordance with human rights standards. They have the right to live in peace and their human rights should be protected through legal systems and international human rights standards. Commitments within and between communities should be permanently respected.

As the war on Gaza continues to unfold, Israeli forces (and Hamas) have violated international humanitarian law  – including the fundamental right to life, the massive destruction of infrastructure and a growing famine in the territory – many times. Their rights infringements include administrative detention for civilians in the West Bank, including children and a lack of information about detainees in the Gaza strip.

There is a significant issue here with double standards, especially when we look at the refusal of Israel to follow decisions made by the International Court of Justice. If International Humanitarian Law is to be upheld, it must be upheld by everyone, regardless of their international alliances.

‘It is now time to activate the international accountability system by stopping the policy of impunity, eradicating hypocrisy and double standards, in order to reach a world free of wars, where justice and humanity prevail.

We cannot have a “two-level” system of international law and accountability. States and warring parties should not be free of their international obligations, especially around protecting civilians and the most vulnerable. If we fail to uphold standards within this war, we may find far-reaching repercussions in the future.’

The 2024 IHSA Annual Lecture was followed by a roundtable discussion on the theme of ‘War and Humanity’. The next blog in this series will include the contributions from expert panellists from that discussion.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the Authors:

Khaled Quzmar

Khaled Quzmar has worked with Defence for Children International – Palestine (DCIP), since 1985. He is a lawyer by training and profession, and as part of his work with DCIP he has represented hundreds of children held in arbitrary detention, tortured and otherwise mistreated by the Israeli government.

DCIP as an organization works on documenting human rights abuses, advocacy and campaigning on the right to a childhood. The organization also works within the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including with the Palestinian Authority, on child protection, education and access to justice. For their work on protecting the rights of children, Khaled Quzmar and DCIP were awarded the 2023 Rafto Prize.

Tom Ansell is the Coordinator of the Humanitarian Studies Centre and International Humanitarian Studies Association.

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Questions of Sovereignty -Somalia on the UN Security Council

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Photo Credit: Evan Schneider

In this blog, Ahmed Sh. Ibrahim and Nisar Majid consider how Somalia’s joining of the UN Security Council at a time when its nationally recognised government controls only a portion of its territory. With Somalia’s internal territory so fractured, the authors look at a growing gap between how the ‘international community’ treats the Somali state and how the Somali state interacts with its internal polities and citizens. This all has serious knock-on effects for our understanding of the term “sovereignty”.

On 6 June 2024 Somalia won a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, along with Denmark, Greece, Pakistan and Panama. As East Africa’s representative, Somalia along with the other newly elected members will join five already existing members to create the 10 non-permanent members on the Security Council. They will join the Security Council’s five permanent veto-wielding members of Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States. This two-year position, commencing in 2025, gives Somalia a voice in how the UN responds to conflicts around the world. Reacting to this development, the Foreign Minister of Somalia stated that Somalia would take up “its position on the global stage” and that “We stand ready to play a vital role in promoting peace and security in the world,” while the UN secretary general’s special representative for Somalia claimed “Somalia has come a long way over the past three decades on its path to peace, prosperity and security.”

Somalia, though, is a country that has minimal control over its territorial boundaries; with the secessionist region of Somaliland in control of the northeast of the country, various regional administrations with limited allegiance to federal authorities in central and southern regions and the militant Islamist group al-Shabaab holding arguably more territory than the government to the south. In this blog, we discuss Somalia’s election to the UN Security Council in relation to the juridico-political concept of sovereignty. We contend that Somalia’s election to the UN Security Council reveals one of the central problems with the concept of sovereignty: the disparity between a state’s internal sovereignty – a state’s ability to exercise effective control over its territory – and external sovereignty, also known as juridical sovereignty – the recognition by other states of a state’s rights to exercise control over its territory. We assert that there appears to be an increasing gap between Somalia’s ability to exercise sovereignty within its own territory and therein over its own people and its investment in external sovereignty or rather the investment of the international community in Somalia’s external sovereignty.

Sovereignty in Africa – a colonial inheritance

One of the most important concepts in contemporary political thought and practice is the juridico-political doctrine of sovereignty. The long and complicated history of this concept can be traced to the early history of state formation in Europe when it functioned as an organizing concept in debates over political authority

Since the emergence of the nation-state in Europe and its subsequent spread to the rest of the world, sovereignty has become synonymous with state authority and prerogative. As such, the specific history of this concept in African political history is deeply intertwined with the rise of the colonial state in the era of colonization. Ironically, the doctrine of sovereignty was initially part of the legitimating discourse used to justify European colonization of non-European peoples, including Africans. It was claimed that the attainment of a certain level of cultural and civilizational status was necessary in order for a particular society to legitimately claim sovereignty. Africans, as well as other colonized peoples, were too backward to exercise sovereignty over themselves, it was argued, and must be governed.  

While Africans and other colonized peoples rightly celebrated the attainment of sovereignty at independence, the historical legacy of colonialism was made evident when postcolonial sovereignty was bestowed on the successor of the colonial state, the postcolonial state. In Africa, this meant that the political borders drawn by colonizing European states were to crystalise into the parameters of postcolonial juridico-political sovereignty.

Despite arguments by some African scholars that the form of sovereignty inherited from colonialism is incompatible with African political history, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its successor, the African Union (AU), have maintained that respect for colonial borders is a practical necessity to avoid chaos and balkanization of the continent into countless ethnic enclaves. But as the postcolonial state in Africa has come under increasing economic and political crisis, so has the contestation over sovereignty become a contemporary reality in Africa. 

No region in Africa is this more evident than in the Horn, considered one of the most conflict-prone regions on the continent. A significant contributor to the region’s conflicts are contestations over sovereignty. There have been several wars in the region over the question of sovereignty, including the 1977-78 war between Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as the 1961-1992 war that led to Eritrea’s separation from Ethiopia.

The recent and highly controversial MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland, signed on 1 January 2024, is only the latest expression of one of the fault lines of conflict in the region.  The agreement gives Ethiopia access to and the right to build on land on the Somaliland coast: land that the Somali government considers to be its own sovereign territory. The disputes over sovereignty in the Horn is further exasperated by the complete disintegration of the postcolonial Somali state in 1991.

Photo Credit: Evan Schneider

Somaliland – internal sovereignty, external exclusion

The origin of the dispute over Somaliland’s sovereignty lies in the fallout from the breakdown of the Somali Republic. After about a decade of armed rebellion by several rebel groups, the longtime military regime of Mohamed Siyad Barre fell in 1991. Subsequent to the regime’s fall, the different rebel forces failed to agree upon the formation of a new government. This failure threw the country into a prolonged period of civil war creating the longest running and the paradigmatic example of a ‘failed state’ in the contemporary world. Reflecting the socio-cultural structure of Somali society and the machinations of rebel leaders, the various rebel movements were organized on the basis of clan and regional identity. This meant that when the military regime fell in 1991, each rebel group took control of the region where their specific clan predominated. The north-eastern part of the country was taken over by the Somali National Movement (SNM), whose members were primarily from the Issaq clan. Subsequent to their takeover of the region, SNM and traditional leaders from the region (Issaq and non-Issaq) decided to unilaterally secede from Somalia in 1991.  

In keeping with the dominant understanding of sovereignty in postcolonial Africa, regional authorities in Somaliland grounded their right to secede on sovereign authority inherited from the colonial state. Their argument is based on the fact that the region was a distinct colonial entity from the rest of Somalia. It was under British colonial administration from 1884-1960 and known as British Somaliland, or officially, the Somaliland Protectorate, while the rest of Somalia was colonized by Italy, Italian Somaliland. Five days after becoming independent on June 26, 1960, British Somaliland merged with Italian Somaliland to form the postcolonial state of Somalia.  Separatist officials from Somaliland argue that they are separating from Somalia and reclaiming the sovereign statehood, which was lost when the region voluntarily united with Italian Somaliland. This argument is made with an eye to the AU’s position that the political borders inherited upon independence should be the basis of African sovereignty and statehood.

Subsequent to its unilateral declaration of independence, Somaliland has created a relatively effective governance structure combining indigenous and modern forms of governance mechanisms. Consequently, and for the most part, Somaliland exercises a certain level of internal sovereignty, especially when compared with the rest of Somalia, where there has not been an effective internal authority since the fall of the state in 1991. Even Somaliland’s internal sovereignty and legitimacy was always more contested than claimed and has arguably weakened in recent years, including most evidently in the form of the Las Anod conflict. Despite its arguments and relative stability, however, no state has recognized Somaliland’s claim to sovereign statehood, That said, Somaliland does maintain quasi-official diplomatic relations with some countries (Ethiopia) as well as other contested/semi-recognised polities (Taiwan).

Somalia – limited internal sovereignty, external recognition

Somalia’s internal sovereignty is limited both by the secessionist Somaliland (as indicated above), but also by highly autonomous regional states, such as Puntland, whose formation precedes that of the Federal Government of Somalia, as well as by the persistence of al-Shabaab, whose own lifespan is longer than the Federal government, and which opposes the current Somali state.

Following the collapse of the state in 1990/91 and various periods of conflict and a succession of internationally supported peace processes, Somalia’s current federal government was established in 2013. It is very much the product of external intervention and a response to the perceived Islamist threat in a post-9/11 world, vividly described by Ken Menkhaus as’ ‘principally a division of spoils that is held together by a combination of a common threat posed by Al-Shabaab, copious levels of security driven external aid, and protection afforded by AMISOM peacekeepers.’

Since the establishment of this governmental arrangement Somalia is now in its third Presidential election cycle. As a sovereign entity it largely operates as a series of city states, divided between the Federal Government based in Mogadishu, operating out of a bunkerised ‘green zone’ and the Federal Member States, each with its own limitations on territorial control and legitimacy. Al-Shabaab holds sway over large swathes of the rural hinterland as well as possessing  a strong extra-territorial power, is able to tax business and people in government-held territory and operates a sharia’a based judicial system that many people utilise as it is considered both relatively fair/just and has the coercive capacity that ensures judgements are implemented.

Aisha Ahmad et al. argue that in fact there are two key parallel political bargains in Somalia, an elite political deal or bargain between members of the Federal Government and Federal Member States and a civilian deal which al-Shabaab establishes with citizens under its influence. The former deal is essentially backed up by the international community in the name of state sovereignty, and which serves to undermine the incentive for the government to develop a social compact with much of its population.

For many Somalis as well as many in the international community who work in and on Somalia, there is increasing recognition that domestic governance or internal sovereignty is not progressing even as the federal authorities in Mogadishu are increasingly invested by the international community with more powers of external/juridical sovereignty.

Conclusions

Somalia’s acceptance on the UN Security Council continues this external legitimising dynamic – and external sovereignty – with  limited signs on the ground that government – whether at the national, regional or local levels – is acting to improve its legitimacy with local populations, or that negotiations are taking place with either Somaliland or al-Shabaab, to further develop its internal sovereignty. It is in fact possible to argue that the continued legitimization of the Somali government by the international community in the name of sovereignty disincentivises government authorities from acting to consolidate internal sovereignty by investing in effective governance structures, improving its legitimacy with the local population through service provisioning and negotiating with the various competing authorities throughout the country. While reconciling the Westphalian notion of sovereignty with the complicated realities of African states struggling to exert internal and external sovereignty has always been difficult, the situation in Somalia underscores not only this country’s struggle with sovereignty, but the potential for contradictions between the external trappings of sovereignty and the internal reality.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the Authors:

Dr. Ahmed Sh. Ibrahim

Dr. Ahmed Sh. Ibrahim is a socio-cultural anthropologist with a PhD from the Graduate Center, City University of New York (CUNY). He is currently an anthropology instructor with Carleton College’s Ecology and Anthropology Program in Tanzania. Dr. Ibrahim has done research in the Horn of Africa and among the African diaspora in the U.S. with a focus on the history and politics of religion, political conflicts and immigration. His research has appeared in peer-reviewed academic journals, edited volumes, and popular websites such as Africa is a Country and Responsible Statecraft. He can be reached at ahmedf95@gmail.com.

Dr. Nisar Majid

Dr. Nisar Majid is the research director for the PeaceRep (Somalia) programme at the LSE. He has worked in and on the Horn of Africa and the Somali territories for over 20 years, in various applied and research capacities. His areas of research have included food security and famine studies, humanitarianism, and diaspora studies. He is the co-author of ‘Famine in Somalia, Competing Imperatives, Collective Failures’, 2011-12 (Hurst). He can be reached at N.Majid1@lse.ac.uk.

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UNFCCC Conference 2024 | How a feminist approach to climate change can help bring together animal welfare and gender equality agendas

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Source: AI Generated Photo
Source: AI Generated Photo

Attending the UNFCCC (SB60) Conference in Bonn in June this year as a representative of the World Federation for Animals (WFA) was a remarkable experience for ISS PhD researcher Irma Nugrahanti, most of all because it visibilized the striking parallels between climate change-related issues faced by women and animals and the crucial role of these two advocacy groups in fighting climate change. In this blog article, she reflects on different conversations that took place at the conference and how this reaffirmed the significance of a multifaceted approach to climate issues.

At the recent UNFCCC conference, observing dialogues on animal welfare, gender, and climate change enhanced my understanding of how these topics are interlinked and what this means for climate action. Each conversation opened my eyes to the rich tapestry of perspectives, revealing how interconnected and parallel these issues are, like chain links, impacting one another and forming an intricate and powerful network of interactions. Reflecting on the discussions at the UNFCCC conference and beyond, it is evident that embracing the intersectionality of feminism and animal welfare is essential for creating a just, sustainable, and resilient world for all living beings — and for tackling climate change.

Author at the UNFCC (SB60) Conference

A step in the right direction

While preparing for the UNFCCC side event focused on the crucial role of animals in climate change mitigation strategies, I reviewed the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) of various countries. I observed the notable failure to acknowledge the contribution animals can make to climate resilience. However, from different discussions at the conference, I observed a positive shift towards recognizing the role of both human and non-human actors in environmental protection. For example, the crucial role of the social sciences in understanding indigenous communities and the human-nature relationship, particularly within the context of ocean-climate dynamics, was acknowledged.

Additionally, there was a strong emphasis on engaging local governments, advocating for locally-led solutions tailored to community needs, and advancing the implementation of global stocktake suggestions. These recommendations include incorporating animals into the Loss and Damage (L&D) matrix, allocating resources to scientific research and data collection, and ensuring that the contributions of animals are acknowledged in IPCC reports and NDCs. These discussions highlight the need to move beyond an anthropogenic view of humans as the central to climate solutions and to embrace a plurality of perspectives that value different types of knowledge and practices, the diversity of life, and its intrinsic values.

As these conversations advanced, it became evident that while progress was made in embracing different perspectives, the commonalities between the experiences of women and animals in relation to climate change have not been sufficiently acknowledged. And they should: women and animals, while vulnerable to the effects of climate change, both play a pivotal role in mitigation efforts. Thus, furthering the role of women in climate change action and strategies and protecting animals are intertwined objectives. This recognition is crucial because caring for animals transcends compassion; it is a profound expression of feminism.

Recognizing the shared challenges faced by both women and animals in the context of climate change could help broaden our understanding of vulnerability and resilience, so that we can transform existing policies that often overlook these marginalized groups. In doing so, we must also recognize and confront the existing power dynamics that influence climate policies. As many studies have shown (see here, here and here), in the climate change domain, men have a dominant presence, namely in research, policy, implementation, and activism.

What women and animals have in common

1. Both women and animals face substantial obstacles stemming from oppression, violence, and objectification.

The connection between patriarchal gender relations and the exploitation of animals reveal how sexism and speciesism come from the desire to dominate inferior groups; this mindset, rooted in patriarchal values, shapes people’s attitude toward women and animals, as Ashley Allcorn and Shirley M Ogletree have noted. Women in countries with a strong patriarchal culture experience multifaceted oppressions, which results in limited possibilities for accessing education and economic opportunities, as well as in exposure to growing harassment and violence. This systematic marginalization is embedded in legal frameworks that hinder gender equality. Likewise, animals endure exploitation and cruelty, being seen as simple commodities rather than sentient beings.

2. The economic value of animals and women in mitigating climate change is underrecognized.

Moreover, although women’s environmental care work plays a crucial role in climate change mitigation, economic assessments often overlook their value. Conventional economic indicators, including the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), fail to include the unpaid care work performed by women in the form of managing natural resources and supporting their communities. This omission underestimates their valuable efforts and maintains ongoing gender disparities. Likewise, the ecological benefits offered by animals, such as carbon sequestration and biodiversity preservation, are rarely accounted for in economic analyses. This omission results in the insufficient protection of animals and a lack of investment in animal welfare. Integrating economic analysis using a gender lens, such as gender-responsive climate budgeting, and the direct valuation of animal welfare in environmental economics may help to ensure adequate resources and appropriate valuation for both women and animals.

3. Both women and animals play a pivotal role in protecting the environment and combating climate change.

Women’s knowledge of sustainable agriculture, water management, and biodiversity conservation is invaluable. Thousands of women-led initiatives around the world serve as proof. For instance in Peru, the indigenous women-led initiative Asociación de Mujeres Waorani de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana (AMWAE) is dedicated to preserving the Amazon rainforest. These women use indigenous knowledge to combat deforestation and advocate for sustainable land use, making a substantial contribution to carbon sequestration and the preservation of biodiversity. Similarly, women play a critical role in community-based conservation efforts. In Kenya, the Green Belt Movement, founded by Nobel laureate Wangari Maathai, has empowered women to plant trees, combat deforestation, and restore ecosystems. This initiative not only mitigates climate change but also improves local livelihoods and promotes gender equality.

In a similar vein, the preservation of an ecological balance and the promotion of biodiversity depend on the existence of healthy animal populations. For instance, African forest elephants make significant contributions to natural carbon capture. They reduce competition and facilitate the growth of larger trees that store more carbon by trampling young trees as they move through the rainforests. This would increase carbon capture equivalent to over 6,000 metric tons of CO2 per square kilometre if their population were to be restored to its previous level, which highlights their critical role in climate regulation.

Why an ecofeminism lens is useful

Ecofeminism, a branch of feminist theory, offers a critical analysis of the dominance of nature and animals imposed by patriarchal systems, drawing parallels with the oppression experienced by women and marginalized populations. Carol Adams and Lori Gruen in their 2022 book Ecofeminism: feminist interaction with other animals and the earth explain the notion of the “logic of domination”. This concept highlights the shared struggles women and animals experience: they are subjected to hierarchical dualisms that diminish their worth, objectify them, and dismiss their individuality and intrinsic value. On objectification, women are often valued according to their appearance or reproductive capabilities, while meats and dairy products have been deeply valued and integral to human diets in most cultures for thousands of years.

Another example of using a feminist lens is incorporating multi-species justice in climate change action. Multi-species justice theories advocate for the recognition of rights, welfare, and interconnectedness between human and non-human beings. It calls for rethinking justice systems for the impacts of human actions on non-human entities and the environment. Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka in their book Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights for example advocate for a political framework that recognizes animals as co-citizens and grants them rights and protections. This viewpoint challenges the traditional concept of justice by advocating for a political framework that acknowledges animals as co-citizens. Their ideas extend the concept of justice, commonly applied to humans and challenging the anthropocentric bias in political ideologies.

Lastly, the feminist and animal rights movements are both grounded on ethical issues. Lori Gruen emphasizes the objective that ethical veganism and feminism have in common, namely to put a stop to the exploitation of the powerless by those in positions of power. This ethical position challenges the prevailing systems of oppression and exploitation, promoting a society that is more compassionate and just.

Toward an ethics of care

Ecofeminism offers a framework for defining an ethics of care that transcends human interactions and includes every living being and the environment. It emphasizes care as an essential component of our interactions with others, both human and non-human. Its relational and caring approach not only criticizes current power structures but also suggests a paradigm shift toward inclusive and compassionate behaviours, especially those related to animal welfare. In her book In A Different Voice, Carol Gilligan critiques anthropocentric and patriarchal structures through her definition of ethic of care by promoting a caring and attentive connection with nature, akin to a mother’s care for her child. This entails actively listening to and caring for nature in a non-hierarchical manner, promoting a transition from unequal power dynamics to ecologically responsive relationships.

The ethics of care promotes a deep appreciation for natural environments, including animals, which contribute to the process of carbon sequestration and the conservation of biodiversity, which is essential for the ability of ecosystems to face the impacts of climate change. Therefore, in our ecological relationship, it is important to reflect on the way we are being, doing, and seeing to be more environmentally conscious and honour the interconnectedness of all living beings. I believe the common task for posthumanist feminist scholars and policymakers now is to translate this concept into policy and legal frameworks, a complicated but important mission to achieve.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the author

Irma Nugrahanti

Irma Nugrahanti is a PhD researcher at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), focusing on the intersection of gender, climate change, and public finance management. Her research highlights the importance of integrating a gender lens into climate budgeting policies and practices, particularly at the national and regional levels of public expenditure management. With a background in the non-profit sector, Irma has extensive experience in finance, program management, and policy advocacy, striving to bridge the gap between research and practice to create inclusive and sustainable climate policies.

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Is Liberia’s illiteracy problem linked to absent fathers?

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School Reading Corner: Image by Author

The prolonged civil war that brought life in Liberia to a standstill for over a decade has left deep wounds that the country is still working to heal more than twenty years after the conflict ended. While significant interventions have been made in the country’s education sector, low literacy rates persist — but the war and its aftermath may not be the only reasons, writes ISS MA graduate Christo Gorpudolo.

Liberia has one of the highest illiteracy rates in the world, with an adult literacy rate of 48.3% in 2017 (the global average is 84.7%) and a youth literacy rate of 77.46% (the global average is 91.68%). The country scored 177 out of 193 countries and territories on the 2022 Human Development Index (HDI), a composite statistic used to measure and rank countries’ levels of social and economic development according to the level of education, life expectancy, and standard of living.

But while the country’s low adult literacy rate has been linked to civil war and resulting poverty, a lack of infrastructure, and inadequate teacher training, recent research I conducted in central Liberia revealed another possible explanation: absent fathers. This observation is important because it is a factor that is not directly attributable to the civil war but that may have a potentially significant impact on efforts to address the persistent low adult literacy rate.

Understandings of Liberia’s low literacy rates

Much of Liberia’s education-related backlogs have been attributed to the civil war that ravaged this low-income country between 1989 and 2003. The long-standing impact of the war, including the destruction of much of the country’s trained workforce, has led to a struggling educational system still recovering from many challenges, including those related to access to education, the quality of instruction, and a lack of human and financial resources.

The absence of fathers hitherto has not been cited as a factor contributing to illiteracy, although it has been marked by scholars as an important factor positively affecting the growth of school–going children in Liberia. A report by the 2024 World Education network on Liberia’s education system moreover states that fathers’ involvement in children’s education means a lot to children, who eventually tend to perform better.

Conversely, non-profit organization All For Kids states that children who grow up without fathers are more likely to experience unemployment as adults, have low incomes, remain on social assistance, and experience homelessness. The organization also states that absent fathers is a factor consistently co-occurring with a wide range of mental health disorders and related problems, particularly anxiety, depression, and increased suicide risk.

An unexpected observation

My observation that the absence of fathers could be linked to low literacy levels among children came as I was conducting research on another topic. In March this year, I was hired by the CERATH Development Organization to research how young Liberian adolescents view the Liberian food system. This research is intended to help CERATH understand Liberia’s food security and what children’s visions are for a food secure Liberia. I spoke to 50 young adolescents between the ages of 9 and 17; of these children,19 were not attending school and the remaining 31 children were attending school.

During the research, while interviewing the children who were not attending school, I made an unexpected observation: all the children I spoke to who were not in school faced absent fathers at home or in their lives. Some of them live with mothers, aunts, or grandmothers who work to some extent; others live with mothers, aunts and grandmothers who are physically able to but do not engage in economic activities.

One of the children (aged 16) stated that his father died in 2020 in Monrovia, Liberia’s capital. Because of his father’s death, he and his mother had to move back to Bong County in central Liberia; he has not been enrolled in school since 2020. Another participant aged 16, also without a father, has never been to school. Yet another participant aged 9, also without a father, has also never been to school.

Thinking outside the box

Given their ages, all of these children were born after the Liberian civil war and were not actively involved in the war. Most of them also live close to schools and don’t necessarily have to walk miles to school. The country moreover has a free and compulsory primary education policy, which was introduced in 2003. Yet, despite these factors that may facilitate (or at least do not hinder) school attendance, these young adolescents are not currently in school. Could absent fathers be a reason for this and, thus, for Liberia’s low literacy rate?

Speaking with these young children, I observed that they are increasingly concerned about possibly never going to school. Others hope that their mothers and guardians would secure funding to send them to school. It is clear that the children I interviewed do want to attend school, but do not foresee the possibility of doing so. This is why it is important to examine all possible reasons for children’s failure to attend school.

The World Literacy Foundation states that in developing and emerging countries, the number of children and youth with no basic foundational and literacy skills is continuing to rise by an estimated 20% per year. Without any effective intervention, these young people face a lifetime of poverty and unemployment. Thus, further investigation is needed to ensure that children can attain quality education. Investigating the possible link between school attendance and the absence of fathers is an important place to start.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the author:

Christo Z. Gorpudolo is a development practitioner with over 9 years of work experience in the development sector. She is particularly interested in research  areas that cover peace and conflict, children rights, humanitarian aid and gender. She has a Masters of Arts degree in Development studies, Social Justice Perspective from the International Institute of Social Studies.

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Data inaccuracy is a global problem — a plea for decolonizing the debate on the quality of statistics

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Policy makers and researchers want their analyses and advice to be evidence-based. Economic and social statistics seem to provide the hard data needed to make decisions. But those statistics are often inaccurate and are measured imprecisely. In this blog article, ISS Professor of International Economics and Macroeconomics Peter van Bergeijk points out the biases of academia in the global North, showing that their pretention about their statistical superiority perpetuates power imbalances in academic and policy discourses.

In the realm of economic analysis, the pursuit of precision has long been hailed as the ultimate goal. Yet, behind the veil of statistical exactitude lies a disturbing reality: the pervasive presence of measurement errors, typically disregarded and sidelined. Data inaccuracy at first sight might look like a very boring issue, but it is actually highly relevant for development studies, amongst others because of the data-based nature of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Indeed, large data-driven projects such as the SDGs are seen as a major step forward, but since no attention is paid to the accuracy of the target variables during the selection of quantified goals, disappointment is, so to speak, built in.

A good example is the goal to reduce global poverty. Espen Prydz, Dean Jolliffe, and Umar Serajuddin compared per capita income statistics calculated from the national accounts to countrywide household surveys. The numbers should be the same, but the difference can be as much as 50%. They found that for the year 2011, the World Bank’s target of reducing poverty to less than 3% globally was met when looking at national accounts, but that the number of people living in poverty was actually twice as high when household surveys were considered. Those who do not recognize or report inaccuracies such as these rest on their laurels before the work is done.

It is unfortunately common practice for economists to sweep data inaccuracies under the rug. We are confused with data that doesn’t work the way we want it to. So, we continue ignoring the problem. Obscuring their existence means that we don’t know the extent of these inconsistencies. And, as I argue below, the mainstream ignores its own mistakes while emphasizing the statistical problems of developing countries.

A rude awakening

The journey into the murky waters of economic data accuracy often begins with a rude awakening. For many, like me, it was during our early professional endeavours that we encountered an unsettling truth: economic and social statistics, even from reputed sources, are riddled with inconsistencies and inaccuracies. The disillusionment can be profound when young professionals realize that the numbers they rely on to inform critical decisions are far from infallible. I was introduced to this issue only when regarding the reading list of my final exam. The examiner asked what I thought about this, and I told him that this should have been part of teaching from Day 1.

Yet, the issue has persisted for many decades. Published in 1950 as a discussion paper and in 1963 as a monograph by Princeton University Press, Oskar Morgenstern in his seminal work On the Accuracy of Economic Observations was one of the first to expose the shadows of data imperfection. Through meticulous case studies, Morgenstern revealed the inaccuracies that plague economic and social statistics; he uncovered measurement error to the tune of 20% to 50%, even for massively quoted numbers such as GDP, international trade, and the current account of countries worldwide. The areas from which Morgenstern drew his examples are wide and include agriculture, natural resources, (un)employment, prices, and production. In my last book that I briefly discuss below, I show that these problems persist, redoing Morgenstern’s research and adding some of the SDG indicators (poverty, health and nutrition, and illegal flows).

Figure 1. Only few economic analyses have few data inaccuracies — most studies have significant error rates. Source: Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, 2024, On the inaccuracies of macroeconomic observations, National Accounting Review, Figure 5.

A wake-up call

Yet, despite the continued relevance of Morgenstern’s findings, nothing has changed, and the discourse around measurement error remains conspicuously absent from mainstream economic narratives. What happened was that a discourse developed that presented inaccuracy as a major problem in Africa and Asia. The publication in 2014 by Morten Jerven, Professor in Development Studies at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences, of Poor Numbers: How We Are Misled by African Development Statistics and What to Do about It struck me in particular and served  as a wake-up call. Jerven fell into the trap of the fallacy of portraying measurement issues as a problem confined to the global South.

The cost of pursuing perfection

The roots of the ignorance of measurement error lie in the biases embedded within academia in the global North. The training of economists is steeped in a tradition that venerates precision and disregards imperfection, perpetuating a culture of intellectual superiority and exclusion. This obsession with precision not only blinds economists and social scientists to the realities of measurement error; the global South, all too often relegated to the margins of economic analysis, bears the brunt of this colonial legacy.

The prevailing narrative portrays measurement issues as exclusive to developing countries, conveniently ignoring the systemic inaccuracies that plague advanced economies. Evidence-based policy making will often be counterproductive if based on mock statistics. A trade balance can be reported as showing a deficit and may induce policy measures to boost exports and restrict imports. But the statistics can easily get it wrong and may deprive a nation from important resources.

Doing economics (education) better

The imperative for decolonization in the measurement error debate cannot be overstated. It is time to dismantle the colonial perceptions that have long dictated our approach to economic data accuracy. This necessitates a fundamental re-evaluation of our methodologies and practices, rooted in principles of transparency, accountability, and inclusivity. I decided to write my last book titled On the Inaccuracies of Economic Observations: Why and How We Could Do Better on this topic because an accessible up-to-date text is necessary to convince students that this is a real problem. I hope that it will help to improve the education of economists and other social scientists.

In the book, which has just been published by Edward Elgar, I pay tribute to Morgenstern and redo much of his analysis but for more recent times and for a much broader country sample. Most importantly, I provide a concrete methodology and strategy for what I call crowd-researching the extent of measurement error and empowering data users, allowing them to take part in dismantling the power hierarchies that fundamentally perpetuate colonial perception within economic discourse. There have occasionally been calls for fundamental changes of the statistics producers, but that has not led to any change. It is time to try to do this differently. It is perfectly doable for data users to investigate the measurement errors that plague social and economic statistics.

A radical reimagining

Our journey towards progress demands a radical reimagining of our approach to data accuracy. Confronting the legacies and mainstream views that underpin our current discourse helps to pave the way for a more equitable and inclusive understanding of economic and social phenomena. Especially in the current times of disinformation, scientific rigour requires us all to be transparent about measurement error and its impact on our analysis and policy advice.

The implications clearly stretch beyond academia. Policymakers must confront the uncertainties inherent in economic observations, recognizing the limitations of relying on flawed data for decision-making. Similarly, researchers must embrace methodologies that prioritize inclusivity and equity by treating the problem of statistical quality from the perspective that the problems are similar for all countries. But this starts with the recognition that it is indeed a phenomenon that should not be ignored but ultimately should be embraced for what it is.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the author: Peter van Bergeijk

Peter van Bergeijk

Peter van Bergeijk is almost emeritus professor. His valedictory ‘In Praise of Observations’ is scheduled October 1, 16:00 +

link to event:  https://www.iss.nl/en/events/valedictory-lecture-professor-peter-van-bergeijk-2024-10-01

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How the United States’s legacy of slavery influences unequal credit scores and what we can do about it

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The credit scoring system in the United States, particularly the FICO score, significantly impacts individuals’ access to affordable financing, housing, and employment opportunities. In this blog article, recent ISS MA graduate Conor Farrell shows that though deemed “colour-blind,” the model inadvertently perpetuates racial disparities rooted in historical injustices, particularly slavery. Reforms, including AI-enabled credit scoring and policy changes like excluding medical debt from credit considerations, are essential to address these inequities and break the cycle of intergenerational poverty and racial inequality, he writes.

Acting as the economic gatekeeper in the United States, the credit score, most commonly known in its FICO form and that which is referenced throughout this blog article, scores individuals on a range from 300 to 850, with lower scores representing greater risk of default or missing payments, and higher scores the opposite. Within the FICO form, an individual’s score is primarily calculated across five components, each with an approximate weight (1):

  • Payment history (35%):an analysis of timely payments on outstanding debts and the severity of late payments (i.e., 30 or 60+ days late).
  • Amounts owed (30%):calculated as a percentage of total credit available and amount currently employed with a rule of thumb to keep this percentage lower than 10%.
  • Length of credit (15%):calculated as the amount of time an individual has accessed credit.
  • New credit (10%):how recently the individual opened a new account.
  • Type of credit(10%): considers the different revolving and installment loans you have active.

Poor credit scores almost always mean far fewer lending options and far more expensive options when available. Putting this into hard numbers, according to data from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, a change from a “subprime” 640 credit score to a 740 credit score in one example might allow a potential home buyer to access a mortgage interest rate as low as 5.75% instead of 7.625%, resulting in almost $90,000 in lower interest costs over the life of a thirty-year loan for the same house (2).

The five factors determining the level of risk are claimed not to consider demographic characteristics. However, the map of average percentages of county populations with subprime credit scores in the United States (Figure 1) shows the stark differences between the American south and north.

Figure 1: Subprime Credit Score Populations by County

The percentage of people per county with subprime credit scores in the United States. Orange indicates counties with fewer subprime credit scores and blue counties with more subprime credit scores. The red line on the map is the Mason-Dixon line and Ohio River extension, the traditional division between northern and southern states. Source: (Equifax and Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2024).

In particular, given that over 60% of the total African American population resides in the American south, as we further break out the average credit score by race, it is therefore unsurprising to find a mirrored divergence in subprime credit scores, particularly between Black and White Americans (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Average Credit Scores by Race in 2021

Seen across race, there is a significant divergence between the average credit scores of White Americans (734) and Black Americans (677) with the average score for Black Americans averaging near the subprime threshold. Source: (Dual Payments, 2020)

This brings into question whether these differences can be explained by other factors not accounted for by the model. Given that credit scores play such a significant factor in one’s ability to obtain affordable finance and in certain cases may impact where one can live or rent or inhibit one’s ability to obtain employment opportunities, how is it then that such a “colour-blind” model appears to be disproportionately impacting Black Americans? In this blog article, I show that a historical institution fundamental to economic development of the United States and the racial and geographic divisions still present in the present — the institution of slavery — can provide an alternative explanation for injustices in the credit score system.

A quick history lesson

While present for the initial two centuries of colonial expansion in North America, slavery rapidly grew in the early 1800s as the United States solidified into a nation-state (Figure 3). Ultimately abolished after a bloody civil war, the history of the United States since slavery’s abolition in 1865 has been characterized by a various forms of institutionalized and explicit forms of race-based discrimination and exclusion, including the sharecropping system, housing discrimination in the form of redlining, and segregation in the education system. While each of these systems and institutions can each be understood to be extensions of the historically unequal forms of development in the United States with their own unique impact of the historical inequalities in their respective period of development, my research as part of my MA thesis set out to determine how is it that the Figure 3 and that of Figure 1 bear strikingly similarities to one another.

Figure 3: Relative Slave Populations by County (1860)

Figure 3 presents the relative slave population as a share of the total population in 1860. Counties with dark yellow shades have the largest slave population relative to the total county population, while light blue are the counties with lower slave populations. Counties in dark blue are either unreported or have zero slave population according to the census. It is important to note that this data may not be fully reflective of the actual slave population, but it is the best official data that is available. Source: (United States Census Bureau, 1864)

Current models are far too simplistic

Hypothesizing that the current model claims to be colour-blind in its analysis and that its simplistic model focuses solely on the present-day actions of an individual without acknowledging the persistent inequalities already present within our society, my research analysed 1860 census data alongside contemporary panel data from 2014–2021 through an instrumental variable specification. Through the most stringent specification applied,  I found a 10-percentage-point increase in the relative slave population of a county in 1860 results estimated average effect of 0.791 percentage point increase in the percentage of the current population with a subprime credit score in 2021, holding all else constant; a result that remains highly significant even in the most stringent model employed (3). Put simply, counties that had higher proportions of enslaved people in 1860 tend to have a higher percentage of residents with poor credit scores today, even after considering other factors that might influence this outcome.

Given the consistent but varying forms of discrimination experienced by Black Americans since the abolition of slavery, I also found that relative slave populations influence different channels’ persistence including through an education system that requires Black Americans to take on higher levels of debt to obtain the same education, only to earn consistently lower wages than their White counterparts. Unable to generate as much wealth as their White counterparts, Black Americans are often far more burdened by greater amounts of relative debt, limiting their ability to obtain larger assets like homes, which are so vital in generating and retaining intergenerational wealth (4).

Such findings demonstrate that the current credit scoring model, one that claims to be unbiased and does not explicitly penalize individuals based on race, fails to account for the multitude of contextual historical factors that continue to privilege certain groups while barring others from accessing the same system. Contemporary economic inequalities may be influenced by the lingering effects of historical factors emphasizing the complex interaction between race, inequality, historical factors, and contemporary economic outcomes.

As such, it also provides clear evidence that policies that do not adequately consider historical inequalities existing and persistent in the system may in fact serve only to continue to perpetuate such inequalities. Particularly in the context of the credit scoring model in the United States and similar systems of economic gatekeeping, not addressing the existing inequalities through the model restricts an individual’s ability to access affordable financing, housing, or decent employment prospects.

Significant reforms are the only way to address persistent injustices

The rapid introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) holds some promise in this context. A greater number of AI-enabled credit scoring algorithms are being tested that could vastly expand the number of variables influencing a credit score. This will hopefully allow a far more comprehensive picture of an individual current financial health. Models with a greater number of variables would increase the diversity of scoring criteria and de-emphasize the potentially discriminatory data points currently prioritized in the FICO model. The recent decision by the Biden administration to remove medical debt as a variable influencing credit scores also helps to address the burden of emergency care costs that can be detrimental to an individual’s ability to meet their financial responsibilities (5).

However, given that poor credit scores have the potential to make financing almost inaccessible for low- and middle-income individuals, additional social safety nets must be considered to ensure that drastic emergency expenses do not create cycles of intergenerational poverty resulting from poor credit scores. Without significant reform, the current credit scoring model will continue to punish low-income families, forcing them to take on more expensive financing to obtain the same assets as their neighbours, inhibit access to home ownership, make higher education less accessible without taking on larger debt, and continue to ensure a cycle of poverty that perpetuates racial inequalities within the United States.

Footnotes

(1) Pritchard, J., (2021) How the FICO Credit Score Is Composed. Available at: https://www.thebalancemoney.com/fico-credit-score-315552 (Accessed 28 July 2024).

(2) Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), (2023). Explore interest rates. Available at: https://www.consumerfinance.gov/owning-a-home/explore-rates/ (Accessed 28 July 2024).

(3) Farrell, C. (2024). The lingering legacy of slavery: historical injustices and credit scores in the United States. International Institute of Social Studies (ISS). ISS working papers. General series No. 723

(4) Jones, J., & Neelakantan, U. (2022). How Big Is the Inheritance Gap Between Black and White Families? Richmond: Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Brief.

(5) The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) (2023). CFPB Kicks Off Rulemaking to Remove Medical Bills from Credit Reports. Washington, D.C.: CFPB. Accessed 4 July 2024.

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) (2023). CFPB Kicks Off Rulemaking to Remove Medical Bills from Credit Reports. Washington, D.C.: CFPB. Accessed 4 July 2024.

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2024). Explore Interest Rates. Retrieved from Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: https://www.consumerfinance.gov/owning-a-home/explore-rates/. Accessed 5 July 2024.

Dual Payments. (2020). Credit Score. Retrieved from Dual Payments: https://dualpayments.com/statistics/credit-score/#race. Accessed 28 July 2024.

Equifax and Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Equifax Subprime Credit Population, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/EQFXSUBPRIME036061. Accessed 28 July 2024.

Farrell, C. (2024). The lingering legacy of slavery: historical injustices and credit scores in the United States. International Institute of Social Studies (ISS). ISS working papers. General series No. 723

Jones, J., & Neelakantan, U. (2022). How Big Is the Inheritance Gap Between Black and White Families? Richmond: Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Brief.

United States Census Bureau, (1864). 1860 Census: Agriculture of the United States, Washington: United States Census Bureau. Available at: https://www.census.gov/library/publications/1864/dec/1860b.html

About the author: Conor Farrell

Conor Farrell

Conor Farrell is a graduate of the International Institute of Social Studies where he majored in Economics of Development. He is passionate about the intersection of history and contemporary economic outcomes understanding that history is not a set of fixed beginnings and ends, but continues to live on through the institutions we have created to shape our societies and influence our future.

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How artisanal fishers across the world are trying to turn the tide by adapting to climate and anthropogenic change

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Artisanal fishers across the world are facing change from all sides. While these changes have been well documented, the intricacies of the adaptation strategies they are forced to assume remain underexplored. A group of researchers met at a workshop held at the ISS in December last year to discuss the challenges artisanal fishers face and what we can learn from their responses. In this blog article, Ilaha Abasli, Nina Swen, and Oane Visser highlight the key takeaways of the workshop, showing that while artisanal fishers are trying to turn the tide by adapting, the challenges they face at times may seem unsurmountable.

Artisanal fishing is a profession and livelihood profoundly impacted by climate and other anthropogenic changes (Mills, 2018; Ojea et al., 2020; Otero et al., 2022). Fishers across the globe are facing declining fish stocks, biodiversity loss, and shrinking spaces caused mainly by environmental pollution, changing sea temperatures, and fish migration, combined with increasingly restrictive ecological conservation policies. They are forced to adapt their practices, for example by changing how and where they fish.

The adaptation practices of artisanal fishers remain under-researched, however, which prompted a group of researchers at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) to organize a workshop in December last year titled ‘Artisanal fisheries, climate change and knowledge for adaptation’, which sought to bring together junior and senior researchers from the Netherlands and beyond who work on socio-ecological aspects of fisheries, climate change, and marine anthropologies.

We as workshop organizers focused on the following questions: How do fishers adapt to the changes they face? What role do collaboration and new technologies play? The first part of the workshop comprised a panel discussion among early-career researchers centred around artisanal fisheries, knowledge, and technology in the context of climate change adaptation. The second part of the workshop featured a plenary session where senior researchers discussed their research on artisanal fisheries. This was followed by a roundtable discussion with representatives from academia and beyond. This blog article shares the workshop’s key takeaways.

Is climate change the only cause of the challenges fishers face?

Artisanal fishers are among the first to notice climate and other anthropogenic changes, including fluctuations in sea levels and temperatures and changes in the quantity and quality of available fish, altered fish migration patterns, and the appearance or extinction of species.

Climate change and anthropogenic activities heavily impact artisanal fisheries. Ilaha Abasli, Nina Swen, and Oane Visser of the ISS showed that fisheries situated along the coast of the Caspian Sea for instance are threatened by oil and gas extraction that causes pollution, disrupts fish migration, and affects fish populations. Vitor Renck of Wageningen University & Research demonstrated that Brazilian artisanal fishers in Bahia face overfishing by larger vessels and inadequate regulation of fishing activities. And Yasmine Ahmed Hafez of SOAS University of London noted that at Lake Victoria, strict quota systems and environmental conservation measures exacerbate the negative impacts, limiting their access to certain areas and types of fish.

Climate and anthropogenic change is fundamentally changing how small-scale fisheries are operating.

 

The combination of climate and anthropogenic impacts on these water bodies lead to fundamental changes in the practices and livelihoods of small-scale fisheries. They are unable to maintain the same level of fishing in quantity and quality as they did previously and have to go further offshore in vessels that are ill suited to withstanding harsher conditions, risking their lives. These changes often affect their practices, income, and food sovereignty.

For instance, fishing communities must adapt to unfamiliar species, such as the invasive round goby in the Eastern Baltic Sea. Guntra Aistara of the Central European University talked about how such invasive species transition from being perceived as threats to becoming a valuable food source. It exemplifies how communities rapidly recognize their nutritional and social significance.

By sharing their skills, knowledge, and technology with each other, fishers are learning more about adapting.

Many of the case studies discussed during the workshop highlighted the exchange of knowledge and technology as a key adaptation strategy. Workshop participants drew on their research to discuss its definition and the ways in which it manifests. Artisanal fisheries in the Caspian Sea for example adapted to change through collective initiatives; these include pooling resources to acquire affordable technologies like GPS trackers and life vests, which facilitates navigation in deeper waters, and sharing skills, for example teaching others how to swim and how to repair and refurbish old technology and boats.

Along the Caspian coast, communication platforms and tools such as WhatsApp groups and gatherings at tea houses (cayxanas) served as a way of sharing information on weather events, fish migration patterns, and recipes for preparing fish previously considered “poor man’s food”. Aistara noted that fishers from the Eastern Baltic and Caspian Seas share a Soviet history that enable them to compare adaptation strategies. Both groups have adapted to the new conditions of the seas by becoming skilled in repairing, constructing, and repurposing materials and other existing technologies.

Knowledge- and technology-sharing practices are influenced by social norms and values.

Such cases reveal that while knowledge and technology sharing are widespread, these practices are influenced by community social norms and values. In specific communities, people for example uphold and respect territorial boundaries agreed upon by fishers and refrain from crossing into each other’s parts of the sea, even if it means catching fewer fish.

Ahmed Hafez highlighted the bottom-up adaptation process taking place at Lake Victoria and Egypt’s Nile Delta by reflecting on internal dynamics that (re)shape social norms and values such as race, migration, and gender. She explicitly focused on patriarchal norms, as men in the communities mostly dominate fisheries. Iddrisu Amadu and Ingrid Boas of Wageningen University & Research talked about how nomadic Fante fishing communities in Senegal and Gambia are adapting, focusing on the entanglements between social and material elements across land-sea spaces (1). They also stressed that mobilities and their challenging encounters within fisheries during adaptation transcend fixed land-sea boundaries.

Traditional knowledge driving local adaptation needs to be incorporated into official adaptation strategies.

Artisanal fishers in Bahia have successfully adapted technologies, actively using advanced GPS technology and various nets combined with traditional knowledge to navigate changing waters. Renck observed that the significance of adaptation to fishing communities (in Siribinha and Poças) extends beyond preserving fisheries; they are also actively involved in mangrove preservation initiatives in Brazil. Workshop participants agreed that documenting and incorporating the traditional knowledge of local fishers into adaptation strategies is of critical importance for fostering a dialogue between scientific and indigenous and local knowledge systems amidst environmental and anthropogenic changes.

Contextual factors have a bearing on collaboration but does not prevent it.

In several fishing communities, collaboration among fishers is facilitated or constrained by the geographical, political, legal, technological, cultural, and social context they live in.  Cornelie Quist of the International Collective in Support of Fishworkers (ICSF) for example shared that despite their diversity, artisanal fishing communities have mobilised nationally and globally in manifold ways to push for recognition and prompt political change through policies and treaties. The most significant achievement in this respect is the endorsement in 2014 of the International Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Alleviation following their lobbying efforts. Quist noted that these guidelines are important for promoting a human rights approach in fisheries policies.

Fishers are adapting, but what does the future hold?

A critical reflection followed on the limitations of adaptation to climate change. Participants highlighted unease among fishers in the adaptation process, particularly because of its high costs for artisanal fisheries already unacknowledged by governance regimes and crowded out by industrial aqua fisheries. And despite pooling resources, adaptation through technology and collective action is only sometimes feasible due to ecological and governance limitations.

For instance, at Lake Victoria and in the Nile Delta, artisanal fishers are forced to abandon their fishing grounds due to resource depletion and relocate further along the river. Similarly, in the case of the Caspian Sea, some artisanal fishers have abandoned their vessels and have become taxi drivers to provide for their families. Joeri Scholtens of the University of Amsterdam commented that fishers working in the Indian Ocean are subjected to a shrinking space for adaptation, with smaller fisheries being outcompeted by bigger industrial vessels.

Additionally, adaptation practices are influenced and disrupted by evolving border regulations and stricter governmental policies prioritising environmental preservation or industrial activities, such as imposing quotas, fines, and territorial markings. Scholtens demonstrated how the Indian government’s Blue Revolution and Blue Economy policies from 1960 to 2020 squeezed out many of the small fisheries and reinforced the pre-existing vulnerabilities of these groups.

We need to work towards preserving traditional knowledge systems and better understanding and recognising their role in modern adaptation strategies.

All in all, the workshop sparked extensive discussions and highlighted the cultural, economic, and social importance of artisanal fishing. Moreover, it highlighted the significance of fishers’ knowledge in addressing the challenges posed by climate and anthropogenic change. The conversation also discussed the interplay between moral and legal boundaries and associated imaginaries. As Aistara aptly summarised, the future holds manifold uncertainties for artisanal fishing, influenced by climate and economic changes and conditioned by political regimes and internal dynamics.

(1) This case explored the intricate ways that fluid relations binding mobile fishery practices (including women involved in market and land practices) of the Fante on land and sea in a transnational context enable adaptive strategies, challenging conventional understandings of cross-border land and sea-based fishery mobilities.

 

We would like to thank all participants for their thoughtful and engaging contributions:

  • Callie Berman (PhDResearcher, Cambridge University);
  • Cornelie Quist (Sociologist; Member of the International Collective in Support of Fishworkers);
  • Guntra Aistara (Associate Professor, Department of Environmental Sciences and Policy, Central European University);
  • Ilaha Abasli and Nina Swen (PhD researchers, International Institute of Social Studies);
  • Joeri Scholtens (Assistant Professor, Department of Geography, Planning and International Development Studies, University of Amsterdam);
  • Ingrid Boas and Iddrisu Amadu (respectively Associate Professor and PhD researcher, Environmental Policy Group at Wageningen University);
  • Matteo Lattuada (Post-Doctoral researcher, Technische Universität Braunschweig);
  • Oane Visser (Associate Professor, International Institute of Social Studies);
  • Per Knutsson (Senior Lecturer, Director of Center for Sea and Society, University of Gothenburg).
  • Vitor Renck ( Post-Doctoral researcher, Federal University of São Paulo and Wageningen University); and
  • Yasmine Ahmed Hafez (PhD researcher, SOAS University of London).

List of presentations:

Abasli, I., N. Swen, N & O. Visser (2023) ‘Climate change in  Caspian Sea, small-fisheries and climate adaptation’. Presentation at the ISS Workshop ‘Artisanal Fisheries, Climate Change and Knowledge for Adaptation Workshop’, 8 December 2023.

Ahmed Hafez, Y. (2023) ‘A lakeview on Nile politics: A socio-environmental analysis of fishing in Lake Victoria and the Egyptian Delta lakes’. Presentation at the ISS Workshop ‘Artisanal Fisheries, Climate Change and Knowledge for Adaptation Workshop’, 8 December 2023.

Aistara, G. (2023) ‘ “The ugly guest who’s come to stay”. Round Goby from foe to food on the Eastern Baltic Coast’. Presentation at the ISS Workshop ‘Artisanal Fisheries, Climate Change and Knowledge for Adaptation Workshop’, 8 December 2023.

Amadu, I. and I. Boas ( 2023) ‘Fisherfolk navigating west African borderland in the context of changing environments’. Presentation at the ISS Workshop ‘Artisanal Fisheries, Climate Change and Knowledge for Adaptation Workshop’, 8 December 2023.

Quist, C. (2023). Roundtable Discussion, ‘Artisanal Fisheries, Climate Change and Knowledge for Adaptation Workshop’, 8 December 2023.

Renck, V. (2023) ‘Varieties of expertise in local communities. Insights from artisanal fishing villages in Brazil’. Presentation at the ISS Workshop ‘Artisanal Fisheries, Climate Change and Knowledge for Adaptation Workshop’, 8 December 2023.

Scholtens, J. (2023) ‘Blue revolutions, shrinking spaces and adaptation of small- scale fishers in the Indian Ocean Region.’ Presentation at the ISS Workshop ‘Artisanal Fisheries, Climate Change and Knowledge for Adaptation Workshop’, 8 December 2023.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the authors:

                                                                          

Oane Visser is an associate professor, Political Ecology research group, ISS) studies the role of technology in agrifood and the environment, for instance in precision agriculture, greenhouses  and urban agriculture.

Ilaha Abasli is a PhD researcher at the International Institute of Social Studies (Erasmus University Rotterdam). Her research interests include the circular economy in the Global South, especially its social dimension, and fostering sustainability through science-driven and participatory policies.

Nina Swen is a Ph.D. researcher at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS). Nina’s research focuses on knowledge, technologies, and human-environmental relations in contexts of pollution and extractivism, with a regional focus on the Amazon.

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India’s Modi returns to power — but his victory is not as sweet as he’d hoped for

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Source: Made using Canva

India’s elections marked an unprecedented third term for prime minister Narendra Modi’s Hindu right-wing government. However, the victory was won by a narrower margin than expected, challenging Modi’s invincible image and signalling the resurgence of opposition parties. The electoral setback was driven by farmers’ protests and strategic voting by Muslims in crucial constituencies. This outcome could either embolden Modi to intensify his communal agenda and suppress dissent or compel him to moderate his stance due to coalition pressures, writes Haris Zargar.

In a dramatic anticlimax right out of a Bollywood movie, India’s voters have shredded Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s plans of a supermajority in the Indian Parliament as his ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) secured a third term to rule with a weakened mandate. The BJP’s seat share fell significantly short of both the predictions made by exit polls and the 400-seat target set by Modi before voting began. In the results announced on June 4, Modi’s ruling BJP secured 240 of the 543 seats in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian Parliament, falling short of the 272-seat majority required to form a government independently. In 2019, BJP had a clear majority with 303 seats.  

With the support of its allies, the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition, which amassed a total of 293 seats, is poised to form the new government. Modi’s political fate now remains in the hands of his two key partners, Janata Dal (United) in North India’s Bihar state and the Telugu Desam Party of Andra Pradesh in South India. The Congress Party (Indian National Congress — INC), principal opposition party and spearhead of the INDIA bloc, secured 99 seats, improving its 2019 tally of 53 seats. The INDIA bloc coalition secured 234 seats, making it strong opposition for the NDA coalition. 

The results are particularly significant due to the noticeable loss of support for the BJP in its traditional strongholds across India, especially in the bellwether state of Uttar Pradesh and the financial hub of Maharashtra. The electoral losses in these states, where BJP is regarded the dominant force, effectively breaks the perception of Modi’s invincibility and gives the opposition a shot in the arm that BJP’s hold can be challenged even in their fiefdoms. In Uttar Pradesh, which is ruled by the BJP and witnessed largescale state violence against Muslims, the NDA won 36 seats in 2024 out of 80 as against 62 in 2019, while the opposition INDIA alliance secured 43 seats. Likewise, in Maharashtra, NDA only secured 17 of the 48 seats while the INDIA bloc secured 30 seats.  

In this blog article, I show that the loss of power in traditional strongholds comes from the recognition that Modi’s polarising politics is witnessing a pushback from minorities, especially from oppressed castes and Muslims, who consolidated their vote in favour of candidates that are seen as viable opponents to the BJP.  

Pushback in Hindi heartland 

Modi’s hopes to return to power with a bigger mandate to reign with a sense of invincibility was rooted in his success in the Hindi heartland where the party traditionally does well. Modi, who has served as premier since 2014, is lauded by his Hindu right-wing supporters as a transformative figure who modernised the country and turned India into a global power.  

But his decade-long rule is principally characterised by detractors as turning India into an illiberal democracy and as a move towards an authoritarian regime. His incumbency has been marked by the brutal repression of political opponents and dissenters, by violence by militant Hindu nationalist vigilantes’ groups against Muslims and oppressed castes, and by the rise in communal rhetoric and Islamophobia.  

It is perhaps this surge in nationalist hate acts and rhetoric that has led the population to respond sharply, condemning Modi’s intention to quash the opposition and act against anyone that is not ‘traditionally Hindi’. It additionally highlights that Modi’s appeal as economic reformer with a developmental agenda for the country is waning even among the financially weaker sections of Indian society.  

A divisive poll campaign  

The electoral setback for Modi, 73, who has dominated Indian politics for over a decade with his communally divisive anti-Muslim rhetoric, comes against the backdrop of murmurs of his plan to push through the constitutional changes he yearns for to create a presidential system that would give him and his Hindu right-wing party greater powers. The opposition meanwhile pitched the elections as a battle to save the constitution.  

During the elections, the BJP’s campaign adopted an increasingly vitriolic tone towards Muslims. To consolidate the Hindu vote base, BJP leaders resorted to speeches laden with hate, dog whistles, Islamophobic tropes, and communally charged rhetoric. Modi himself made a series of anti-Muslim statements, referring to Muslims as “infiltrators” and characterizing them as “those who have more children.” 

The results reflect a growing dismay of ‘cult’ Modi. The BJP lost the key constituency of Faizabad, which houses the newly inaugurated Ram Mandir in Ayodhya, which was one of the biggest ideological promises in the BJP manifesto.  

A revitalized opposition 

The opposition INDIA bloc in contrast significantly gained in semi-rural and rural areas and received considerable votes from Muslims, Schedule Caste (SC), and Schelde tribes (ST) communities. The alliance performed better than what political analytics and pollsters had predicted. While its campaign was under considerable duress and faced unprecedented threats of raids or arrests by government agencies that have been weaponised by the Modi government to target its detractors and critics, the collective opposition managed an unexpected revival to challenge Modi’s election machinery. Often deemed as either fractured or in disarray, the opposition managed to set its own electoral agenda by targeting Modi and his performance rather than the script often set by BJP. The nationwide marches led by the Congress Party struck a positive note with the public.  

Farmers’ pushback 

Modi’s political mavericks’ persona moreover has arguably been dented by the protracted farmers’ protest that saw different landholding castes like Jats, landless agricultural labourers including Dalit and Muslims, and other agrarian intermediaries coming together against the BJP government. However, most critically, it is the consolidation of the Muslim voters, who have been facing the institutional violence of the Indian state and from the emboldened Hindutva far right, that has helped the INDIA bloc in several key constituencies. 

Little indication of change 

Although Modi has been re-elected to a third term, there is still little indication that his ruling right-wing party will shift its Hindutva agenda of communalism in the immediate future. The electoral loss may perhaps push his ruling BJP to sniff out any last opposition before the next elections, and we could see an escalation of clampdowns on opposition parties, civil society actors, the media, and minorities, who are deemed as eternal electoral foe of the BJP. It is highly plausible that Modi may double down on the implementation of a national register for citizenship and the controversial citizenship act that could render Muslims both disenfranchised and stateless.  

At a geopolitical level, Modi will continue its pro-America policy tilt, with greater trade and military relations with EU countries as well. Lastly, there is little indication that Modi will change his hawkish position towards his arch-rivals and neighbours China and Pakistan, which also means greater competition between Beijing and Delhi on seeking strategic influence in other regional nations including the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Afghanistan.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the authors:

Haris Zargar

Haris Zargar is a doctoral researcher at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) of Erasmus University Rotterdam, specializing in agrarian change, social movements, and Muslim revivalist thought. He holds degrees in Journalism from the University of Kashmir and Development Studies from SOAS, University of London. He has been a journalist for over 12 years, currently writing for the UK-based Middle East Eye.

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How a new conscription law is threatening everyday humanitarian action in Myanmar

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Image Source: Unsplash

The compulsory enlistment of young men and women in war-stricken Myanmar following the enactment of a conscription law in February this year is adding a layer of complexity to a society already struggling with human rights abuses and a lack of safety for civilians. The conscription order is systematically depleting the youth who are pivotal to everyday humanitarian action, thereby posing a threat to humanitarianism in a country facing a massive humanitarian crisis, writes ISS PhD researcher Hyeonggeun Ji.

Over three years have passed since the Myanmar military seized power, ousting the democratically elected government. Until early last year, the junta currently in control of Myanmar showed unparalleled power over the joint resistance force, which consists of armed organisations opposing the government that emerged from the coup. However, the junta now faces many challenges, in particular a significant manpower shortage. According to several estimations, the junta’s armed forces once comprised between 300,000 to 400,000 troops, but this number has now dwindled to approximately 150,000 due to desertions and casualties.

To address this shortage, the military on 14 February this year enforced a conscription order, targeting men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27. In mid-March, it started enlisting the first batch of civilians by mail, with plans to draft 60,000 people annually. The military authority announced that the first batch of 5,000 troops would be called to duty in mid-April; however, the actual number summoned remains undisclosed so far.

Young people are fleeing en masse…

The announcement has been met with resistance. Young people, unwilling to kill or serve in military, have been compelled to flee abroad en masse — a  phenomenon frequently portrayed in the media as a mass migration or exodus — to avoid conscription. And two people tragically died of suffocation in a crammed queue days after the law was enacted while trying to obtain visas at the Myanmar passport office.

…leading to the loss of youth in Myanmar society

This sudden flight of young people signifies the loss of youth in Myanmar society, both in the sense of youths become forced to be soldiers opposing civilians and by leaving the country altogether. Moreover, the military is continuously trying to label young people as the ‘worst’ enemies due to their active and potential role in anti-coup and pro-democracy movement. In this context, recruiting them can be seen as part of a broader strategy to eliminate the presence of youth from the social fabric by turning young people into soldiers. Concurrently, it is possibly related to the junta’s manoeuvre to politicise aid for its political gain — the military regime could cite reduced humanitarian activity as a means to render people more compliant.

The humanitarian crisis is being exacerbated…

This development is compounding an existing humanitarian crisis. The war is violent — a recent report by Action on Armed Violence estimates this ‘under-reported war’ resulted in 2,164 casualties due to explosive weapons in 2023 alone, and according to a UN report, systematic military violence against civilians had displaced 2.6 million people and had forced another 600,000 to flee by December 2023. War-torn Myanmar moreover is marked by humanitarian needs; 18.6 million people — one-third of the country’s total population — struggle with precarious living conditions, hunger, a lack of clean water, illness, and human rights violations. And the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has sharply increased to nearly 2 million people over the past three years. Military forces are even brutally attacking IDP camps, where unarmed civilians have relocated after their homes were attacked. Affected people are grappling with trauma.

The international humanitarian system moreover is facing multi-layered constraints, making it difficult for humanitarian aid to reach affected people. At the international level, the attention of developed countries, whose resources and decision-making power are essential, to the war in Myanmar is woefully inadequate, partly due to the country’s perceived lack of economic potential. In addition to the utterly inadequate scale of international relief efforts and a lack of funding, the restriction of humanitarian aid and a hostile environment for aid workers have also prevented humanitarian workers from assisting people in need. Meanwhile, the junta jeopardizes the neutrality of humanitarian assistance by requiring international humanitarian organisations to hand over aid resource to military authorities.

…but everyday acts of humanitarianism persist

Despite these frustrations and limitations, humanitarianism persists in Myanmar, with local people and grassroots organisations sustaining alternative humanitarian approaches through everyday acts of humanitarianism. For instance, teachers are continuing to teach, which can give children access to psychosocial services in emergencies while also preserving their right to education. Another instance is the crucial role of diaspora organisations in reporting the local conditions in inaccessible conflict zones and by organising fundraising activities to provide help in the form of emergency relief, assistance for IDPs, and education support. These instances represent mere glimpses of the myriad everyday humanitarian practices conducted by diverse local actors within Myanmar and along its borders, operating beyond the boundary of the hierarchical global humanitarian system.

The youth embody humanitarianism…

Along with continuing humanitarian efforts led by diverse local actors, young people in Myanmar embody humanitarianism in their everyday lives. The role of youth in humanitarian practice is not new but has become intricately intertwined with social norms and culture over time. Young men and women in the country lead and support the social affair groups that organise cultural events, weddings, funerals, blood drives, and various community activities within their villages. Through this social environment, the youth have forged the virtue of helping others in voluntary and collaborative ways. Their important role was highlighted during COVID-19 as they demonstrated capacity to raise funds and circulate health-related information within the communities when external resources were insufficient for managing the pandemic situation.

As humanitarian needs escalate while external assistance remains limited, the volunteerism, leadership, and unity embodied by the youth for humanitarian action are now more critical than ever.

…and their erasure should be countered

But the Myanmar junta’s conscription law presents a systematic obstacle to youth-led everyday humanitarian action and, consequently, poses a threat to humanitarianism in Myanmar. A recent report, Forced to Fight, underlines the emerging signs of young people’s apprehension about conscription, noting how these fears significantly impede their social participation and how their absence is acutely felt within the society.

Currently, the limited attention paid to the issue focuses solely on the security of the youth, which is essential for discussing the conscription law; however, it neglects the broader implications for people and the society. I contend that the conscription law should be recognised as an instrument of power designed to dismantle humanitarian action sustained by everyday practices of local youth in collaboration with other actors on the ground. The failure to respond appropriately to this critical juncture could push humanitarianism in Myanmar to the brink of an existential crisis.

 

Funding statement

This blog article is part of the work of the Humanitarian governance, accountability, advocacy, alternatives project funded by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under grant agreement No. 884139.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the author:

Hyeonggeun Ji is currently pursuing his PhD at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS). His research focuses on humanitarian governance for climate-related displacement in Bangladesh.

Hyeonggeun Ji

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Pandemics such as Avian Influenza and COVID-19 show that we need to overcome human exceptionalism to prevent another ‘catastrophic moral failure’ by Dorien Braam

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[vc_row css=”.vc_custom_1592900783478{margin-right: 0px !important;margin-left: 0px !important;}”][vc_column css=”.vc_custom_1592900766479{margin-right: 10px !important;margin-left: -10px !important;}”][vc_column_text]After the COVID-19 pandemic, governing bodies, research institutes, and health organizations around the world reflected extensively on our (failed) responses to the pandemic, hoping to identify lessons that can be applied to the governance of future pandemics. As various bird flu strains are spreading across the world, Assistant Professor of Social Sciences at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Dorien Braam reflects on gaps in the COVID-19 response and the need for a different approach to prevent mistakes from being repeated. Without understanding people’s behaviour and decision-making processes related to animals, it will be impossible to respond appropriately to the next pandemic, she writes.[/vc_column_text][vc_separator color=”custom” accent_color=”#a80000″ css=”.vc_custom_1594895181078{margin-top: -15px !important;margin-bottom: 10px !important;}”][vc_single_image image=”28825″ img_size=”full” add_caption=”yes” alignment=”center”][vc_separator color=”custom” accent_color=”#a80000″ css=”.vc_custom_1594895181078{margin-top: -15px !important;margin-bottom: 10px !important;}”][vc_column_text]Only four years ago, much of the world came out of its first lockdown after the COVID-19 pandemic swept across the globe. People hastily stocked up on essentials, found coping mechanisms to deal with isolation, and showed their appreciation for healthcare providers working on the frontline. Many people died; many more fell ill. At the time, the pandemic had a profound impact on us, changing our behaviour and views of the present, past, and future.

There has been much high–level reflection on the pandemic since then, for example about how we can prevent ourselves from making the same series of mistakes that led to the devastating pandemic and the significant loss of life, especially among marginalized populations lacking access to healthcare (something we wrote about in the Conversation in May 2020). The Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO) in January 2021 similarly remarked how our way of handling the pandemic as a collective can be seen as a ‘catastrophic moral failure’ with a profound impact on the world’s poor. In making this claim, he highlighted the impact of unequal access to healthcare, vaccines, and livelihood support. And now, our collective response to the current avian influenza (‘bird flu’) pandemic shows that we risk making the same mistakes we did then.

Novel, much more deadly pandemics

While some lessons may have been learned, there is increasing disquiet among professionals that the world has not learned enough, in the best case scenario, or, in the worst case, has blatantly ignored warning signs of novel pandemic threats, of which Avian Influenza (the H5N1 virus or ‘bird flu’) is currently the most likely candidate.

There is good reason to take this virus seriously. Outbreaks have occurred sporadically throughout the past century; however, the current pandemic has arguably been ongoing since 1995, when it was recognized that the ‘epizootic’, or outbreak of animal disease, dwarfed the bird flu outbreaks until then. In the past months devastating images from Antarctica have shown that the disease has now affected virtually every ecosystem in the world. Besides the risk to humans, bird and other animal populations have been devastatingly affected by the disease, including some species which are already struggling for their existence.

At the end of April 2024, an article in the Washington Post sounded the alarm: after two human casualties in the United States, the risk of a new, much more deadly pandemic seems to be edging ever closer. The writers mention the frustration among officials and experts that not more is done in terms of testing and data sharing, drawing parallels with some of the failures that occurred at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.

These conclusions dangerously ignore the fact that the disease has already caused the death of millions of non-human animals, in addition to 463 human deaths out of 889 human cases across 23 countries. Besides highlighting the geographic health inequalities through expressing only concern for human health in the Global North, they also ignore the realities of the biological interconnectedness of animals and humans whereby the majority of emerging infectious diseases are transmissible between animal and human populations. The result of this messaging is that animals are routinely blamed for disease outbreaks and are considered a disease ‘risk’, which ignores the fact that zoonoses spread largely as a result of human behaviour, such as through industrial intensive farming systems and deforestation.

The COVID-19 pandemic initiated the global revisiting of existing approaches to the interlinkages of animal and human health, strengthening systems approaches such as Ecohealth, Planetary Health and One Health, the latter of which earned its very own high–level panel consisting of animal, human, and ecosystem health experts. The panel includes social scientists as well, as the importance of including social science to outbreak responses is increasingly acknowledged; now this needs to become more pronounced within One Health approaches.

Towards a more inclusive approach

What we can learn from reflections about the COVID-19 pandemic — a conclusion that should be guiding our response to Avian Influenza — is that no-one is safe until everyone is safe, including marginalized populations such as animals; understanding our relationship with the animal world is key to responding effectively, as well as to developing intersectoral and transdisciplinary responses.

The negative impacts of animal and human disease are greatest in poor populations depending on agriculture and livestock for their livelihood; therefore, poverty reduction needs to be part of disease prevention activities. Facilitating testing for animal disease requires providing insurance and compensation to animal owners, who otherwise may lose essential livelihoods through diseased livestock. Most importantly however, industrial farming needs to be rapidly scaled down, which requires large-scale, and potentially costly, sustainable solutions for farmers. This will simultaneously address a range of increasing health challenges beyond the risk of pandemics, including the existential risks of anti-microbial resistance, pollution, and biodiversity loss.

Without understanding people’s behaviour and decision-making processes related to animals, it will be impossible to respond appropriately to the next pandemic. And without more drastic measures to increase interspecies health equality, it is unlikely that we can prevent or respond effectively.[/vc_column_text][vc_separator color=”custom” accent_color=”#a80000″ css=”.vc_custom_1594895181078{margin-top: -15px !important;margin-bottom: 10px !important;}”][vc_column_text]Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.[/vc_column_text][vc_separator color=”custom” accent_color=”#a80000″ css=”.vc_custom_1594895181078{margin-top: -15px !important;margin-bottom: 10px !important;}”][vc_column_text css=”.vc_custom_1719387091156{margin-top: 0px !important;}”]

About the authors:

Dorien Braam, PhD, is Assistant Professor in Social Science at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, and member of the UK Health Security Agency Rapid Support Team, as well as Director of Praxis Labs, a global research collective. Her research focuses on interspecies inequalities in complex emergencies, and she has conducted fieldwork with communities in Jordan and Pakistan. Previously, she worked with the United Nations, Netherlands Government, IFRC and NGOs across Asia, Africa, Europe and the Middle East.

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Medical Drones in Africa: A Gamechanger for the Continent’s ‘Ailing’ Health Sector?

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While medical drones can be lauded as game-changing health technologies that help save lives, and usher efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the often contextualized as fragile African health systems, Edwin Ambani Ameso and Gift Mwonzora argue that this is not the complete picture.

The sight of desolate buildings, makeshift health settings characterised by a shortage of drugs and machinery and demoralised workers is an enduring reality of African health care centres. Medical professionals staffing these under-resourced health institutions work under depressed morale. The deplorable state of the African hospitals and clinics continues to affect in large part the underprivileged and often impoverished citizens. To fill in the gap where governments are failing to implement the right to health, some non-state actors like the Melinda and Bill Gates foundation have perennially stepped up. Thanks to the presence of vertical medical programmes funded through the assistance of donor agencies like USAID, UKAID, GIZ, DANIDA, NORAD, CIDA and more, this has saved somewhat dire situations.

While such assistance has helped improve the healthcare contexts for citizens, most African states have been left with the solitary and unfashionable role of coordinating healthcare initiatives rather than providing health as a public good accessible to all its citizens. Critical to note, however, has been the endless political rhetoric by African elites seeking political office who entice the electorate with the hype of ‘Health for All’. Often such public pronouncements are not met with clear-cut plans for providing universal access to healthcare for largely underprivileged portions of global citizens resident in the continent.

These governments anchor their political promises to the global health agenda of universal healthcare delivery with lofty promises of leaving no one behind.  It is in such contexts characterised by fragility, shortages, stock-outs, postcolonial legacies of poor infrastructures, and more grounded structural concerns that we are witnessing a rapid uptake and use of digital health technologies, notably medical drones, to leapfrog the aforementioned challenges. Thus,  questions arise  whether the real and imagined futures of healthcare access in Africa can in the long durée afford and embrace medical drones as the future of healthcare delivery.

Against this background, there is a need for robust research on whether African countries need these drones. If so, to serve which health  areas and how successful  have they been in saving lives in areas where they have been utilised so far? If found ineffective, what should be done, and with what urgency, to remedy the situation? Issues of the procurement and supply chain management of these drones at a government level also remain critical. This is considering African government elites’ proclivity to flout tendering processes: a trend reeking of grand corruption schemes.

These schemes have birthed what others have referred to as the ‘tenderpreneurs’ within the African healthcare systems. Worth noting have been the cases of looting of COVID-19 funds and the subsequent inflating and overpricing of medical accessories among various African countries. How then do we guard against state-led grand heists and corruption clothed under the procurement of moon-shot medical technologies with lofty promises of saving thousands if not millions of lives in much of Africa?  We contend that to simply adopt such technology without also addressing the governance side in several states would simply be tinkering on the edges.

We maintain that even if African governments embrace the digitalisation of the health sector without a change of conduct all efforts will come to naught. Digitalising the health sector is ideal but seems to be favouring private players such as drone companies whose contractual engagements with African states guarantee their health funds cut. This then leaves the health care budgets skewed to the detriment of the whole health system where human resource deficits, stockouts, and ill-equipped health settings persist.

Africa’s New Era of Digital Health Technologies

To then celebrate the digitalisation of the health sector without the concomitant financial support of the sector will be an disingenuous act  on the part of African ruling elites who are failing as duty bearers to guarantee the fundamental right to health for all citizens. This is sometimes in ways hard to see if one is to swallow the populist narratives of ‘health for all’ spewed during election campaigns.

Currently, the urge to embrace these technologies as essential to meeting the World Health Organisation’s triple billion target seems to be a politically driven promises of precision health delivery.

Drones or No Drones: Time for a Reality Check

Today, more than at any point, unlucky children and adults are dying from kwashiorkor, malaria, and snake bites in remote areas in rural Africa. What should be done? Is digitalising medical health including access to medical care and attention the panacea to cure this malady

Numerous benefits of medical drones range from the facilitation of emergency medical supply delivery, rapid response to disease outbreaks, improvement of maternal and child healthcare, provision of telemedicine, and facilitation of remote consultations. These drones have also proved useful in other contexts in mapping and the surveillance of disease-prone areas. Further, it is observed that medical drones can also be effectively used in humanitarian aid delivery, especially on impassable roads. Others have even stated that relying on road traffic can only go so fast and so far. Undoubtedly, these drones are convenient for providing emergency relief and aid, especially in low-lying areas such as Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. These are contexts prone to recurrent floods and cyclones.

The Road Ahead

In the end, successful adoption twinned with sustainable use of these drones requires a multi-stakeholder buy-in. This will include the collaboration between governments, healthcare institutions, donors, drone service providers, the aviation industry, and local authorities.  Further, the buy-in (reception and acceptance) by the community is also paramount. It needs to be rehashed that without addressing the structural and underlying factors affecting Africa’s health care system, relying on drones alone as the magic bullet to cure challenges affecting the sector will be missing the forest for the trees. Medical technology needs to be anchored in a socio-economic, cultural, financial and political context which is not only permissible for innovation to thrive. The political will to stem corrupt practices, bad governance and other bulwarks that may militate against the full adoption and use of medical technology should be available. Absent due diligence, embracing medical drones in Africa without addressing the underlying structural, institutional, political, and governance factors will be akin to lofty ambitions of flying a kite where there is no wind.

This article was first published on EADI

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the authors:

Edwin Ameso

Edwin Ambani Ameso is a postdoctoral Researcher at Universität Leipzig, Germany. He researches on “off-the-grid”: Infrastructures, processes of spatialization, and drones in Africa. His areas of research include health insurance, social protection and welfare, digital health technologies, infrastructures of care.

Gift Mwonzora

Gift Mwonzora is a Research Fellow in the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy at the University of Erfurt, Germany. He researches on digitalisation, politics and the future of work in Middle-Income Countries. His areas of Research include development policy, digitalisation, governance, democracy, human rights, social justice.

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Delhi Diaries: The Dystopian Reality of India’s slide into Fascism

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India’s mammoth general election has started — a process lasting several weeks as nearly one billion people cast their votes. Sophia Miller recently visited India, witnessing both excitement and fear in the run-up to the election as Indians ponder a possible third term of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and of the Hindu nationalist ideology (Hindutva) he furthers. What will another term of an increasingly fascist government mean for India and especially for its Muslim minority?

Hindu-nationalism is coloring the city of Delhi in shades of orange

During my last days in Delhi the city is being draped in orange. The flags are flying from garlands criss-crossing busy market streets and narrow alleys, from almost all shops, from every lamppost along the slow-moving traffic lanes, from cars, from auto rickshaws, even from bicycles whose underdressed owners are shivering their way through the exceptionally cold winter days of late January. On the edge of the roads, vendors with handcarts sell the neon-coloured flags displaying the god Ram and an endless repetition of Jai Sri Ram, Jai Sri Ram, the background soundtrack to the temple inauguration that for weeks has seen large swathes of the population high on Hindu-nationalism.

The as yet unfinished Ram Mandir (temple of Ram) in Ayodhya is being built on the ruins of the Babri Masjid, a mosque that was destroyed by right wing fanatics in 1992. They claim that the mosque was built at the birthplace of the Hindu God Ram and accept the 2000 people that died in the ensuing violence – most of them Muslim – as a fair price to pay for clearing the area. After almost three decades of legal and political battles, the Indian Supreme Court ruled in 2019 that a temple should be constructed on the land. The judgment more than anything else reflected the decay of the Indian judiciary – the executive by then had long stopped even pretending it follows the secularism enshrined in the Indian Constitution. To quote Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s words from the temple inauguration ceremony: “Ram is the faith of India, Ram is the foundation of India. Ram is the idea of India, Ram is the law of India”. Defying Hindu tradition and angering more than a few senior priests, Modi chose to place statues of gods and perform the consecration rituals before the temple’s construction was completed, determined to milk the issue to the last drop in his bid for re-election in the general parliamentary elections in spring this year.

In the last general election in 2019, 37% of voters gave their vote to Modi’s party BJP, but with India’s first-past-the-post system this translated into a landslide victory of 56% of seats in parliament. With the state institutions firmly in his hand, the opposition bogged down with in-fighting or jailed, and any notion of an independent media gone for good, some polls predict Modi might score up to 10 percentage points more this time around.

“You shouldn’t have invested all that money into the house,” says Mahi* matter-of-factly, pointing to the air conditioner that’s proudly attached to the raw brick walls of the single room that forms Nadiya’s home. “The elections are coming, they will tear down your house and all the money will be lost. What’s the use?”

I have to blink, blink again, and stop for a moment. The year is 2024, the country India, and this is a normal Tuesday afternoon conversation between two of my friends. Welcome to Modi’s Amrit Kaal, the golden era that will supposedly see the country transform bottom-up.

Nadiya lives in a predominantly Muslim, informal and low-income neighbourhood not far from a busy metro station in South Delhi. There is a dispute as to whose land the houses are built upon. The state claims it belongs to the archaeological survey of India while the residents, some of whom have lived there for more than 30 years, who have seen children born, marry, and in turn give birth, claim it for themselves. In 1995, the government demolished the neighbourhood. The residents rebuilt their houses brick by brick, just to see them demolished again in 2012, and then once more in December 2022, with hundreds of families becoming homeless overnight each time. It was due to mere luck that Nadiya’s house was left standing this time around, and there is no way of knowing when the bulldozers will come back. While these demolition drives are not a unique feature of Modi’s government, they have intensified under his rule and are usually conducted in poor and/or Muslim neighbourhoods, often following rallies of the Hindu far right. They are indeed common enough to have earned themselves the nickname ‘bulldozer politics’.

 

People in the ruins of their homes in South Delhi, 2012.  Source: Author

Born into an impoverished family with 6 children, Nadiya has worked herself through government schools and universities to complete an MA in Hindi, has learned sewing, parlouring and other marketable skills in free courses along the way, and has amassed years of work experience as a teacher in underpaid NGO jobs. Now, having to look after her own son, she tutors children at her home, often teaching 30 pupils at once in a room that can’t be larger than 10 square metres. Working 8 hours a day, 6 days a week, she earns a few thousand rupees per month which she combines with the 12,000 rupees (roughly 130 Euros) her husband makes.

“Where would I go?” Nadiya asks when Mahi brings up the bulldozers again. “I can’t afford to move anywhere else. Plus, I grew up here, my whole family lives here, my son’s school is in walking distance. Tell me, where else should I go?”

Hindu nationalist ideology, or Hindutva, is built on Brahminism and propagates a type of Hinduism that is not representative of the incredibly diverse belief system practiced by Hindus across the Indian subcontinent. The BJP wants people to forget that Hinduism was never a unified religion but rather a collection of beliefs, rituals, and practices, the most unifying characteristic of which was for a long time that they neither fell under Buddhism, Islam, Jainism, Christianity nor any of the many other religions practiced in the region.

Hindutva followers stand against this diversity. They antagonise lower castes, tribes, Christians, the broader political Left, disapprove of sexual self-determination and women’s freedom, but most important of all, they hate Muslims. In the eyes of Hindutva supporters, Muslims should accept their place as second-class citizens, or, as a popular slang says, go to Pakistan.

The skyline with mosques and temples in the south of Delhi. Source: Author

Attending an urban upper-middle class wedding, it is almost possible to forget all these politics. The discussions centre on who is wearing what, how the bride and groom are looking, and what desserts are being served. Then an older man starts a conversation with me, a wealthy upper caste Hindu with an impressive moustache that seems to grow longer the more the talk drags on. When I mention that I come from Germany, he enthusiastically starts telling me about a box of knives he got as a gift from a German friend a few years ago. “They’re so sharp,” he says in Hindi, chuckling, “they don’t just cut vegetables – they could even cut a katua.”

Later, I learn that katua is a derogatory slang for Muslim men who have been circumcised. I also learn that the older man alone bought 1000 orange flags to decorate his exclusively upper caste Hindu colony for the Ram Mandir inauguration.

Among the 2019/20 protesters against the Islamophobic Citizenship Amendment Act, a law which would see fast-track citizenship granted to applicants from all major religions except for Islam, and which could contribute to stripping Muslims of their citizenship, there was a white student with a sign that read “I’m from Germany, your grandchildren will be very pissed at you.”

I think about it often these days. So many things I see in India are achingly familiar from what I studied at school, and sometimes I want to scream out of sheer frustration at how glaringly obvious it is that history is repeating itself.

I think of Berlin’s streets clad in swastika flags; of people boycotting Jewish shops the same way some Indians I know are now boycotting Muslim street vendors or maids; of laws banning kosher food or halal meat, restricting inter-religious marriage; of the prosecution of journalists, the imprisonment of political dissidents, the limitless surveillance of all citizens to make sure nobody will be able to escape; of the government forging and forcing a national uniformity on a territory that for the longest time was not one nation but the collection of various kingdoms in geographical proximity; of paramilitary ground forces like the SS marching in the street. Much like in Germany, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Hindu nationalists’ volunteer paramilitary organisation with more than 5 million members, has been practicing for indoctrination and pogroms. The RSS has dedicated branches for women and children and runs India’s largest school network. The second chief of the 100-year old organisation openly admired Hitler and asserted that India should treat her minorities the same way the Nazis treated the Jews. Looking at the country now, it seems there isn’t a long way left to go for his wish to finally come true.

I think of the government renaming Muslim cities, tearing down Muslim architecture, erasing Muslim contributions to history; of them rewriting the country’s history. I think of the fake news filling newspapers, TV channels, schoolbooks, WhatsApp chats. The lies, the endless lies. ‘We do this for the country. For the greater good. We do this for you’.

An Indian children’s book, published in 2016, that names Hitler as a great Leader among Barack Obama, Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, Narendra Modi and Aung San Suu Kyi. Source: Author

Is nobody else noticing? Does nobody else care? Nobody who matters, it seems, as countries and multinational companies keep doing business with India as if nothing is happening, exploiting its cheap wages, flexible environmental standards, and its government’s high demand for shiny new arms. It seems that nobody ever learns from history. (The Germans didn’t, for sure, or they wouldn’t be supporting Israel’s ongoing genocide in Palestine.)

Gaza has 2 million people, India maybe 200 million Muslims. Imagine: 100 times more spyware and arms to sell to a government that wants to get rid of them one way or another. In 2022 the Early Warning Project ranked India as the eighth most likely county in the world to see genocide. A recent poll found that almost half of all Indians said they were very much satisfied with Modi’s work. Sometimes I have nightmares of what they may do to Nadiya if they get the chance.

I don’t want to remember Delhi like that, draped in ugly neon orange, but the colour leaves an ugly aftertaste that doesn’t dissipate. Flying up and away through the layers of smog, I think of when I will return, and there is both yearning and fear in my heart.[/vc_column_text][vc_separator css=”.vc_custom_1713852542354{margin-top: -15px !important;margin-bottom: 10px !important;}”][vc_column_text]This article by Sophia Miller was originally published on http://www.tni.org under a Creative Commons Licence https://www.tni.org/en/article/delhi-diaries

A pseudonym was used in this article; the author’s identity is protected at her request due to the sensitive nature of the article.

Opinions expressed in Bliss posts reflect solely the views of the author of the post in question.

About the author:

Sophia Miller a project officer with The Transnational Institute’s War and Pacification programme.

 

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